

LEA

1-4, 19-25, 93-99.

RIOTS - GENERAL

A COMPANION TO ELEMENTA

7 JANUARY 1980 - 25 April 1980

JPL. DOKE PIONEERS 43 : A

U WOMEN.

PHRASES AND A VOCABULARY C  
V. ED.

AGE, AS SPOKEN BY THE TRIB

IF EVERYDAY ZULU USAGE.

LONDON — After the revelations in The Observer last week about the operations of Boss (or the Department of National Security as it is now called), its head, Mr Alex van Wyk, denied that Dons had files on any member of a recognised political party.

This is blatantly untrue, the Observer claims. Documents from Boss's archives, now in the possession of The Observer give the number of the file on Mrs Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party (Sic). That number is 24596.

In addition to political figures, files exist on nearly every important South African writer including Alan Paton, Laurens van der Post, Andre Brink, Nadine Gordimer and Renne Le Roux.

It also has files on virtually all major mining company directors, including Mr Harry Oppenheimer and Mr Tiny Rowland. More bizarre still, it has files dating from the early 1970s on President Carter, identified on the computer index as Governor of Georgia, Mr Cyrus Vance, Mr Andrew Young and former-President Ford.

It also maintains files on Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations.

Files on British personalities include Sir Harold Wilson and Sir Robert Killey, former headmaster of Eton and visiting Professor of Education at Witwatersrand University.

### 'Knoopgat'

Most of the mass of information filling the files comes from four faintly-named continuous operations:

● Operation Knoopgat (Buttonhole) is the interception of mail. Priority suspects have virtually all their incoming mail intercepted, and outgoing mail as well if it can be identified either from the



Helen Suzman . . . file number 24596.

velope or from the suspect's habitual use of the same post box. Failure to put the sender's name and address on the back of air-letter forms ensures opening. Occasionally an entire mail-bag is opened at random — the contents are photographed and returned.

● Operation Hanslam (Pet Lamb) is the tapping of telephones and telex lines, usually at exchanges where tape recorders are installed

● Operation Rystoel (Wheelchair) is the installation of electronic bugs, a favourite being a device that converts a telephone into a microphone which will operate even when the phone is not in use.

● Operation Ompik (Pick Over) covers a variety of rougher activities ranging from breaking into premises to photograph documents to fake muggings which enable agents to search a suspect person.

In contrast to all this attention on the white side observation of what

# Soweto uprising had Boss all at sea

South Africa's blacks has been at once patchy and obsessive.

## Agitators

The Soweto uprising on June 16, 1976, took Boss by surprise. Before then it was believed that nothing could stop the divinely ordained spread of Afrikaans and that any resistance was due to white agitators

Early in 1976, a meeting of all evaluators took place. Those present were asked to suggest topics for research in depth by Division J (a research division which was disbanded soon afterwards).

The idea was to determine what were the greatest threats to the security of South Africa. Only one man came anywhere near to being right when he drew attention to new methods of literacy training being used by liberal educationists to raise blacks' awareness of their disadvantaged position.

In the following months there were increasing

schoolchildren protesting against the requirement that half their courses should be taught in Afrikaans. In reality, says the Observer, their protests were against the poor standard of education they received from the Department of Bantu education.

But the growing dissatisfaction received little attention at Boss headquarters — Rhodesia was on the boil again, Mr Ian Smith had appealed to Britain for aid in finding a settlement, and the Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster, was going to meet Mr Henry Kissinger in Geneva.

Then Soweto erupted.

## No advice

The first telex reports started coming in just before lunchtime. At an emergency meeting the top brass tried to formulate advice for Mr Vorster but in fact they had none to give.

For some weeks, while unrest spread from one black township to another,

RIGHT: Mr Arthur Mc Given (seated second from left) on the Wits SRC in 1973, his second year as Boss informer. Another security spy was Mr Derek Brune (seated third from right) who declared himself in the 1976 trial against Glenn Moss (standing third from left) who together with ex-Nusas presidents Charles Nupen and Karel Tip were acquitted of charges under the Suppression of Communism and Unlawful Organisations Acts. The SRC president, Mr Adam Klein (seated centre), said during 1973 several students had told him the Security Branch had asked them to become informers.

culprits. At first it was suggested that the CIA had been running a destabilisation operation to put South Africa at a disadvantage during the Kissinger talks.

The spotlight was then turned on the Black Consciousness movement and efforts were made to determine where it got its ideas from. Among others, Stokely Carmichael, and Herbert Marcuse were read and discussed.

Meanwhile the Security Police detained one black student council after another, only to see immediate replacements appear, says The Observer.

It took months for Boss to understand that a whole generation of black students had come to think along the same lines. When it did so, it instinctively decided that there was a subversive network to be eliminated. This led to a "banning" spree.

One of the first victims was the largely white Christian Institute because it had encouraged black theology. Another



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World which had been publishing a series called 'People's College', prepared by the South African Committee on Higher Education (Sached) in an attempt to fill the gaps in the Bantu education syllabus

Sached received funds from the world university service in Geneva, and its Scandinavian, German and Dutch finance sources, including Government ministries, were considered to be "anti-South African."

The refusal to consider black grievances continued, reinforced by the convention that Boss must never embarrass other State departments.

### Ignored

Time and again warnings were ignored. A German lecturer in Sociology at the (Coloured) University of the Western Cape, Wolfgang Thomas, undertook research of the conditions in the squatter camps around Cape Town.

He even offered full assistance to the authorities in dealing with what

However, before this he saw as a crisis could be done the Minister of the Interior, Dr Connie Mulder, deported Thomas on the strength of an accusation from another lecturer that he was a trouble-maker, and a report by a young evaluator with only two months' experience

Thus, besides straining relations with Germany, South Africa lost the services of an expert.

Another German researcher, Theo Hanf of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, had earlier written about a number of problems perceived by blacks in Soweto. The attitude at Boss headquarters to Hanf's efforts was predictable

Who was Hanf? Who did he think he was, try to teach us our own business? Who was he working for? The Soweto uprising occurred just before Hanf was due to conduct another survey, so the problem of what to do about him could be shelved.

A Swiss organisation, the International University Exchange Fund

(IUEF), channels funds from organisations and Governments in Europe to educational and developmental bodies in developing countries.

IUEF funds played a major role in the projects set up by the Black Consciousness movement, which in turn helped develop a new mood of independence and self-pride among blacks.

### Dangers

As a result Boss started research into the dangers of community development over which the Government had no control. In-depth investigations have taken place into cottage industries, literacy courses, clinics and creches. Attempts have also been made to find out who is "behind" the IUEF, starting with the CIA and moving on to the Socialist International.

A second cause of concern is about Americans who become involved in the South African legal system. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCRUL) is a Boss

target Set up by President Kennedy as a counter to the far-left dominated National Lawyers' Guild, it has often provided defence funds in political trials, as well as sending observers to such trials.

### Target

South African blacks who are offered bursaries to study overseas are a further target for Boss investigations. No black is granted a passport until Boss has checked his background.

Keeping tabs on South Africans overseas is part of the duties of the two external operations divisions, Division C has men at embassies and consulates overseas. These are highly prized posts for both prestige and financial reasons. They are frequently filled on an "old boy" or seniority basis, sometimes with ludicrous results.

Thus in the early seventies a former head of catering was given charge of the Washington station, where he began by sub-

mitting reports about a fantastic new source he had recruited

The source turned out to be the editor of "political periodical know as the Intelligence Digest who writes long diatribes against American liberals and leftwing organisations and personalities and then backs them up with extracts from his own magazine.

### Blackmail

Boss also recruits South African Blacks who have gone overseas and got themselves into money difficulties. Once they have accepted money from Boss (receipts must be signed and photographs taken) they can be blackmailed into spying if necessary.

After the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola, Boss found itself without sources of information in that country to replace its previous co-operation with Salazar's Pide.

Consequently it was decided to set up a new operational division — Division V — for covert operations within black Africa.

Unlike Division C which uses the system of handlers and sources in the same countries, V adopted the more orthodox idea that the handler should where possible be placed in an adjoining country.

Operation Timmerwerk (Carpentry) is an intelligence pipeline through Botswana into Zambia.

Operation Indiaman reaches into Mozambique, using parts of the old Pide network. Its function is to spy on members of the South African Communist Party in Maputo and on East Europeans in reconstruction and development projects.



	W		A		C		B	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
0-1	0,51	0,54	2,10	1,24	7,00	6,86	19,69	19,83
1-4	0,04	0,04	0,21	0,35	0,75	0,77	2,58	2,48
5-24	0,01	0,01	0,09	0,06	0,08	0,03	0,21	0,23
								0,78

ALL CAUSES

	W		A	
	M	F	M	F
0-1	21,76	16,18	40,44	27,11
1-4	1,17	0,94	2,42	2,39
5-24	1,05	0,46	1,31	0,74
25-44	3,02	1,47	4,33	2,48
45-64	17,46	9,49	26,27	18,72
65+	73,62	54,55	92,20	82,93
ALL	9,44	7,40	8,03	5,51
NO.	19600	15374	2828	1967

CT. 25/1/80

# Survey shows literate blacks reject violence

Staff Reporter

**MOST** literate blacks in urban areas reject violence as a means of bringing about significant social, political and economic change in South Africa.

This was one of the findings of a survey by Professor John Simpson, director of UCT's Graduate School of Business, into attitudes of literate urban blacks towards South Africa's socio-economic system.

Professor Simpson found that very few respondents felt that violence was the only means of bringing about significant results and reaction from others in the interviewed groups where this was suggested "quickly indicated the belief that violence was futile."

The survey was conducted in Pretoria, Springs, Port Elizabeth, Durban, Johannesburg (including Soweto and other black townships) and Cape Town. It involved interviews with 230 people over two months.

Without exception, the respondents agreed that "blacks' views were not taken into account in any meaningful way in the determination of the policies of the country."

White attitudes towards blacks were perceived as basically hostile, though this was generally under the surface, hidden under a veneer of politeness.

Blacks saw most of the changes, for example multiracial restaurants and hotels, as

no more than mere window-dressing

On the subject of black leaders it was found that there was no leader who enjoyed the support of a wide cross-section and there were suggestions that potential leaders were either in detention or out of the country.

"Those are the people who have been banned, who are behind bars, who have left the country unwillingly. We are not interested in the Gatshas and the Thebehalis," was a typical response.

To a large extent support for suppressed leaders appeared to be symbolic and they were respected for the fact that they were suppressed rather than for their actual views.

Inferior education, was another area of major concern. It was felt that the education system was not nearly sufficient to prepare blacks for the job-market and education on the same level as that of whites was sought.

"At present blacks believe that a combination of white prejudice and lip service to the concept of equal opportunity, coupled with the real restraint of inferior qualifications, make it very difficult for blacks to achieve success in the workplace."

Professor Simpson concludes: "A major finding of the research was the remarkable consistency of black views irrespective of age, sex or geographic location."

	W		A		C		B	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1-4	0,49	0,21	0,31	0,27	0,68	0,38	0,68	0,12
5-24	0,71	0,22	0,68	0,20	1,40	0,38	1,22	0,26
25-44	1,18	0,30	1,43	0,37	3,32	0,70	1,10	0,31
45-64	1,25	0,42	1,55	0,40	2,89	0,76	1,02	0,53
65+	1,26	0,71	1,34	0,91	2,19	0,90	0,89	0,20
ALL	0,95	0,33	0,95	0,29	1,91	0,56	1,868	324
NO.	1973	677	333	104	2175	652	1868	324

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# Demand for 'unrest' findings

BLACK leaders yesterday demanded an immediate tabling of the findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1976 disturbances and described as an excuse the reason given for the delay by the Minister of Justice, Mr A L Schibusch.

In a Press statement yesterday, Mr Schibusch said the report of the commission of inquiry into the 1976 unrest at Soweto and other places might not be tabled before the second half of the coming parliamentary session.

He said this was because he only received the Afrikaans text of the report on January 21 this year and that the report

could not be tabled until the English translation was available in printed form

The chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten, Dr Nihato Motlana, called on Mr Schibusch to "issue the report without any further excuses"

In a statement to FGST, Dr Motlana said the accepted purpose of a commission of inquiry was to take an in-depth look "at a pressing problem by considering expert evidence from eye-witnesses with a view of producing a report as soon as possible."

He said: "This report must contain recommendations for the solution of the said problem. We find

it incredible therefore that an inquiry into the traumatic events of 1976 and 1977 are so ridiculously protected and the pressing recommendations so unduly delayed

"We, therefore now demand that the minister responsible for the delay, issue the report without any further excuses," Dr Motlana added

The suspended president of the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo), Mr Curtis Nkondo, said it was obvious that the authorities do not take the events of the 1976 and 1977 seriously.

Nkondo said the delay might be that the recommendations of the com-

mission did not need any attention. He said: "The fact that the minister says the report is in Afrikaans proves that it is intended for the benefit of the folk."

Mr Tom Manthata, a member of the Committee of Ten, said commission "was a white product to serve white interest". He said the commission was in fact meaningless to blacks.

Another member of the Committee of Ten, Mr Leonard Mosala, said the findings of the commission were outdated because blacks aspiration "has escalated far beyond the recommendation contained in the report."



# Soweto report delayed

CAPE TOWN. — The report of the commission of inquiry into the 1976 Soweto unrest will probably not be tabled before the second half of the coming Parliamentary session.

The Minister of Justice, Mr Alwyn Schlebusch, said this in a statement yesterday.

He said he had received the Afrikaans text on January 21, but the report could not be tabled until the English translation was available in printed form.

The statement said:

"From time to time inquiries have been made about when the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the unrest at Soweto and other places in the Republic during and after June 16, 1976 will be available.

The Afrikaans text is in the hands of the translators and it will not be possible to table the report before the English translation is available in printed form.

"It now appears that tabling can possibly not take place before the second half of the session." — Sapa.



## Keeping cool over the schools

THERE'S a sense of déjà vu about current events at Soweto schools, a feeling that we travelled down that road in 1976. Then the issue was compulsory instruction in Afrikaans. We still do not know for certain whether that was the root cause of the June 16 flare-up or the spark, although we can make intelligent guesses. The one-man commission appointed to investigate the causes of the unrest has only recently submitted its findings, and they are still not public.

It seems, however, that in 1976 the ominous rumblings in the schools were allowed to develop into full-scale riots partly because of pig-headedness. It was a case of irresistible forces and immovable objects. Bitter lessons must have been learnt from the mishandling of the situation. However, identifying the problems should be comparatively simple; providing overnight solutions is not so easy. Decades of an inequitable system cannot simply be wished away, however hard one may wish. Grievances that were first mentioned in this round of complaints included the

cost of schooling and uniforms. The Department of Education and Training has said uniforms are not essential and Senator Horwood, in a BBC-TV interview, hinted that more money was to be spent on black education. Surely there is a basis for compromise.

A new element in the pupils' grievances concerns the admission of adults or pupils who have failed. The authorities contend that the failures should make way for pupils coming up behind them in the already overcrowded schools and that grown-ups should attend adult education classes. Mixing children and grown-ups may well cause psychological problems, especially if the older pupils sense an inadequacy because they are under-educated. Nevertheless their schoolmates have declared a solidarity and the situation is sensitive.

The next two days leading up to the protest meeting scheduled to be held in Soweto on Saturday are crucial. Diplomacy and cool heads will be vital on both sides.



## 10.2 Economics of the Drug Industry

Brodie (Vol.2) shows that a large part of the ethical drug industry in South Africa is controlled by overseas firms. He discusses whether the high price of pharmaceutical products is related to the structure or to the practices of the industry. He concludes that, although there are no 'excess' profits, drug prices are unnecessarily high; and discusses

13. South Africa '77: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, p.650.
14. R. Roland 'Some Aspects of the 1912-1914 Tuberculosis Commission, B.A. Honours Essay, University of Cape Town, 1978. p.70.
15. *Ibid*, p.70.
16. *Ibid*, p.42.
17. *Ibid*, p.37.
18. Tuberculosis Research Institute, MRS, 1976 Annual Report, p.3.
19. See Harriet Ngubane 'Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine', Rev. I.A. ... and 'Zulu Thought Patterns and Symbolism', Monica Wilson

# POST

TRANSVAAL

Telephone 27-6081

## Do get that report tabled

MORE than three years ago the Government set up a commission of inquiry to look into the causes of the June 1976 disturbances that rocked this country and led to the death of hundreds of people.

We have now entered the 80s, but the report of this commission is still not ready. We have been told that it may not be ready for the session of Parliament which starts tomorrow because, apparently, it is still being translated.

This is what we were also told late last year. All the while concerned citizens of this country are waiting to hear just what blew up the country. It seems the Government is in no hurry to let the country know.

Meanwhile many people were smeared and branded, and accused of having caused the riots. We are sure that those who are innocent of such innuendos would like their names cleared. Until the Cillie Commission report is tabled, and the real causes of the unrest identified, those people have every right to be impatient.

Surely such a matter — which, as we said cost hundreds of lives — ought to be given priority. It is a matter which affects blacks deeply.

When the commission was set up, it was hoped that the grievances presented would be looked into, and something be done about them to avoid a recurrence of the events of that fateful day.

Dare we say that there seems to have been very little change anyway since June 1976? Dare we say that resentment and anger are still running high — dangerously so, in fact?

We appeal to the Prime Minister to step in, and engage every possible means to make sure that this report is tabled in the coming session of Parliament.

8. This is essential as difficulty in deriving a social welfare function.

9. National Health Services Commission Report (1944): Union Government No. 30: Pretoria: Government Printer.

10. V. Knutzen & D. Bourne, S.A.Med.J. G.ter Haar, 'Transkel and Ciskei Research Society Biennial Conference, Umtata, March 1978.

11. See, e.g. O. Gish & G. Walker, 'Mobile Health Services'. Trimed, London, 1977.

12. See 'The Village Health Worker', Ministry of Health & Social Welfare, Lesotho, Maseru, 1977.




processes is essential; and the division will have to be more fine the more discriminating public decisions can be. <sup>10</sup>

The results of programme budgeting may be valuable in themselves, although the mere procedure does not necessarily ensure that better decisions will be made. Their potential is realised only if there follows an assessment of the value of expenditure in each programme.

2.2 Programme Evaluation

Methods of evaluation range from simple procedures for looking at costs, where the conclusions are left largely to intuition, to highly complicated processes which present more or less clear-cut solutions. For these more precise methods, most of the value judgements have to be made explicitly in advance. Some points on the spectrum between these two extremes are analysed below.

2.3 Looking at Expenditure



Basically logical and social that on program a break may be on the fits of expenditure analysis seeks to formalise (see below). For example, if it can be shown that expenditure on preventive medicine constitutes approximately 2% of all expenditure on health, <sup>11</sup> it may be felt that the benefits from this kind of provision warrant an increase in the share of the budget allocated to it.

Unfortunately, such intuitive processes can pick out only the grossest incongruities which are recognised by all, whatever criteria of 'value' are used. The optimum level of expenditure on a particular objective is, from the point of view of intuitive judgement, highly uncertain, because of the wide variation in benefits attributable to a particular type of spend-

ing. This is partly due to a deficiency in information on the results of the programmes which can be resolved by recourse to appropriate data. Nevertheless, there will also be differences of judgement which cannot be resolved without prior agreement on the relative valuation of different benefits which have to be fed into the analysis; and in the intuitive process, these two factors may not be differentiated.

A very large proportion of decisions are now taken with no further analysis than this. Any further steps involve a way of systematically valuing the benefits of different programmes to render them comparable to one another.

2.4 An Informal Method for Setting Objectives

The following method for guiding the choice of priorities has been described by John Bryant. <sup>12</sup> It has been used by medical and nursing students in Thailand, and one of its advantages is that it can be used where no numerical data is available. It, therefore, lends itself to discussion, to draw on the experience of a group of people.

Potential health problems are first listed, and then given a score (from one to four pluses) under each of four headings:

Diagram 1: A method of ranking health problems

Problem	Prevalence	Severity	Community concern	Vulnerability to management	Total
Large & poorly spaced families	++++	++++	+++	++	96
Inadequate antenatal & obstetric care	++++	++	++	+++	48
Malnutrition	+++	+++	++	++	36
Need for medical care	++	++	++++	++	32
Specific diseases:					
V.D.	++	++	++	++	16
Dental problems	++++	+	++	++	16
TB	+++	+++	+++	++	54
Common cold *	++++	+	+	~	0
Yaws *	~	++	+++	++++	0

\* Added to test scoring method

# Cillie Commission

MR JUSTICE Cillie's report on Soweto, 1976 was at long last handed to the Minister of Justice on January 21. But it is in Afrikaans and must be translated into English and printed. So it probably will not be released until the second half of the parliamentary session. That means that close to four years will have elapsed between the appointment of the one-man commission, in August, 1976, and publication of its findings.

Even in a country where the reports of commissions quite frequently tend to take time before appearing, the Cillie Commission has proved to be a phenomenon: for speed of inquiry and reporting were surely of great importance.

With these lost, other events must inevitably have overtaken those being investigated.

The extraordinary delay in the commission's operation has other implications: Mr Justice Cillie has now been off the bench for nearly 3½ years; he is also now chairman of the Delimitation Commission and this job will presumably take him well into the year, keeping him away from judicial duties for still longer.

Yet, late last year, he was also appointed to the Appellate Division.

In all these circumstances, his elevation is bound to lead to comment.

is consistently worse than that of the whites. The 'coloureds' have higher mortality rates for all the major causes of death apart from cardiovascular diseases and neoplastic diseases in men over 65 years of age, neoplastic diseases in women in this group, and cardiovascular disease in men 45-64 years of age during 1960 and 1970. Clearly the rate of 5/1 000 which has been chosen is entirely arbitrary but a similar pattern of mortality emerges if lower or higher levels are selected.

Two aspects of these age-cause mortality rates require emphasis. Firstly, whilst being affected by the incidence of the diseases in question, these rates are also influenced by their fatality rates, for example, a decrease in the mortality related to Tuberculosis will not only be influenced by a decreasing incidence of this disease but also by improved prevention at the associated mortality.

the calculation of rates is taken into consideration the true care the actual numbers the total population, for a different demographic profile in Fig. 1, and this profile between 1941 and 1970 are, of little importance.

It is presented in Fig. 6. This is speculative and is to warrant inclusion. Two (1) e<sub>0</sub> - the expectation of life at 45 years of age. In fact, 'coloureds'. In fact, females have a better perhaps of some concern is males and females is widened and the 'coloured' community for whom Male:Female ratio is 1.9 years in 1970. For whites 7.0 years in 1970.

Both white and 'coloured' females have shown an increasing life expectancy at the age of 45, and although this has been small, it contrasts with the downward trend of both white and 'coloured' males.

Although it is apparent that the Expectation of Life at birth for the 'coloureds' has shown a marked improvement between 1941 and 1970, it is salutary to note that neither 'coloured' males nor females, at either age 45, have reached expectations of life in 1970 which are as high as the whites were in 1929. What also gives some cause for concern is that although the expectation of life cannot be expected to improve indefinitely, it would appear that the 'coloured' life expectancy is levelling off at a much lower age than has occurred in the white community.

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**Soweto riots: Committee examining claims**

\*2. Mrs. H. SUZMAN asked the Minister of Justice:

- (1) Whether the committee appointed under the chairmanship of the Acting Judge President of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court for the purpose of examining the claims arising out of the Soweto riots has completed its investigations,
- (2) whether the committee has made any recommendations; if so, what are the recommendations?

The MINISTER OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS (for the Minister of Justice).

- (1) Yes
- (2) Yes. I received the recommendations of the committee on 6 February this year. I have already decided to make certain recommendations and the Government will probably make a decision on the recommendations shortly. A list in which is indicated what claims were laid before the committee, and in which cases *ex gratia* payments are recommended by the committee, will be tabled.

Civil defence organizations

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CT 27/2/80.

# Riot damage to black schools has all been repaired — report

Political Staff

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. — All damage caused to black schools in the 1976 riots has been repaired.

Since 1976, the Department of Education and Training, which is responsible for black education, has made "special attempts" to upgrade standards "to a level comparable with those of other population groups".

As a result of the purposeful development programme by the department, which was also initiated in 1976, healthy relations with the black communities had been established, the department said in its annual report for 1979, tabled yesterday.

The department said security fences had been put up at about 150 schools.

"As a result damage to schools has declined drastically. All riot damage has also been repaired," the report said.

A further 48 new schools would be completed by the beginning of April this year.

During the 1979/80 financial year, 77 new community

schools, comprising 1 040 classrooms, a further 814 classrooms at existing schools, 37 laboratories, 25 libraries and 48 centres were erected.

The report said: "The department can rightly claim that the purposeful development programme which was initiated in 1976 to provide in the urgent need for school accommodation has resulted in the establishment of healthy relations with the black communities.

"Concerted efforts have been made to execute successfully the programme for the renovation and upgrading of existing schools and the erection of new school buildings.

"Special attempts are being made to upgrade standards to a level comparable with those of other population groups."

Good progress had been made with the planning of secondary-school facilities and this had made it possible to transfer a greater number of Std 6 pupils, from primary school to secondary school.

The report disclosed that the number of black matriculants was expected to top 50 000 in

1980 for the first time after a 117 percent increase in the number of Std 9 pupils in 1979.

The number of private candidates for matric had also increased, from 59 000 to 98 000.

The department said it was encouraging that a large number of teachers were busy im-

proving their academic qualifications with the aid of adult-education centres — 5 826 teachers were studying for matric, 1 514 more than in 1978.

By last year, 84 adult-education centres and 94 remote campuses or satellites had been created



# Cillie report

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tomorrow 246

CAPE TOWN — The report of the Cillie Commission of Inquiry into the 1976 Soweto riots is to be tabled in the House of Assembly tomorrow morning.

The Minister of Justice and the Interior, Mr Alwyn Schlebusch, will table the report.

Mr Justice P M Cillie was appointed as a one-man commission of inquiry into the riots on June 24, 1976.

The Star will provide detailed coverage in all its editions tomorrow of this report on one of the most traumatic events in South African history.

# Treurnicht may take a battering

29/2/80  
2:14  
**Political Staff**

THE Transvaal Nationalist leader, Dr Andries Treurnicht, could take a battering in the parliamentary debate on the findings of the Cillie Commission.

Dr Treurnicht was Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education when riots broke out in 1976. He was an important figure in the enforcement of a policy which, the Cillie Commission has found, was the immediate cause of unrest.

Although Dr Treurnicht escapes direct criticism in the commission's report, Opposition MPs can be expected to focus on the role he played in events leading to June 16 1976. They may accuse him of 'fiddling while Rome burned.'

## OFFICIALS BLAMED

A full day is due to be set aside for debate on the commission's report.

The commission blames education officials in Soweto for not having properly informed the

Minister, Mr M C Botha, and his deputy, Dr Treurnicht, of growing black unrest.

However, Opposition spokesmen can be expected to point out that dissatisfaction with the policy of equal treatment for Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools had received a great deal of Press publicity before June 16.

## ON STRIKE

Homeland leaders had been drawn into the issue, there was growing unrest in schools and persistent appeals from parents, while at one point in May, there were about 1600 scholars on strike.

Dr Treurnicht's attention was drawn to the problem by questions tabled in Parliament and a telegram sent to him by the director of the Institute of Race Relations, Mr Fred van Wyk, warning him of the dangerous situation in Soweto.

Only a few days before unrest broke out, Mr Percy Qoboza, editor of The World at the time visited Dr Treurnicht and appealed to him to suspend the language policy.

## DISCREDITED

Dr Treurnicht gave a reply which was the same as that given by the regional director of education for Soweto, Mr W C Ackermann, who emerges as a discredited figure in the commission's report.

Mr Qoboza recalls (and this is not mentioned in the Cillie report) that Dr Treurnicht said: 'Surely Mr Qoboza, if we pay for your people's education, then surely we must be given the right to decide what and how they are taught.'

Mr M C Botha and the former Minister of Police, Mr Jimmy Kruger, are also likely to come in for criticism for their departments' poor handling of a delicate issue.

# Coloured welcome

By Hugh Robertson

COLOURED politicians and academic leaders today cautiously welcomed some of the findings of the Cillie Commission's report on the 1976 riots.

But Professor R E van der Ross, Rector of the University of the Western Cape, which the commission described as having been the 'combustion point' of the riots in the south, said he felt it was wrong to generalise about the university's role.

## TOOK ISSUE

He took issue, too, with the finding that the riots had been the 'evil fruit' of planning and incitement on the UWC campus, although he conceded that there had been widespread solidarity at UWC 'with the cause of opposition to discrimination.'

Emphasising that he was commenting on only a general outline of the commission's report, Professor van der Ross said 'We should be careful about generalising in such a way as to infer that the whole university was involved in plotting and organised activity.'

'To my knowledge some of our students and staff were detained, but I can-

not recall any student or staff member having been charged in court with this sort of subversive activity.

'There may be a few people involved, but if this is so they should be brought to book in the courts.'

He added: 'There were a few individual cases of students having been involved in acts of violence, such as the stoning of cars, but this is a different thing from actively planning public disorder and deliberately spreading it.'

## ITS SUPPORT

'There was, it is true, widespread demonstration of solidarity with the cause of opposition to discrimination. It was out of this solidarity that violent action drew its support.'

The Leader of the Labour Party, the Rev Allan Hendrickse, said he did not support the 'singling out' of UWC in the report but felt that in general terms he supported many of the other findings.

'I appreciate the fact that the background causes to the riots have been identified for so long we have been hearing about so-called



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# cautiously illie report



Professor van der  
Ross

communist infiltration and influence and so one is pleased to note that the report underlines the effects of Group Areas, separate education, discrimination and the destruction of community life.

A point I would have liked to have seen made is that the younger generation which was largely

involved in the riots, as the first true apartheid generation which has grown up isolated from the whites and with no common feeling. They were reacting to the older generation's experience of dispossession, hardship and even death.

The chaplain of UWC, the Rev. Alan Boesak, said the commission was correct in pointing out the impact of the whole system of separate development on the coloured people and said this had led over many years to anger.

The riots were an expression of that anger. It is quite correct that solidarity with the people of Soweto was one of the main causes of the riots, though not the root cause. It was just the spark that let loose the anger.

# Cillie... Cillie... Cillie... Cillie...

# Grievances caused by apartheid

**Political Staff**  
GOVERNMENT apartheid policies and discrimination contributed greatly to the fuse of violence being lit in Soweto, the Cillie Commission has found.

Although the immediate cause was the question of Afrikaans-medium instruction in black schools, the commission's report lists a number of other grievances that to a greater or lesser degree added to anger and hate or provided fertile ground for incitement.

Among the factors named are some of the cornerstones of apartheid, such as influx control

The commission found that organisations such as the ANC, the SA Communist Party and the PAC played an active role in inciting and encouraging the riots.

The Black People's Convention's greatest contribution was to awaken black consciousness and solidarity.

Members of the South African Students' Organisation (Saso) were closely involved in incitement during the riots and organised unrest at black universities.

The Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC), which was a sub-committee of the

South African Students' Movement (SASM), organised the marches that first sparked the violence in Soweto on June 16, and was largely responsible for the continuation of unrest.

### 'Visitors'

Other factors listed by the commission as contributing to the climate of unrest included:

● The breaking up of families in urban areas because of section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, the 72-hour restriction on 'visitors' to controlled areas and the dominating manner in which white officials applied the influx control laws;

The report quotes a witness before the commis-

sion as remarking on influx control: 'Once you have seen a group of blacks with the hate they carry with them, one can understand why they acted as illogically and destructively as they did.'

● Resettlement caused by the Group Areas Act which usually affected a black or a coloured community. Dissatisfaction about Group Areas decisions were the direct cause of unrest in Stellenbosch and Mossel Bay.

● Opposition to the homeland system was sometimes reason for actions that led to unrest. Dissatisfaction about the policy led to frustration and opposition to authority.

● Urban blacks found they had no say in their own affairs, they feared the loss of their South African citizenship, they were unhappy about lack of home ownership and they felt the sting of discrimination.

Although none of these matters caused any disturbances, they created a spirit of dissatisfaction and resistance.

### Great hate

● Discrimination, not only by authority but by whites generally, not only caused dissatisfaction, but also a great hate, which was one of the most notable contributors to the spirit of unrest.

● The administration boards, which were seen

as unrepresentative law-givers, caused such dissatisfaction that black people were easily activated to riot.

● There was general dissatisfaction with housing, the wage gap, shortcomings in train and bus services and lack of everyday facilities.

● There was a lack of parental and teacher discipline over black children to curb their activities.


● A role was played by 'liberation movement' successes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and Namibia to engender the feeling that the blacks' 'hour had come.'

## Nearly 6 000 arrested

POLICE made nearly 6 000 arrests in the period of unrest from June 16 1976 to February 28 1977.

The commission emphasises the difficulty it had in obtaining accurate statistics but, according to the figures at its disposal, 3 024 people were arrested for public violence, 1 562 for offences related to riotous assemblies, 283 for sabotage, 818 for arson and 293 for wanton damage to property.

Of the males arrested, 56 percent were above the age of 18 — while 45 percent of the females arrested were above the age of 18



laws, and the hurtful way they are applied, the Group Areas Act, especially as it affects the coloured people, the homelands system, the rule of administration boards and the citizenship prescriptions applied to urban blacks.

## Those



# Cillie... Cillie... Cillie... Cillie... Cillie...!

## R45-m damage to buses, cars and buildings

THE total cost of the damage caused during unrest throughout South Africa which started in June 1976 could be higher than R45-million.

This emerges from the report of the commission which gives details of the staggering amount of damage caused in riots.

Biggest losers were the administration boards, which suffered damages totalling R29-million. The West Rand Administration Board alone suffered R6,3-million worth of damage.

The commission heard evidence that private persons and concerns suffered damage of more than R10-million.

By the end of 1976, a total of 599 buses had been damaged or burnt out, while 764 private vehicles had been damaged or destroyed.

### BOTTLE STORES

During the unrest, 114 beerhalls, 74 bottle stores and 124 administration board buildings were destroyed or damaged by fire. A total of 222 board vehicles were wrecked.

Many schools were damaged: a total of 265 throughout the country, with 158 in Soweto, 44 in the Cape Midlands, 20 on the East Rand, 24 in the Central Transvaal and 18 on the Cape Peninsula. Total cost of damage to schools was more than R800 000.

Damage amounting to more than R600 000 was caused in various homelands, while police suffered damage of nearly R800 000. Damage totalling R1,5-million was done to property belonging to the Department of Public Works



## News coverage did not spark unrest

THE Cillie Commission has found no evidence that any actions of the Press were directly responsible for the unrest.

It has, however, found that publicity given to the unrest by the Press and radio did impress some people so much that they could rebel as a result of slight provocation.

'The commission believes that the publication of riot reports in itself could have consequences which were not intended or desired.

Wide publicity was given to unrest and it appears from evidence that the news reports about the unrest were read in newspapers and heard on the radio by youths throughout the country.'

### RECEPTIVE

After considering all the evidence, the commission concludes that it cannot be said that the distribution of news about the unrest directly caused any unrest or helped it persist.

'The commission is, however, convinced that this distribution influenced young people to such an extent that they would listen to an agitator with receptive minds. They could even of their own accord have gone over to unrest as a result of another provocation.'

The commission refers to the difficulties involved in covering riots and says newspapers sometimes give different versions about the same event.

FLASHBACK . . . A woman flees a cloud of teargas as a canister explodes near Electricity House on the corner of Strand Street and St George's Street, Cape Town.



# SUBJENES OF PLUNDER AND DEATH

## evidence

ONLY 15 blacks below the age of 18 were among the 563 people who testified to the Chile Commission.

A total of 340 whites, 184 blacks and 39 coloured people testified to the commission according to statistics contained in its report.

Fewer than 10 percent of the witnesses were women.

The largest group of witnesses were policemen: 127 white, black and coloured members of the force gave evidence.

In addition to the 563 people who appeared before the commission, the chairman of the commission had informal talks with 44 people.

A total of 69 witnesses testified in camera, and the chairman of the commission ordered that the names and addresses of 48 witnesses who testified in public should not be published.

**PHOTOGRAPHS**  
The evidence of all the witnesses taken in 126 sittings came to about 9,000 pages. In addition, nearly 500 documentary exhibits were dealt with. These included photographs, banners, placards, letters, books and memorandums.

Copies of newspapers dealing with unrest were also sent to the commission. It also read foreign periodicals.

The commission also studied the 178 court cases which arose from the disturbances and reports of former commissions which dealt with matters relevant to its work.

**PROFESSORS**  
Among the people who testified were dozens of university lecturers and professors, school inspectors, headmasters and teachers, 26 journalists, 12 detainees, 36 administrators, 20 ministers of religion and many black political figures.

Only 15 blacks below the age of 18 and one university student testified.

The commission's report stresses the efforts which were made to attract witnesses.

All evidence given in camera was, if possible, put to people whom it affected.

der of officials by mobs and the shooting of scores of rioters.

It started with protest marches at 8 am on June 16, 1976.

The first white man to feel the black anger was Mr D D Smit, inspector of black schools, whose car was attacked near Jabu-lani.

He escaped with 'no notable injuries.' By 8.30 am huge crowds of schoolchildren bearing placards and giving the black power salute were moving through Soweto.

Soon stones were being thrown at police who had to retreat.

The first serious outbreak of violence that lit the torch took place at 10.30 am at Orlando West High School where a crowd of between 5,000 and 6,000 was gathered.

The report says: 'Colonel Klengfeld (the officer commanding Orlando police station) and his men were attacked with stones and it was not possible for him to address the crowd.'

The patrol comprised about five police cars, three heavy vehicles and two patrol vans with dogs. Four black men were busy melting the scholars. Among those present were adults and others not in school uniform.

The teargas used to disperse the crowd was ineffective. Only one teargas grenade exploded. A baton charge was also not successful.

The police were attacked from the flanks and could have been surrounded. Members of the police were hit by stones. Colonel Klengfeld fired five shots with his pistol over the crowd without any effect. After that he fired 20 shots with an automatic rifle in front of and over the crowd.

Other members also fired shots with their pistols and revolvers although Colonel Klengfeld had not ordered them to fire.

A black boy, H Ndhlovu, who incited the crowd, was killed.

Two police dogs were killed and mutilated by the crowd. One of the dogs was sprinkled with petrol and set alight.

Police vehicles were damaged by stones. Hector Peterson, a black boy, was fatally wounded by the police.

A woman reporter took his body to the Phomolog Clinic.

The death of the first official, Mr J N B Esterhuizen, of the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB), a few minutes later is described:

Mr Esterhuizen was travelling in his car along Khumalo Street when he was attacked by youths at the Phomolog Clinic. Pupils of Morris Isaacson High School took part

in the assault. Mr Esterhuizen jumped out of his car but was surrounded by youths and beaten to death in a side street opposite the clinic.

Rudging by marks on his clothing and body it appeared that attempts had been made to set fire to the body.

Members of the police travelled up Khumalo Street but did not see the incident, probably because of the chaos that reigned. Mr Esterhuizen's body could be removed only about four hours later.

Hector Peterson's death was probably the most highly publicised of the hundreds of deaths in the unrest which started on June 16. Many black people saw him as a martyr — a symbol of an uprising by black youngsters against a hated system.

The commission found there was a great diversity of opinion among witnesses over who committed the first violent act in that first confrontation.

After considering all the evidence concerning that morning's incidents, the commission cannot accept that the police used firearms when everything was still quiet and calm, says the report of the commission.

After an evaluation of all the evidence, the commission accepts the following on their arrival the police were taunted by the crowd which threw stones at them.

After the use of teargas the stone-throwing became heavier and Colonel Klengfeld fired two warning shots and called for reinforcements. When the police returned from the (baton) charge, they were encircled by the crowd and stones were thrown at them from all sides.

Because they were in mortal danger, Colonel Klengfeld tried to keep the crowd away from them with gunfire. Without him having given any order, his men also began to fire in a desperate attempt.

However, it does not believe that there were reports which were deliberately false or that there was any aim behind them. There is no evidence that family reporting was a direct cause of unrest.


The commission looked at a large number of leading articles and commentaries published in newspapers and found that those dealing with the unrest were usually marked by a sense of balance, impartiality and clear insight.

In two instances, newspapers hampered the commission in its efforts to obtain witnesses, but these difficulties were overcome.

It does give examples of what it judges to be inflammatory reporting. Both are reports on speeches. One was by the Rev Allan Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party, who said among other things that he could not condemn youths for their actions because he was proud of what they had done.

The commission regards these reports as inflammatory, but says it does not want to generalise and say that newspapers published inflammatory reports.

The commission does believe, however, that in some cases too much emphasis was placed on the grievances of black people, as important as they might be. The commission believes that some newspapers criticised the Department of Bantu Education and the police so severely that their image was damaged. However, it should be added, says the commission, that members of the public actively contributed to this criticism. It would be difficult to determine to what extent the newspapers' criticism contributed to unrest.



FLASHBACK — a cloud of smoke billows from burning fires in De La Rey Road, Ravensmead. Mobs built roadblocks and stoned cars when the Soweto uprisings spread to some Peninsula townships.

They were out of desperation and a young boy died

Police ignored the signs

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# Riots report out today

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## POST REPORTER

THE long awaited report of the Cillie Commission, set up soon after the riots in June 1976, will be tabled in Parliament this morning — more than three years after it was set up.

The appointment of the one-man commission was formally gazetted on July 2, 1976.

Mr Justice P M Cillie, formerly Judge President of the Transvaal and now a judge of the Appellate Division, heard evidence from various people over the unrest which swept the country from June to February of 1977.

### The findings

Since the appointment of the commission, blacks, in particular, have been waiting to hear what the findings are. This was particularly so with blacks and organisations who had been accused of having stirred up the unrest.

Mr Justice Cillie had appointed a number of advisers to help him. Among them were officials of the Department of Justice.

Early this year, it was indicated in Parliament that the report may not be ready to be tabled during this session of Parliament. However, the report will now be tabled in the Afrikaans version only, and the English version is expected to be published within the next few months.

POST will publish a special edition later today, which will be on sale as soon as the report is tabled.

Do not miss this special edition to find out what the Cillie Commission has reported.



FLASHBACK TO JUNE 16, 1976 . . . students during a march.



# Newspapers editorials found to be objective and balanced

By Tom Duff  
Political Reporter

The Cliffe Commission has found no evidence that any actions of the Press were directly responsible for the unrest.

But it has found that publicity given to the unrest by the Press and radio did impress some people so much that they could rebel as a result of a slight provocation.

"The commission believes the publication of riot reports in itself could have consequences which were not intended or desired.

"Wide publicity was given to unrest and it appears from evidence that the news reports about the unrest were read in newspapers and heard on the radio by youths throughout the country."

After considering all the evidence, the commission concludes that it cannot be said the distribution of news about the unrest directly caused any unrest or helped it persist.

The commission is, however, convinced that this distribution influenced young people to such an extent that they would listen to an agitator with receptive minds. They could even, of their own accord have gone over to unrest as a result of another provocation.

The commission refers to the difficulties involved in covering riots. Several newspapers sometimes give different versions about the same events.

But it does not believe that there were reports which were deliberately false or that they were any aim behind them. There is no evidence that any reporting was faulty.

The commission looked at a large number of leading articles and commentaries published in newspapers and found that those dealing with the unrest were usually fair, impartiality and clear insight.

In two instances, newspapers hampered the commission in its efforts to obtain witnesses, but these difficulties were overcome.

It does give examples of what it judges to be inflammatory reporting. Both are reports on speeches one a speech by the Transkei Consul, Mr H T Mponzi, who said, "I am proud of the Bantu education had been developed to keep blacks as slaves of the whites."

The other speech was by the Rev Abel Heald, leader of the Labour Party, who said, "I am proud of the Bantu education had been developed to keep blacks as slaves of the whites."

The commission regards these reports as inflammatory, but says it does not believe however that in some cases, too much emphasis was placed on the grievances of black people, important as they might be.

The committee believes that some newspapers criticized the Department of Education and the police so severely that their image was damaged.

However, it should be added, says the commission that members of the public actively contributed to this criticism. It would be difficult to determine to what extent the newspapers' criticism contributed to unrest.

## Police ignored signs of unrest? Apartheid led to violence

Soveto police ignored clear signs of gathering unrest before June 16 1976 and when trouble broke out they were unprepared in terms of manpower, equipment and attitudes.

This is among the findings of the commission. The first time the Divisional Commissioner of Soveto, Brigadier S W le Roux, heard that an exceptional gathering was being planned was early on the morning of June 16.

And in the first confrontation between school-ars and the police, several teargas grenades were thrown and only one exploded.

The commission says it keeps in mind how easy and unfair it can be to be wise after the event and to criticize police action.

But it concludes the police to a great extent were responsible for their lack of knowledge about what was being planned and therefore also for their lack of preparedness.

**DIFFICULT**

Clear signs of gathering unrest in the last few weeks before June 16 were ignored. The commission points to some of these and says:

"It is difficult to understand how a group of young people can prepare for three days for a demonstration by 15 000 or

more, without the police being aware of it. The commission is convinced that the police were not prepared for such a large demonstration.

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However, it should be added, says the commission that members of the public actively contributed to this criticism. It would be difficult to determine to what extent the newspapers' criticism contributed to unrest.



## Education policy was immediate cause

Government apartheid policies and discrimination contributed greatly to the fuse of violence being lit in Soveto, the commission has found.

Although the immediate cause was the question of Afrikaans-medium instruction in black schools, the commission's report lists a number of other grievances that to a greater or lesser degree added to anger and hate or provided fertile ground for incitement.

Among the factors named are some of the cornerstones of apartheid such as influx control laws, and the hurtful way they are applied — the Group Areas Act, especially as it affects the Cape Coloured people, the homelands system, the rule of administration boards, and the citizenship prescriptions applied to urban blacks.

The commission found that organizations such as the ANC, the SA Communist Party, and the PAC played an active role in inciting and encouraging the riots.

**UNREST**

The Black People's Convention's greatest contribution was to awaken black consciousness and solidarity.

## Group areas decisions blamed

Group areas decisions were a direct cause of a riot in Stellenbosch and set Bay in 1976, says the commission.

The general dissatisfaction among black and coloured people about group areas had definitely contributed to a state of mind that was receptive to a stimulus to riot.

In Stellenbosch coloured pupils had to evacuate their school because it fell in an area that had been declared white. The building was then apparently prepared for white children.

During the unrest the coloured pupils held a procession to the school and demanded that the school be given back to them. The police stopped the procession.

**STOOD EMPTY**

In Mossel Bay the commission had evidence that an old school standing empty had been an important factor leading to the unrest.

The school building was situated in the white residential area and was standing empty because the pupils had been transferred to a new school.

At the local coloured school facilities were insufficient and a request for use of the old school was refused. The report said that group areas decisions





throughout Soweto, and that the police should receive the first incomplete reports about it only on the night before the demonstration was to take place.

Police officers got information from two sources on the night before and the headquarters which had to correlate information only heard about it after the demonstration had begun.

"There was no plan of action for combating unrest and patrols had to be sent out to report on what was happening."

#### WITNESSES

Some witnesses believed the divisional commissioner's order that schools should be kept at their schools could have prevented the unrest, or markedly reduced it. But it was impossible to carry out this command because virtually all the scholars had already left their school's grounds.

"There were also not enough men to carry out such a command effectively."

The commission points out that most teargas canisters were defective. Dogs were also of no use on the morning of June 16 — in fact two were killed.

An officer in charge of the unit which confronted a large crowd did not have a loudspeaker and was unable to give the crowd an effective command to disperse.

When reinforcements, equipment and helicopters finally arrived, four people were dead, many injured and various buildings were in flames.

The commission does however praise the police for trying their best to preserve peace and for not becoming panic-stricken. It points out that they rescued many white people and at one stage herded a group of very young children out of a dangerous area.

Except for young urban blacks and a few other groups, relations between blacks and whites are now virtually the same as they were before the unrest, says the commission.

The commission has found there was an exceptional deterioration — especially in urban areas — of young blacks' attitudes towards whites.

However, the attitudes of black adults — if they had changed — returned to what they were before the unrest.

"With the exception of the black youth in the urban area, and a few other groups, the commission believes relations between the white and black races is virtually the same as it was before the unrest."

The commission did receive evidence that because the police had to enforce unpopular and irritating laws, any good relations which existed between the community and the police had deteriorated. This led to poorer relations with the white community.

The commission gives an account of the many appeals for changes to the policy, of early warnings by well-informed people of impending trouble, and of newspaper reports about the ferment in some Soweto schools.

The Regional Director of Bantu Education, Mr W C Ackermann, is portrayed in evidence that received in the commission's report.

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Evidence of bungling by intrinsigent Bantu Education officials who could not understand the rising anger in black schools in Soweto is contained in the report of the Cillie Commission.

The commission has found the application of the policy of equal treatment of Africans as a medium of instruction in black high schools was a prime cause of the black unrest which broke out on June 16 1976.

It criticises education officials in Soweto for not having properly informed the then Minister of Bantu Education, Mr M C Botha, his deputy, Dr Andries Treurnicht, and the Secretary of the Department of Bantu Education, Mr G J Roussseau, of the badly deteriorating situation.

The commission gives an account of the many appeals for changes to the policy, of early warnings by well-informed people of impending trouble, and of newspaper reports about the ferment in some Soweto schools.

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They were not in a position to warn the Minister and the Secretary of the threatening danger and could not supply on demand the important details for answers in Parliament.

The report says their actions did not to any extent contribute to preventing or delaying the unrest.

Even without contact, says the report, there were enough warnings to put the officials on time alert. Time after time there were problems with schools boards which ignored the policy.

Already from February scholars started trouble in their schools over Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. Various schools had boycotts of classes. At one stage 1 600 scholars refused to go to school.

Soweto leaders visited Home Land over education troubles in Parliament and outside questions about exemption and boycotts were put to the Minister.

The officials were asked for details, but advised the Secretary that

the history of attempts to enforce the equal use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools and points to the problems encountered.

There were uncertainty, misunderstanding and dissatisfaction over the grounds for exemption from the policy.

One departmental circular gave the impression that no exemptions would be allowed. This resulted from the words "where possible" being accidentally excluded from the English version.

was its attempts to make young blacks aware of their blackness.

The commission emphasises connections between the BPC and the Young African Students' Organisation.

Other factors listed by the commission as contributing to the climate of unrest included

The breaking up of families in urban areas because of Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, the 72-hour restriction on visitors to controlled areas, and the dominating manner in which white officials applied the influx control laws.

The report quotes a witness before the commission as remarking on influx control: "Once you have seen a group of blacks with the hate they carry with them, one can understand why they acted as illogically and destructively as they did."

Resettlement caused by the Group Areas Act which usually affected a black or a coloured community. Dissatisfaction about group areas decisions were the direct cause of unrest in Stellenbosch and Mossel Bay.

Opposition to the homeland system was sometimes reason for actions that led to unrest. Dissatisfaction about the policy led to frustration and opposition to authority.

Urban blacks found they had no say in their own affairs, they feared the loss of their South African citizenship, they were unhappy about lack of home ownership, and they felt the sting of discrimination.

Although none of these matters caused any disturbances, they created a spirit of dissatisfaction and resistance.

The administration boards, which were seen as unrepresentative law-givers, caused such dissatisfaction that black people were easily activated to riot.

Much of the trouble in

caused great dissatisfaction among black and coloured communities

ACT OF THEFT  
Dealing with the evidence given to it, the commission says group areas often meant that and it was usually blacks and coloureds who had to move.

Such moves brought about a loss of the right to own property. Urban blacks were the worst hit because they could not be houseowners in other urban areas, but the coloured people also felt angry.

The report says one of their leaders described the particular legislation as "an act of theft".

Resettlement usually meant that those who had been moved lived further away from their work and had to use additional transport.

Natal stemmed from work done by agitators particularly those belonging to the South African Students Organisation who had used the "magnetic influence of black power".

The Commission found there were numerous reasons for the comparatively low scale of unrest in Natal. These included:

The Zulus were a conservative, traditional nation who disciplined their children.

There were good relations between the Zulus and the authorities.

The influence of aid centres.

The influence of urban Bantu Boards.

Discussions between school principals, teachers and parents arranged by kwZulu officials.

The two people who died were both from Dundee. One Themban Madonsela (26), was fatally wounded by the police during the theft of a cash register from the Bantu Administration Board offices and the other, Petrus Zwaga (13), died after running into an anchor during a riot.

Biggest losers were the Boards, which suffered damages totalling R29 662 870. The West Rand Administration Board alone suffered damages of R16.3-million.

The commission heard evidence that private persons and concerns suffered damage of more than R10-million. It did not make its own estimate.

By the end of 1976, 599 buses had been damaged or burnt out, while 764 private vehicles had been damaged or destroyed.

During the unrest 114 beerhalls, 74 bottle stores and 124 Administration Board buildings were destroyed or damaged by fire. A total of 222 Board vehicles were wrecked.

Many schools were damaged: 265 throughout the country, with 158 in Soweto, 44 in the Cape Midlands, 20 on the East Rand, 24 in central Transvaal and 18 on the Cape Peninsula. Total cost of damage to schools was more than R800 000.

Damage amounting to more than R600 000 was caused in various homelands, while police properties suffered damages of nearly R800 000. Damage totalling R1.5 million was done to property belonging to the Department of Public Works.

The total cost of the damage caused during unrest throughout South Africa which started in June 1976 could be higher than R45-million.

The commission is reluctant to speculate about what would have happened if the secretary and the Minister had been properly informed.

However, it says: "But if they had all the information which they should have had, they could have evaluated the situation more accurately and then all the steps to prevent a tragedy would not have been excluded."

The commission reviews the history of attempts to enforce the equal use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools and points to the problems encountered.

There were uncertainty, misunderstanding and dissatisfaction over the grounds for exemption from the policy.

Other factors listed by the commission as contributing to the climate of unrest included

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# Black Consciousness meant black power

## 'Attitudes virtually the same' The same' by school officials

## Evidence of bungling by school officials

## The total cost of the damage

## Natal 'had less trouble'

An unidentified youth pours water over a tear gas grenade during the Soweto unrests

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African Students' Organisation (Saso) were closely involved in incitement during the riots and organised unrest at black universities

The Soweto Students' Representative Council, which was a "sub-committee" of the South African Students' Movement, organised the marches that first sparked the violence in Soweto on June 16, and was largely responsible for the continuation of unrest

The Commission's report says there were suspicions that somebody had set fire to a school in kwZulu to cover up the theft of school funds. Students at one training college set fire to the college because of personal resentment towards the principal.

A pupil set fire to a typewriter to avoid writing exams, while some pupils planned a fire to mislead their parents about why they had been suspended from school.

The Commission has found that the activities of the Soweto Students' Representative Council were among the reasons for the continuing unrest in black areas

The organised strikes which followed the riots did not achieve the aim of paralysing the economy or causing the downfall of the Government — in fact says the Commission, they were a total failure.

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By Tom Duff,  
Political Reporter

Police involved in the first confrontation with demonstrating Soweto students on June 16, 1976 found themselves in mortal danger and fired their guns out of desperation.

And it appears that 12-year-old Hector Peterson, who died in this incident, was killed by a bullet not intended for him.

These are the findings on two of the most controversial questions left in the wake of the first confrontation.

Hector Peterson's death was probably the most highly publicised of the hundreds of deaths in the unrest which started on June 16. Many black people saw him as a martyr — a symbol of an uprising by black youngsters against a hated system.

The commission found there was a great diversity of opinion among wit-

**Death  
toll was  
575 with  
3 907 hurt**

A total of 575 people died in the unrest which swept through various parts of South Africa from June 16, 1976 to February 28 1977, the commission found.

Police estimate that 3 907 people were injured in the unrest — 2 389 of them by the police — but the commission does not regard these figures as complete. It points to the difficulty of obtaining accurate figures because so many people were either treated by private doctors who did not keep records, or did not seek medical aid.

Of the people killed in the unrest, 494 were blacks, 75 coloureds, five whites and one Indian.

A total of 451 died as a result of police action and 124 as a result of the actions of other people.

Of all the 575 who died, 258 were killed in Soweto. The commission reports that 134 of the dead people were under the age of 18 and 431 were over 18.

A total of 137 people were killed in the Western Cape.

The commission says there were many difficulties involved in compiling a list of dead people. There was a fairly long list of people who died as a result of accidents or crimes which had nothing to do with the unrest.

However, the commission is confident that its

# Arson plunder and death

By Hugh Leggatt,  
Political Correspondent

Nightmare scenes of arson, plunder and death in Soweto are set down in the cold, matter-of-fact officialese of the Cillie Commission report.

The lawless days that shook South Africa nearly four years ago are described in detail on a day-by-day, hour-by-hour basis.

But the language of the report barely captures the horror of the chaos that gripped Soweto, and other black areas, for days and nights, the murder of officials by mobs and the shooting of scores of rioters.

It started with protest marches at 8 am on June 16, 1976.

The first white man to feel the black anger was Mr D D Smit, inspector of Black Schools, whose car was attacked near Jabulani.

He escaped with "no notable injuries."

By 8.30 am huge crowds of schoolchildren bearing placards and giving the black power salute were moving through Soweto.

Soon stones were being thrown at police who had to retreat.

The first serious outbreak of violence that lit the torch took place at 10.30 am at Orlando West High School where a crowd of between 5 000 and 6 000 was gathered.

## ATTACKED

The report says: "Colonel Kléngeld (the officer commanding Orlando police station) and his men were attacked with stones and it was not possible for him to address the crowd."

"The patrol comprised about five police cars, three heavy vehicles and two patrol vans with dogs.

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## Migrant workers opposed gang, but did not work with police

Allegations of collusion between the police and the "migrants" during the bloody riots in Nyanga at the end of 1976 are rejected in the report.

In the black areas of the Peninsula as a whole 37 people died in the December riots. The police were responsible for 14 of the fatalities.

The report lays the main blame for the riots on the "Comrades" group.

The commission finds that the fundamental and direct cause of the Christmas 1976 riots in Nyanga was the militant action of the Comrades and the young people activated by them.

The Comrades stepped up their campaign against

shebeens in the weeks before Christmas. They went to reputed shebeens, burnt down buildings and destroyed or sometimes drank the liquor and robbed shebeen owners of their money.

They called strikes and wanted to paralyse the economy. Migrant workers had to have police protection.

They prohibited Christ-

mas celebrations, humiliated migrant workers who did not want to obey and took away Christmas presents and liquor on the streets.

The Comrades ordered everyone to attend a memorial service on Christmas Day, but the migrants refused.

The migrants did not agree with the activities of the Comrades.

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**ILLIE COMMISSION**

# Shots fired because of 'mortal danger'

nesses: over who committed the first violent act in that first confrontation.

The most diverse points of view were the following:

● The crowd threw stones because the police had opened fire, as opposed to police opening fired because the crowd had thrown stones.

● Various witnesses

took up a position somewhere between these two extremes.

"After considering all the evidence concerning that morning's incidents, the commission cannot accept the police used firearms when everything was still quiet and calm," says the report.

"After an evaluation of all the evidence, the commission accepts the following:


ing: on their arrival, the police were taunted by the crowd, which threw stones at them.

"The processions or everyone who took part in them, were not peaceful and orderly at all times. It was an uncontrolled, or poorly controlled advance. Before the shooting, there was a fairly good public violence and it was highly likely that it would occur

again. "The procession was illegal and the police were forced to let the crowd disperse or to force it to disperse and later to curb the unrest."

Two youngsters — Hector Peterson and Hastings Ndlovu — were killed in this confrontation. Ndlovu, according to evidence before the commission, was shot when he charged a policeman.

The commission says that it appears that Hector Peterson died from a bullet not intended for him. It rejects an allegation that he was shot in cold blood by one of five black policemen in a car.



Weeping into a handkerchief Mrs Dorothy Peterson, whose son was killed.

White



# Most of the witnesses were SAP personnel

Only 15 blacks below the age of 18 were among the 563 people who testified to the commission.

A total of 340 whites, 184 blacks and 39 coloured people testified to the commission according to statistics contained in its report.

Less than 10 percent of the witnesses were women.

The largest group of witnesses were policemen: 127 white, black and coloured members of the force gave evidence.

In addition to the 563 people who appeared before the commission, the chairman of the commission had informal talks with 44 people.

## IN CAMERA

A total of 69 witnesses testified in camera and the chairman of the commission ordered that the names and addresses of 48 witnesses who testified in public should not be published.

The evidence of all the witnesses, taken in 126 sittings, came to about 9 000 pages. In addition nearly 500 documentary exhibits were dealt with. These included photo-

## Police were

There is no known case of a policeman who used a firearm during the unrest, being criminally responsible for the death of anyone, the commission has found.

The commission says there was considerable criticism of the police's handling of unrest. But it

graphs, banners, placards, letters, books and memorandums.

Copies of newspapers dealing with unrest were also sent to the commission, which also studied foreign periodicals.

The commission also studied the 178 court cases which arose from the disturbance.

It studied reports of former commissions which dealt with matters relevant to its work and obtained reports of relevant statements made in parliament.

Among the people who testified were dozens of university lecturers and professors, school inspectors, headmasters and teachers, 26 journalists, 12 detainees, 36 Administrators Board officials, 20 ministers of religion and many black political figures.

Only 15 blacks below the age of 18 and one university student testified.

The commission's report stresses the efforts which were made to attract witnesses.

All evidence given in camera was, if possible, put to people who it affected.

## diligent

of hand and this did not happen.

It adds that there might have been exceptional cases where a member of the force fired too soon or before he was certain that innocent people would not be hit.

"In these cases, as in many others, they acted diligently and purposeful-

# Unrest inquiry took 32 1/2 months

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The appointment of the one-man commission of inquiry into the unrest in Soweto and elsewhere was formally gazetted on July 2 1976.

Now its report has been tabled in Parliament — but so far only an Afrikaans edition is available. The English version should be published within the next few months.

Mr Justice P M Cillie, formerly Judge President of the Transvaal and now a judge of the Appellate Division, appointed a number of advisers to help him with his task.

## ADVISERS

Three people advised him during his investigations into the unrest in the Cape Peninsula. Mr J F Malherbe, an attorney, Mr D Ringo, a former teacher and now a public relations officer for a Cape Town company, and Mr P M Sonn, a retired headmaster.

Mr A B Colenbrander, a former Bantu administration official advised the judge on the Natal investigation.

A number of senior officials in the Department of Justice also helped the commission at various stages.

Mr Justice Cillie presided over the trial of David and Charles Porter, who were jailed for their actions in the Fox Street Siege.

He also heard the case

# Coloured people were dissatisfied

Bitter feelings among the coloured people about discrimination are highlighted in the report of the 1976 and 1977 riots.

The coloured people felt that most of their grievances were caused by discrimination.

The report says a large part of the coloured people had the following viewpoint:

"Separate development is the greatest cause of discrimination. The policy and the legislation laying down its principals and their implementation causes an unfair division between coloured and

white

"The community was harmed by such institutions as race classification, group areas and even separate universities.

"The classification is degrading they reject not only the word 'coloured' but also the idea of a separate coloured identity and 'non-white' is an unacceptable definition in the language of the dominant white group.

Separate group areas have caused misery, discomfort and damage to many.

For the student his admission to other universities is made impossible or extremely difficult and his feeling of frustration is aggravated by the paternalistic attitudes of some white lecturers.

As a result of the unnatural division of population groups being enforced by the white Government, the view has taken root that the white man has cast aside the coloured as a friend and a fellow citizen.

The affinity of earlier times had to make way for a feeling of being offended and of frustration and disapproval.

The coloured became anti-white and investigated the various facets of the struggle of the blacks. He linked up with the black community to eliminate grievances and obtain his rights through joint struggle.

The commission's attention was also drawn to the fact that rebellious elements, including the students, were often wrongly informed or had incorrect facts. Sometimes they had little or no information on a matter but they nevertheless believed that it had harmful discrimination.





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# Some police acted 'over-hastily' in Peninsula riots

The commission has found that police action in the Peninsula during the riots was not excessive or wrong and had not caused riots or worsened them, but it concedes there were over-hasty actions.

The report says the finding does not exclude the possibility that policemen individually sometimes acted more harshly than was necessary.

It is also possible that some pupils may have regarded justified police action as an invasion of their right to demonstrate.

In some instances, because of factors such as wrong appraisal of the situation and pressure, policemen had fired too quickly.

The report points out that fatalities were investigated by magistrates.

The commission made the following general findings about the police action:

● The police force had acquitted itself well of its task to control rioters, in spite of extremely diffi-

cult and dangerous circumstances.

● The policy of the police was to use only as much force as was necessary to restore order, to protect life and property and to carry out arrests. Exceptions did occur in some circumstances.

● The policy was to handle rioters firmly but not harshly. In this regard it happened that specific policemen, as a result of what the report describes as their "spiritual composition," had acted excessively.

● It was not police policy to shoot rioters summarily, and this did not happen.

● There were exceptional cases where a few members of the force, as a result of a wrong evaluation of the situation, excitement, exaggerated reaction, the pressure of circumstances and even fear, fired too quickly.

● There were several cases where policemen had fired before they could be sure that people not involved would not be

hit. This happened especially in the case where buckshot was used.

● Police action was not the cause of the first riots and violence in the Peninsula.

## Threats the main force

Intimidation was possibly the largest driving force behind the riots, the commission says.

"Even before June 16 intimidators were active and during the riots they forced people on all levels of the black community through threats or violence to take part in riots and insurrection in some way or another."

Naturally, says the commission, not all people who took part did so because they were forced to.

It cites evidence of intimidation in many parts of the country. Parents were intimidated in some regions, while school principals and teachers were frequently the targets of intimidation.

Attacks were also made on shebeens and shop-owners who refused to close their businesses during periods of mourning.

The commission says a marked aspect of the promotion of a climate of fear during the unrest was the intimidation of members of the police force.

The commission has found that liquor was a factor in the riots. About 20 percent of the people killed in the unrest had alcohol in their systems.

## 6 000 were arrested

Police made just under 6 000 arrests in the period of unrest from June 16 1976 to February 28 1977.

The commission emphasises the difficulty it had in obtaining accurate statistics, but according to the figures at its disposal 3 024 people were arrested for public violence, 1 562 for offences related to the Riotous Assemblies Act, 283 for sabotage, 818 for arson and 293 for damage to property.

Of the males arrested,


56 percent were above the age of 18 and 45 percent of the females arrested were above the age of 18.

From June 16 to August 31 the following number of accused appeared in magistrate's courts on the Witwatersrand: 348 in Soweto and Dobsonville, 154 in Alexandra and 426 on the East Rand.

In Port Elizabeth, Magistrates heard 95 cases involving 2 004 accused between August 7 and December 15.



**Two young men lie dead in a street near Mzimhlope station. They were shot by police after the group in which they were marching ignored warnings to stop.**



Four black men were busy inciting the scholars. Among those present were adults and others not in school uniform.

"The tear gas used to disperse the crowd was ineffective. Only one tear gas grenade exploded.

"A baton charge was also not successful. "The police were attacked from the flanks and could have been surrounded. Members of the police were hit by stones.

**DOGS KILLED**

"Colonel Kleingeld fired five shots with his pistol over the crowd without any effect. After that he fired 20 shots with an automatic rifle in front of, and over, the crowd.

"Other members also fired shots with their pistols and revolver, although Colonel Kleingeld had not ordered them to fire. "A black boy, H Ndhllo

vu, who incited the crowd, was killed. Two police dogs were killed and mutilated by the crowd. One of the dogs was sprinkled with petrol and set alight.

"Police vehicles were damaged by stones. Hector Peterson, a black boy, was fatally wounded by the police.

"A woman reporter took his body to the Phomolong Clinic."

The death of the first official, Mr J N B Esterhuizen, of the West Rand Board a few minutes later is described.

**BEATEN**

Mr Esterhuizen was travelling in his car along Khumalo Street when he was attacked by youths at the Phomolong Clinic.

Pupils of Morris Isaacson High School took part in the assault. Mr Esterhuizen jumped out of his car but was surrounded

by youths and beaten to death in a side street opposite the clinic.

Judging by marks on his clothing and body it appeared that attempts had been made to set fire to the body.

Members of the police travelled up Khumalo Street but did not see the incident probably because of the chaos that reigned. Mr Esterhuizen's body could be removed only about our hours later."

According to the report of Dr L. Al Federspiel, the chief welfare officer of Soweto, took place when he returned to his office after an open-air function for a new workshop, attended by the chairman of Wrab, Mr Manie Milder, and the chief director, Mr J C Je Vilhers.

At about noon he arrived at the youth centre. His car was already

damaged by stones. He ran into his office and locked the door.

"An official of Wrab, Mr R E Hobkirk, was trapped in another office in the centre. The stoning of the building gained in intensity and it was clear that some people in the crowd wanted at least to kill the white men in the building.

"They eventually gained entrance to the building, broke down the office door of Dr Edelstein, attacked him and dragged him out.

**MUTILATED**

"There was a short interruption in the attack when tear gas was thrown in the vicinity by a helicopter. Mr Hobkirk took the opportunity to flee.

"He saw Dr Edelstein's body in the entrance of the building and thought he was already dead. In

fact he was either unconscious or was pretending he was dead.

"He (Dr Edelstein) got to his feet again, but his attackers dragged him outside and eventually beat him to death. Shortly after 1 pm his mutilated body was removed by helicopter.

"Mr Hobkirk, who found shelter in nearby Sizwe stores, was brought to safety."

Among the scores of descriptions of anarchy in the next few days the following is typical.

"Thursday June 17, 0900. Five white members of the police force were surrounded and threatened at the Indingize Bottle Store in Dolosonville by a riotous crowd of about 500.

"After reinforcements had arrived, the crowd grew to about 1500.

Among them were many scholars and youths.

"The stoning increased. The police fired shots over the heads of the rioters without effect.

Three men and one woman repeatedly incited the crowd with gestures and the black power salute.

"The four inciters were wounded by police. One later died. The crowd dispersed and the police found two more wounded. The police were not responsible for their wounds."

Caught in the crossfire later that day were Mrs O Mithi and two of her children, Lily and Martha, who were walking past Diepkloof Hotel to Bagwanath Hospital.

"In the vicinity of the hotel the police fired on a

group of rioters (who had thrown firebombs into the hotel). Both children were hit by bullets, and in the case of eight-year-old Lily, with fatal results."

**LAWLESS**

The climate of lawlessness that prevailed is shown by a policeman's account of how he saw a man driving a Wrab tractor which he aimed at a house and jumped off before the tractor struck the wall.

The detailed synopsis of events runs for 347 pages of an appendix in a separate volume of the report. It covers the period from June 16 to February 1977 and shows how the violence spread from Soweto to hundreds of black areas around the country and in the home

lanas. The report is available from the Government Printer in Pretoria for R32.03.



# Treurnicht must go - Opposition

From Page 1

the commission's terms of reference did not include the making of recommendations, and because so few young blacks gave evidence to the commission.

"One is left with the impression that the commission seems to have taken pains to place responsibility at the level of officials rather than at ministerial level for the initial cause of the riots."

Only a few days before unrest broke out, Mr Percy Qoboza, editor of The World, visited Dr Treurnicht and appealed to him to suspend the language policy.

Dr Treurnicht gave a reply which was the same as that given by the Regional Director of Education for Soweto, Mr W C Ackerman, who emerges as a discredited figure in the commission's report.

Mr Qoboza recalls (and this is not mentioned in the Cillie report) that Dr Treurnicht said: "Surely, Mr Qoboza, if we pay for your people's education, then surely we must be given the right to decide what and how they are taught."

Minister of Bantu Administration at the time, Mr M C Botha and the former Minister of Police, Mr Jimmy Kruger, are also likely to come in for

criticism for their department's poor handling

KwaZulu Chief Minister, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, today rejected the main reasons advanced by the Cillie Commission for the low scale of unrest in Natal and said he found it "incredible" that Inkatha's role in stopping violence was not even mentioned.

Coloured politicians and academic leaders cautiously welcomed some of the findings of the report.

But Professor R E van der Ross, rector of the University of the Western Cape, which the commission described as having been the "combustion point" of the riots in the south, said he felt it was wrong to generalise about the university's role.

## Grievances eased since riots

Political Staff

THE ASSEMBLY — A number of improvements to the way of life of many blacks in Soweto have occurred since the riots, the commission says.

It was not within the commission's terms of reference to make a finding on whether the improvements were a result of the 1976 disorders

Nevertheless, evidence

## Apartheid injustice blamed

From Page 1

found that no actions of the Press were directly responsible for the unrest. However, publicity given to the unrest by Press and radio did impress some people so much they could rebel as a result of a slight provocation.

It found that leading articles published in newspapers were usually marked by a sense of balance, impartiality and clear insight.

The report will be discussed in the Assembly on Friday March 7.

of grievances had brought certain unsatisfactory conditions to the attention of the authorities.

Changes made since the riots included:

- Compulsory use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was scrapped.

- A start was made with compulsory education and free education.

- Community councils replaced advisory bodies and took over certain

functions of administration boards.

- Improvements were made in respect of home ownership, and in the financing, building and planning of houses.

- Arrangements were made for the provision of electricity.

- The elimination of sports discrimination was speeded up.

- Restrictive trade regulations were considerably modified.







ness and also that the scholars were being used as a so-called pressure group. They did not realise that the scholars were so dissatisfied and inspired that they could easily revolt.

### OFFICIALS

This approach of the officials had important consequences. It closed the door for communication, there was no exchange of ideas and the impression was created that the authorities were unapproachable and relentless.

Furthermore, the officials did not know what was going on and how implacable the resistance had become.

They were not in a position to warn the Minister and the secretary of the threatening danger and could not supply on demand the important details for answers in Parliament.

### WARNINGS

The report says their actions did not to any extent contribute to preventing or delaying the unrest.

Even without contact, says the report, there were enough warnings to put the officials on the alert. Time after time there were problems with school boards which ignored the policy.

Already from February, scholars started trouble in their schools over Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. Various schools had boycotts of classes. At one stage 1600 scholars refused to go to school. . . . homeland leaders visited Soweto over education troubles. In Parliament and outside questions about exemption and boycotts were put to the Minister.

By 6 am 18 houses had been burnt down and during the day another 77 houses and 15 motor vehicles went up in flames.

Young blacks broke concrete waterpipes with iron bars and used the pieces as missiles.

In the fights sticks, knobkerries, knives, pangas, garden forks, spades, iron bars and similar weapons were used. On that day 17 died.

Damage to the buildings of the Peninsula Bantu Administration Board amounted to R2 538 686. In the Bellville area the damage to buildings and supplies at 56 schools amounted to R548 677 and in the 80 schools in the Wynberg area to R221 644.

The Cape Town City Council suffered damage of R47 606 and the University of the Western Cape R98 200.

unrest which broke out on June 16 1976

It criticises education officials in Soweto for not having properly informed the then Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, Mr M C Botha, his deputy, Dr Andries Treurnicht, and the secretary of the department of Bantu Education, Mr G J Rousseau, of the badly deteriorating situation.

The commission gives an account of the many appeals for changes to the

policy, or early warnings by well-informed people of impending trouble, and of newspaper reports about the ferment in some Soweto schools.

### UNSYMPATHETIC

The regional director of Bantu education, Mr W C Ackermann, is portrayed in evidence given to the commission as being unsympathetic to black demands.

The regional director's



FLASHBACK: Pupils flee as a teargas canister explodes. But minutes later they reassembled and were dispersed a second time by police firing teargas from moving vehicles.

# 575 died, Police reaction 'not excessive', 3907 injured in unrest

# Abuse of liquor 'influenced' rioting

Political Correspondent

THE Cillie Commission has found that police action in the Peninsula during the riots, was not excessive or wrong and did not cause riots or worsen them, but it says that there were over-hasty actions.

The report says that the finding does not exclude the possibility that policemen individually sometimes acted more harshly than was necessary.

It is also possible that some pupils may have regarded justified police action as an invasion of their right to demonstrate.

In some instances, due to factors such as wrong appraisal of the situation and pressure, policemen fired too quickly.

### COMPLAINTS

On the instructions of the commission all complaints about police action were investigated by senior police officer, Colonel C v R Mouton.

One allegation was that the police had often entered school grounds uninvited.

so, provided teachers undertook to control their pupils themselves and to call the police if they could not do so.

At Salt River High School on October 6 damage amounting to R15 000 was caused, but the police were not called in, nor next day when the children continued their destruction.


In one case the police entered the grounds of a school only after it had become apparent that the principal could not bring his pupils under control.

### POLICE ATTACKED

The policemen were attacked and the commission found that the use of tear gas and batons were justified in this case. There were cases of severe provocation.

Proof could not be found for allegations that coloured youths had been taken to a police station and caned.

All fatalities were investigated by a magistrate.



According to the report, Colonel Mouton could not find a single case where the police entered such grounds in order to dampen riots without a request from a principal or a staff member.

One principal, who alleged that this had happened, did not want to give evidence or have his statement by him read out in camera and its truth could not in the circumstances be verified.

Schools were given the assurance that the police would visit their grounds only when asked to do

Political Correspondent  
EXCESSIVE use of liquor influenced the intensity and the duration of some of the riots in the Cape according to the Cillie Commission.

The commission is sceptical of the explanation that liquor stores were attacked because pupils resented their parents' drinking habits and because these stores were seen as symbols of an authority and policy opposed by the pupils.

### LOOTED

The report says rioters who attacked liquor stores and shebeens also looted and drank some of the liquor.

There was alcohol in the blood of the bodies of 39 of the 137 people who were killed in the riots.

According to police, most of the rioters who were arrested were under the influence of liquor.

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THE main cause of the riots in the Peninsula in 1976 and 1977 was a feeling of solidarity with the people of Soweto — and the students of the University of the Western Cape played a major role, the Cillie Commission has found.

The commission's report, which was tabled in parliament today, states that the efforts of coloured and blacks in the Peninsula to build up a community of interests, feelings and action with blacks elsewhere in the country was often obvious.

### The idea

According to the evidence, the idea of solidarity took strong hold on the students of the University of the Western Cape and they carried this over to other restless elements.

The report finds that the UWC was the 'combustion point' of the riots in the south.

From the UWC campus 'the inspiration, the incitement and the know-how of violence spread to all other teaching institutions.

'Thus the riots spread not only through the Peninsula but to other towns in the Southern Cape.'

### 137 died

From August 11 1976, to February 14 1977, 137 people died in the riots.

The report largely dismisses accusations of excessive police actions, but says that there could have been cases where policemen acted more harshly than was necessary.

It contends that the police were on occasions subject to severe provocation.

Dealing with what it regards as the root cause of events in the Cape, the report says that witnesses who gave attention to the matter said the feeling of solidarity was the main cause of the riots. They explained why coloured people who had previously identified with whites changed in such a way that they now regarded the black as a compatriot in the battle for improvement.

### Main reason

Although the possibility of outside influence could not be discounted, most witnesses thought that the main reason for the change was discrimination.

Among the factors that could have led to the continuation of rioting the detention of demonstration leaders and police action were mentioned as contributory factors.

Referring to the leading of news about the rioting which could have affected its duration, the report says that there is no evidence that any edition of the Press or individual newspapers was directly responsible for the riots.

Some publicity in the Press and radio could, however, have impressed

# Major role played by UWC students

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some readers and listeners in such a way that they could, as a result of a minor stimulus, have rioted.

The report deals with events in Nyanga in a separate chapter in the report.

Referring to UWC, the report says that on June 19 1976, the staff association to which coloured lecturers belonged issued a statement that the association stood by the people of Soweto.

Two members of Saso at UWC were called to Johannesburg by their organisation and returned six days later.

### In camera

In evidence given in camera by witnesses whose names are not being divulged, accusations were made against Professor R E van der Ross, rector of UWC, that his actions had created a climate of unrest at the university.

One of these accusations was that a circular to the staff could have created the impression among students that their boycott of lectures had the approval of the staff.

The commission found that, after considering all the evidence and allegations, it was convinced that the rector had not been responsible for any unrest at UWC and that he had, on the contrary, done everything in his power to combat it.

The report also points out that in spite of statements on issues, there was no evidence that staff members of UWC actively took part in the riots or incited students to do so.

Staff members had, in various ways, helped to subdue unrest.

They had also helped to protect university property, although they were sometimes in serious danger. Some lecturers were even assaulted.

There was also evidence that on September 13 1976 a few senior lecturers had called a small police unit to the campus and that peace was restored.

The report says the role of the students of UWC could not be underestimated.

Their show of solidarity with Soweto and the aims of the blacks made their institution the combustion point of the riots in the south.

After the boycott of lecturers the next aim was riots and violence.

The evidence showed that the rioting did not start spontaneously. It was the 'evil fruit' of planning and incitement.

In the three weeks from July 26 1976 there were six mass meetings and a number of demonstrations.

### Threw stones

For nearly two months boycotts, demonstrations, arson and attempts at arson were rife and when the students rioted they did not hesitate to throw stones.

One of their main weapons was a pamphlet, UWC-Soweto, which was widely distributed

Wherever the pamphlet was distributed riots broke out. After the pamphlet had been distributed in Guguletu, Langa and Nyanga — relatively quiet at that stage — riots broke out.

In Paarl and Stellenbosch coloured schoolchildren rioted after students had encouraged them to do so.

At the University of Cape Town, the report says, the action of students was limited to meetings and demonstrations and the distribution of pamphlets.

### Central city

In the case of coloured schools the general view was that teachers had looked on passively, but the Director of Education of the Department of Coloured Relations gave evidence that teachers systematically cultivated resistance among children. The children grew up with an aggrieved feeling.

A detective gave evidence that at the Salt River High School two teachers incited pupils by teaching the 'freedom songs' and by telling them to use violence when confronted by the police.

This witness also stated that four teachers from the school had joined marching pupils in the central city.

The commission found, however, that on the whole teachers rarely took an active part in riots.

The report says that in contrast to earlier examples, it had to point to the case of the Spes Bona High School where, under the then principal, Mr F Sonn, there was, with one exception, no rioting or violence.

The staff won the confidence of the children by showing them that they shared their grievances.

On one occasion discussions between parents and children solved the problem.

### The holidays

Other principals did a great deal to protect their schools during the holidays and others collected money from parents to have damage to the schools repaired.

The report points out that teachers were in a difficult position.

Had they given their unqualified support to the pupils they would have clashed with the law. If they had gone against the pupils they could have been subject to revenge.

Referring to the role of parents, the report says that the commission has no evidence that parents actively took part in rioting or incited their children to do so.

### They helped

Parents often helped to combat riots and to punish children.

The report also dealt with the difficulties coloured and black parents had in maintaining discipline.

One of the reasons given was that, because children had sound school training, they were often intellectually better developed than parents. In the home they therefore set the pace and parents feared confrontation.


Parents were often reproached by their children and others for not improving the conditions against which the children were rebelling. The guilt that was caused in this way undermined the ability to maintain discipline.

### The groups

According to some witnesses, parents were sometimes intimidated and were then afraid to oppose their children. The presence of skollies in the groups that took part in the riots made children cheeky, brutal and defiant.

Some parents, in the presence of their children, were addressed in a humiliating way by officials, the police and whites and in this way parental control was undermined.





FLASHBACK: Smoke from a teargas grenade rises in Adderley Street during the 1976 riots.

# Discrimination the root of grievances among coloured

## Political Correspondent

BITTER feelings among the coloured people about discrimination are highlighted in the report of the Cillie Commission on the 1976 and 1977 riots.

They felt that most of their grievances were caused by discrimination.

The report says a large part of the coloured people had the following viewpoint:

'Separate development is the greatest cause of discrimination; the policy and the legislation laying down its principles and their implementation causes an unfair division between coloured and white.

### 'DEGRADING'

'The community was harmed by such institutions as race classification, group areas and even separate universities.

'The classification is degrading; they reject not

only the word "coloured" but also the idea of a separate coloured identity and "non-white" is an unacceptable definition in the language of the dominating white group.

'Separate group areas have caused misery, discomfort and damage to many.

### PATERNALISTIC

'For the student his admission to other universities is made impossible or extremely difficult and his feeling of frustration is aggravated by the paternalistic attitudes of some white lecturers.

'As a result of the unnatural division of population groups being enforced by the white government the view has taken root that the white man has cast aside the coloured as a friend and a fellow citizen.

'The affinity of earlier times had to make way



for a feeling of being offended and of frustration and disapproval.

'The coloured became anti-white and investigated the various facets of the struggle of the blacks.

'He linked up with the black community to eliminate grievances and obtain his rights through a joint struggle.'

Other witnesses indicated what the report described as 'a shorter road'.

Dissatisfied coloured people who are said to have perceived an uneasiness among whites with regard to the rise of

the black found a new brother-in-arms in the blacks.

To this could be added that coloured people could have thought that the blacks were gaining the upper hand and would rule the whites and they therefore joined the blacks.

### RACIST

The report says that the coloured people are not at one in these matters.

Some feel that the black power concept is racist, aggressive and reactionary.

There are also those who think that the coloured people are a separate population group with its own identity.

The commission's attention was also drawn to the fact that rebellious elements, including the students, were often wrongly informed.

Sometimes they had little or no information on a matter, but they nevertheless believed that it hid harmful discrimination.



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**ALLEGATIONS** of collusion between the police and the migrants during the bloody riots in Nyanga at the end of 1976 are rejected in the report of the Cillie Commission.

The report, tabled in Parliament today, lays the main blame for the riots on the Comrades group.

The commission finds that the fundamental and direct cause of the Christmas 1976 riots in Nyanga was the militant action of the Comrades and the young people activated by them.

The Comrades stepped up their campaign against shebeens in the weeks before Christmas. They went to reputed shebeens, burnt down buildings, destroyed liquor, sometimes drinking it, and robbed shebeen owners of their money.

### Called strikes

They called strikes and wanted to paralyse the economy and migrant workers had to have police protection.

They prohibited Christmas celebrations, humiliated migrant workers who did not want to obey and took away Christmas presents and liquor on the streets.

The Comrades ordered everyone to attend a memorial service on Christmas Day, but the migrants refused.

The migrants did not agree with the activities of the Comrades.

The report gives as the incident that started the riots an attack on Christmas Day by a group of Comrades on a migrant's car that was full of liquor and the fact that another armed group of Comrades had in a provocative way gone to ask some migrants why they had not attended the memorial service.

## Blame laid on Comrades

...suring peace and protecting life and property.

The police arranged a dividing line, kept the residents and migrants apart, stopped fights and held peace indabas.

The report says the police did their duty impartially, in spite of personal danger.

The report specifically rejects serious allegations made against the police by the Ministers' Fraternal of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga in a report Role of the South African Riot Police in Burnings and Killings in Nyanga, Cape Town, Christmas 1976 and a memorandum by the Rev D. Russell, The Riot Police and the Suppression of Truth.

The commission points out that the clergymen stated that they regarded it as unwise to advise people to lay charges against the police because of the difficulty of identification and because of the lack of confidence in the police and the fear of victimisation.

Mr. Russell declined to disclose the identity of his informants.

### Outbursts

After this, the report says, there was more than one outburst — 'and the Christmas riots had begun.'

The Comrades and some young people were, more than once, responsible for the continuation of the riots as when, on December 26 1976, after a 'peace treaty' had been arranged, they went with a group from Guguletu to attack the migrants.

They also repeatedly attacked patrolling police with stones and petrol bombs and put up road blockades.

According to available pamphlets, the Comrades were strongly opposed to whites, the Government and Bantu education.

They also seriously disrupted school attendance. These aspects of their political views, the report says, did not contribute to actions which led to the riots.

The report also blames another group of Nyanga inhabitants, the residents, for the start and continuation of the riots, because they did not control or oppose their children or other militant youths.


They, in fact, protected the youths and became involved in fights along with them against the migrants.

On the other hand, the role of the migrants was not purely defensive. On several occasions they organised punitive and revenge attacks.

### Petrol bombs

Their actions, like those of other rioters, are described as 'sometimes merciless and cruel. They also fought with stones and petrol bombs across the dividing line.'

The police action in Nyanga over the Christmas weekend is described as being aimed at en-



- The police did not incite inhabitants of Nyanga to riot, did not spread incorrect reports about residents planning attacks and did not advise migrants to arm themselves.
- The police did not mislead migrants into thinking that residents would stop them if they went to work during a planned strike and did not train migrants in the making of petrol bombs.
- Leaders of police patrols sometimes used hand signs to call their men during the riots and migrants misinterpreted this as signs to come nearer and attack residents.

### Wounded

- The police did not point out wounded people on the ground or drag them out of houses, allowing migrants to attack them. The pointing-out and bringing out of people probably had something to do with taking such cases to hospital.
- There was no agreement whatsoever between the police and the Migrants to act together against the residents or the Comrades and where circumstances made it necessary the police shot on rioters regardless of the faction they belonged to.

● People who were not involved in fights or riots could have been shot unintentionally, especially where the police used shotguns.

● A comparison between the number of people killed and the number of shots fired supported a statement that the shots were used mainly to frighten off rioters.



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# Reasons for Boland riot

**Political Correspondent**  
THE causes of the 1976 rioting by coloured and black schoolchildren in the Boland and other parts of the Cape were largely political, the Cillie Commission has found.

Local grievances about school conditions were mentioned as a contributory factor in some areas. In the case of the south-west Cape the commission does not rule out

indoctrination, intimidation and incitement as factors.

In three schools, pupils demonstrated their solidarity with Soweto with placards and black power salutes.

### WHITE TEACHERS

In Paarl, salary differences and the presence of white teachers were the major reasons for dissatisfaction.

Elsewhere pupils were under the wrong impression white teachers at their schools received an

allowance for the discomfort they had to suffer by serving in a coloured school.

Dissatisfaction with the present system of government emerged in many of the demonstrations by pupils.

The commission said it could not say how widespread the feelings were or to what degree incitement had led to it.

In many areas the detention of pupils and leaders had led to dissatisfaction.

In contrast to Soweto the commission found the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was not a serious factor, even in the Eastern Cape and East London.

### AGITATORS

It found that agitators were at work in Ciskei, but pointed out that Chief Lennox Sebe had said there were conditions for agitators to exploit, such as the lack of capital to develop the homeland and to provide work.

# ng 'largely political'

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Bantu education was unacceptable to many younger teachers and many pupils.

The conviction that this form of education was aimed at turning blacks into 'good slaves' of the whites was fairly general.

One of the reasons why there had not been excessive violence in Ciskei was that the police had been 'extremely helpful'. At no stage were firearms used and according to witnesses they acted with great self-control.

In the case of Fort Hare the commission found the 'old spirit of revolt and the black students' resistance to the present political system' were the causes of riots on the campus.

Grievances, objections or requests were not submitted to the university authorities, nor were they given the opportunity to make changes or concessions in order to prevent the riots.

In Port Elizabeth and the midlands, solidarity and sympathy with the

victims of Soweto, political indoctrination by organisations such as the Black People's Convention (BPC) and the South African Students' Organisation (Saso), political grievances and irritating legislation were given as some of the causes.

### DETENTION

In the Kimberley area, the causes given were the detention of a pupil, a demonstration of solidarity, the uproar in the rest of the country and resistance to the Government as personified by

the then Prime Minister, Mr B J Vorster.

The report said there were undoubtedly agitators and inciters in Kimberley especially in the Galeshewe township.

In the case of Upington the report said the desire to show solidarity, and local grievances such as pupils' dissatisfaction with arrangements at school, the behaviour of teachers, insufficient recreational and sports facilities and poor housing, led to rioting.



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# Report on riots out today

Political Correspondent  
THE ASSEMBLY. — The  
Cillie Commission's report  
on the Soweto riots will be  
tabled in Parliament today  
— three years and eight  
months after the outbreak  
of rioting on June 16, 1976.  
The report, in more than

1 000 pages, covers one of  
the most traumatic events  
in South Africa's history  
and makes findings on it.  
The report is the work of  
Mr. Justice Piet Cillie,  
Judge-President of the  
Transvaal, who was ap-  
pointed during the six

months of sporadic unrest  
to inquire into the riots,  
which spread from Soweto  
to townships throughout the  
country.  
The Rand Daily Mail will  
carry extensive coverage of  
the commission's report in  
all editions tomorrow.











# Education officials get much of blame

THE Cillie Commission charges officials responsible for black education with joint responsibility for causing the first outbreaks of violence in Soweto on June 16, 1976.

It castigates them for arrogant attitudes and singles out the former Regional Director of Education in Soweto, Mr W C Ackermann, for particular censure.

Mr Ackermann, transferred from Soweto shortly after the riots began, is accused of adopting a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude towards objections to the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50/50 basis with English in black secondary schools.

The commission finds that the cause of the first unrest was the application of the language policy, the organised resistance in Soweto against the policy, the ineffective handling of opposition by officials and the failure of education and police officials to anticipate threatened violence and to take counter-measures.

"The officials believed there were agitators behind all the rebelliousness and also that students were being used as a so-called pressure group," the commission says.

"They did not realise that students were so dissatisfied they could easily become riotous.

"This attitude had the following important consequences: "First, avenues of communication were closed. There was no opportunity to discuss policy and to explain reasons

for the policy, "There was no exchange of ideas and the impression was created that the authorities were inaccessible and forbidding;

"Further, officials never knew what was going on among rebels or how determined their opposition was; "They could also not establish the nature of objections against the policy;

"They were not in a position to warn the Secretary or the Minister (of Bantu Education) about the threatened danger, and when requested, they could not supply the important details for answers in Parliament."

The commission says that even without having contact with Soweto, there were sufficient danger signals to put officials on their guard. Already in February 1976, students were causing trouble over Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. At one point 1 600 students boycotted schools.

Questions were also being asked in Parliament on boycotts and on applications by schools for exemptions from the language policy.

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cy and a subsequent increased number of refusals.

Officials felt that only the policy-makers in the Government had any say over the language issue and they therefore felt it was unnecessary to discuss the issue with parents and other people involved in education.

Students' actions were a matter for the black school boards which had been given instructions to negotiate on the dispute over the language issue and to ensure that students returned to school.

"It is not clear what room for manoeuvre school boards had in such negotiations because concessions on the policy were out of the question," the commission says.

As examples of how officials handled the language issue, the commission cites two meetings attended by Mr Ackermann on June 7 and 8.

At the first meeting, organised by the Chief Director of the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB), Mr Ackermann spoke to a delegation from the Urban Bantu Council.

The Chief Director of WRAB, unnamed in the report, came under the impression that Mr Ackermann was unwilling to meet the UBC delegation.

The second meeting was organised by the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner and attended by Mr Ackermann, WRAB's Chief Director and three police officers.

Mr Ackermann believed that the meeting was organised to criticise his department's handling of opposition to the language issue, but the commission says this was not the case.


At the first meeting, Mr Ackermann declared that school boards accepted responsibility to end boycotts of classes and that his department could therefore do nothing about the issue.

His attitude was that the policy of equal use of Afrikaans and English was instituted because white taxpayers financed Bantu education and that tax paid by urban blacks went to the homeland.


"This attitude of take-it-or-leave-it could decidedly not calm down feelings," the commission says.

At both meetings, Mr Ackermann also said students' demands could not be met because this would create an unending chain-reaction.

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DR TREURNICHT, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education



MR KRUGER, then Minister of Police and of Justice

# ... and police get a large portion too

POLICE had to collectively bear responsibility for the first outbreak of violence in Soweto on June 16, 1976, the Cillie Commission has found.

The commission says that although the direct cause of the riots was the organisation by students of an illegal mass protest march, the inability of police to anticipate the threat

to take counter measures, was a "concurrent circumstance" causing unrest.

"This means that the police must collectively bear responsibility for this special incident," the commission says.

It discloses that, while students were widely organising for at least three days, police first got to know of the planned June 16 protest march late on the afternoon of the 15th.

At about 4pm, Major G J Viljoen, commanding officer at Jabulani police station, received information that students at Naledi high school were going to protest the following day.

At the same time, a black lieutenant unnamed in the report, told Colonel J A Kleingeld, commanding officer at Orlando police station, of a rumour that students were planning to hold a meeting at one of the high schools in Orlando.

Later in the evening a black sergeant, unnamed in the report, told Col Kleingeld that he had spoken to a student from Orlando North high school.

The student had said that five scholars from Maitse high school arrived at his school in a green Kombi and told scholars they should first go to school the following day and should then march. People other than students should be off the streets and cars on the streets would be burned.

"All this information, no matter how vague and incomplete it was, was never conveyed to the divisional commissioner or headquarters," the commission says.

It was only at 7 45am on June 16 that Col Kleingeld told his men to ready themselves at his police station.

Later, he patrolled the area and realised he needed reinforcements as students massed on their protest march.

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dence that until that morning he had still not received any report on the planned demonstrations," the commission says.

It explains the SAP argued that because there was no compulsory education, it could not take action when children boycotted classes.

"It should be accepted that the force in Soweto should be informed about matters regarding possible unrest in the area," the commission comments.

"Nevertheless, clear signs of simmering unrest were ignored in the last few weeks before the outbreak.

"There were numerous cases of violent opposition testifying to growing tension, but the police did not realise the importance of the warning signals.

"It would appear that the police did not make further or sufficient investigations.

"For this reason, a group of young people could, for at least three days, make intensive preparations for a demonstration involving 15 000 or more students in schools throughout Soweto."

The commission adds that excluding police failure to anticipate unrest, and to take counter measures, there was no acceptable evidence that police action was responsible for the further development of rioting or for riot incidents.

There were, however, cases in which police action led to unrest becoming more intensive.

The commission says police were "completely unprepared" when they received first reports of trouble.

"The police had no plan of action to combat the first day of unrest and patrols first had to go out to establish what was happening," the commission says.


"The divisional commissioner's orders that students should be confined to their school grounds were incapable of execution because most of them had already left their school grounds.

"The police halted the demonstration but they could not control the rebellious crowds. Unrest started and spread through Soweto.

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THE Commission has attempted to reconstruct the events in Soweto on June 16, 1976, when the first clashes between police and students took place. According to the commission, this is what happened:







7h00: Col J A Klein-geld, officer commanding Orlando police station, places all available policemen on standby. A policeman reports back on marching students.




7h50: Brig S W le Roux, divisional commissioner in Soweto, sends out patrols after receiving information on the march.




8h00: Students meet at Naledi high. Tabella Motapanyane leads them to Orlando West high, passing Thomas Mofolo and Morris Isaacson schools. Other students join in, Morris Isaacson students march to Thesela high in White City. Students force motorists to give black power salute.




8h10: A school inspector in a car is attacked by marching students. Col J J Gerber, Divisional Commander of Soweto, investigates conditions in Naledi. He reports to Brig Le Roux that 800 to 1 000 students are marching to Orlando, attacking cars and stoning police. He finds too few policemen at Jabulani police station to disperse the students. Brig Le Roux learns from other station commanders that many youths are assembling, overturning cars and setting them alight. He orders them to mobilise all available policemen and to restrict students to school grounds.




8h20: Another 600 students join the 900 marching from Naledi to Orlando. Maj G J Viljoen, station commander at Jabulani, tells Warb officials and other whites to leave the area. Those marching to Orlando West High are joined by others. A procession in the direction of Orlando West High is followed by Col Kleingeld and two sergeants. When the students notice the police, they begin throwing stones. Col Kleingeld returns for reinforcements and issues guns.




8h15: A black and a white journalist arrive at the Phefeni Junior Secondary School. Teachers warn them to leave the area because of the approach of the Naledi students. The white journalist is threatened and leaves.




8h30: A black crowd greets a white journalist with black power salutes at the Orlando police station. He senses the atmosphere is tense. 10h00: Police are stoned by about 600 students when they arrive at the Thababala garage. Teurgas has no influence. Another 600 join the group. The police are withdrawn as they are too few to cope with the situation.




10h30: Several thousand students gather around a koppie at Orlando West High. Col Kleingeld's party is stoned and he cannot address the crowd. Four blacks are inciting the students. Tear gas and a baton charge is ineffective. Police are attacked and some are hit by stones. Col Kleingeld fires five pistol shots over the crowd, with no effect. He then fires 20 shots with an automatic rifle in front of and over the crowd. Others fire shots with their revolvers and pistols although Col Kleingeld did not give an order to fire. A black youth, H Ndhlovu, who was inciting the crowd, is killed. Two police dogs are maimed and killed. A black youth, Hector Peterßen, is fatally wounded by the police. A woman reporter takes his body to the Phomolong clinic.




10h45: Four white women in a car are stoned and injured by a riotous crowd, but manage to drive through. They reach the Orlando bridge and are taken to hospital.




10h55: A WRAB official, Mr J N B Esterhuizen, is attacked by youths at the Phomolong Clinic, in Khumalo Street. They include pupils of the Morris Isaacson High School. Mr Esterhuizen jumps out of his car but is surrounded and beaten to death. His body is brought out four hours later.




11h00: Drivers of various vehicles are attacked but manage to escape. A truck transporting liquor is plundered and set alight. Two policemen are stoned at the Phefeni bottle store. One is lightly injured.




11h10: A train driver reports that his train was stoned and windows broken. After investigating, a railways police officer reports serious disorder. Police man trains and protect stations. Tseisi Mashimani addresses students at the Morris Isaacson High School and orders them not to go to school for the next two days. He assures them he and others leaders will see to it that Africans will not longer be used at the high schools and announces that the police had shot two students dead and wounded 11 others.




11h20: A large crowd gathers at the offices of the youth centre in Jabavu. In Orlando East, anew WRAB workshop is opened at 11am. WRAB's chairman, Mr M Mulder, his chief director, Mr J C de Villiers, and his chief welfare officer, Dr L M Edelstein are there. They learn of the unrest and Dr Edelstein drives to the youth centre. He arrives at about 12, runs into his office and locks the door. A WRAB official, Mr R E Hobkirk, is trapped in another office. The stoning intensifies; the crowd breaks down Dr Edelstein's office door, attack him and drag him out. The attack is briefly interrupted by tear gas. Mr Hobkirk escapes. He sees Dr Edelstein's body in the lobby. The doctor is unconscious or pretends to be dead. He rises again but his attackers drag him out and beat him to death. Shortly after 1pm his mutilated body is removed by helicopter.




14h00: Police reinforcements arrive from Johannesburg, Pretoria and the West Rand. According to observers, the disorder is being exploited by terrorists. There is general drunkenness. More adults than youths take part in the looting. A vehicle loaded with liquor is looted in Phefeni. Maj Viljoen finds a crowd of about 300 students and adults at the Morris Isaacson High School. They are aggressive and threatening but they are dispersed. Brig Le Roux flies in a helicopter over Soweto, which appears chaotic. Thick smoke hangs over parts of the area.




12h00: Police prohibit white reporters from entering the danger area and they must get information from black colleagues.




12h15: A black social worker of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and a white student visits parts of Soweto during the morning. They are stopped at the Phefeni bridge and the white student is threatened with assault but she is removed by well-disposed pupils and given in the care of a clergyman. Police later remove her from the area.




12h30 to 13h00: A television newsman who accompanies police on patrols in Soweto observes looting and arson by youths and adults. Bottle stores in Phefeni and Dube are broken into, looted and burnt down. WRAB offices are also set alight. Police are stoned and teargas is used with limited success. The office of the station commander at Orlando is set up as an operational office to co-ordinate police action.




14h30: Col T J Swanepeel, three officers and 58 men arrive as reinforcements and divide into two task forces. Col Swanepeel's force run into a crowd of 4 000 to 5 000 blacks at Uncle Tom's Hall in Orlando West, turning over vehicles, starting fires and throwing stones. Warning shots are fired but then shots are fired at the agitators, whereupon the crowd flees. One black is hit. No bodies are found at this stage.




14h30: WRAB's bottle store at Phefeni and its offices and bottle stores in Orlando East are set alight.




15h00: WRAB's offices at Phefeni are set alight by the same group that destroyed the bottle store. WRAB's offices in Diepkloof are set alight. When the police arrive two groups of blacks start stoning them. Two private vehicles are already burnt out. Two blacks inciting the crowd are shot at on the order of a police officer. The WRAB offices in Meadowlands are set alight.




15h00 to 17h00: Arson and looting takes place at bottle stores at Nhalanzane, Moroka, Mofolo, Chawele, Senoane, the Molapo post office, the library in White City and the clinic in Senoane. The Mappelo hostel is set alight, the windows of the Phai Hall are broken, the Etkeng and Vukani schools are burnt down. The police use firearms at these incidents. Arrests are made and several looters are wounded. The bottle stores in Zola and Moletsane in Jabulani are looted. The police use teargas and firearms. At Zola seven people are arrested.




17h50: A Putee bus and another vehicle is burnt out near Uncle Tom's Hall. A control room is set up at WRAB's headquarters in Albert Street in the city.




16h00: Maj-Gen W H Kotze, Divisional Commissioner of the Witwatersrand, joins the Divisional Commissioner of Soweto to assist him until Monday, June 21. The crowds have split up into smaller groups and vandalism is rife.




16h15: A black man is shot dead by police at the Mofolo Centre bottle store. Minutes later the clinic and administrative offices in White City are set alight, as well as several vehicles.



17h00: About 40 blacks try to set taxis in Jabavu alight. The crowd attacks the police with stones, there is rifle fire and two blacks are hit. Later it is established that a black man, K Tokota, has died. About 20 vehicles have been burnt out.





17h30: Two Putee buses are set alight near the Mappelo Garage near the Orlando West-Meadowlands crossroads. A crowd of 5 000 to 6 000, in an ugly mood.




18h00: A classroom at the Naledi High School is set alight. A bottle store in Klipspruit is looted. 400 blacks are dispersed with tear gas and firearms. The Urban Bantu Council building in Jabulani is set alight but the fire is put out, as is a fire at the Sebokeng Garage. Two wrecked cars are removed by the Phefeni railway line but are removed by railways police.





19h00: The police split up into smaller groups with specific tasks. Brig Le Roux travels from Moreska to Jabulani police station by car with a few armed men and stones are thrown at their vehicle.  
 19h45: About 300 men loot the Phenolong bottle store. The police shoot an agitator among the bystanders.  
 19h50: 400 rioters gather at the Mapelia Garage in Orlando West and throw petrol bombs at vehicles and petrol pumps. The police are attacked on arrival and fire on the crowd. Two wounded or dead are carried away.  
 20h00: About 200 rioters cause rioting, looting and arson at the Dube bottle store. Cries such as "kill the whites" are shouted. Five people are believed shot by the police.  
 Two men, including a youth, are shot by police at the Mafale bottle store.



21h00: The Soweto Parents Association meet and a mass funeral of victims is proposed for Sunday, June 20.  
 - This service is later banned.  
 22h45: Police find the Barclays Bank and library in Dube burning. The WRAB offices are already burnt down when police arrive.  
 23h00: A black man, Mr V Nkwanzazi, is apparently shot in front of a nursery school in White City.  
 23h10: The Phenolong bottle store is attacked with fire bombs. Police fire on the attackers.  
 It is later established that 11 people have died during the day. Two of the wounded die later.

THE Cillie Commission has made no mention of Dr Hendrik Verwoerd's famous statement on Bantu Education; often quoted by opponents of the system as proof of its inherently discriminatory nature.

Contradictions between Ministers' versions of the cause of the June 16, 1976 riots and the Commission's findings have also emerged from the Cillie Report.

However, it does not specifically examine the Ministers' statements which were extensively reported in newspapers.

According to the Cillie Commission, Bantu Education was not a direct cause of unrest leading to the riots, but it was to an extent a cause of dissatisfaction, encouraged and exploited by people who wanted to cause unrest.

The imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in schools under the Bantu Education system was, however, a direct cause of riots, according to the commission.

In his statement on Bantu Education, Dr Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs and later Prime Minister, told Parliament in 1963  
 "If the native in South Africa today, in any kind of school in

# Verwoerd decided, Treurnicht echoed him

existence, is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake."

Dr Verwoerd was introducing the Bantu Education Bill bringing black education under one State department. Until then, black education, like that of other races, was under the control of the provinces.

Opponents of the system have also claimed that Dr Verwoerd's attitude in 1963 still underpins black education today.

In his speech in Parliament, Dr Verwoerd questioned the usefulness of teaching blacks about the kings of England and Canada's wheat exports and added: "What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? That is quite absurd."

Dr Verwoerd also said: "If my department controls native education it will know for which type of higher profession the native can be trained, where he will be able to make a living with his knowledge,

instead of choosing his own path in a direction where he cannot find a sphere of activity, thus turning him into a frustrated and dissatisfied being."

"But apart from these persons who can serve their own people, there is the much greater number of natives who have to find a future in other forms of work."

"The latter should have a training in accordance with their opportunities in life, and no department will know better where and how great the opportunities are for the Bantu child in various directions, than the Department of Native Affairs."

Dr Verwoerd added: "For that reason, it will be wise to entrust that department with this type of education which will prepare the people for the battle of life."

He went on to say that black education should not clash with Government policy.  
 "Racial relations cannot improve if the wrong type of education is given to natives," he said earlier.  
 A Labour Party MP, Mr Leo Lovell, warned of the danger

should Dr Verwoerd have thought the object of education was that "the natives should be trained entirely for vocational purposes, that they should be trained, shall I say, as hewers of wood and drawers of water?"

Mr Lovell said black labour was traded as a commodity "like a bag of mashes or a bag of corn, and if that is the way you want to treat native labour, then of course we must logically educate our native people to become a commodity to be bought and sold in the markets of our country."

That was exactly what the Bill meant, Mr Lovell said.  
 The following year, Dr Verwoerd said that under his proposed system it would be possible to give all blacks a fundamental education without an increase in expenditure.

By fundamental education he meant a knowledge of reading, writing and arithmetic, a sound knowledge of their mother language, and a knowledge of both English and Afrikaans up to Standard Two - "the standard of education necessary for a native child in the present

society".  
 In 1967, addressing the Free State congress of the National Party, Dr Verwoerd said education of "natives" in the Western way of life had led some of them into wanting to become part and parcel of the "European community". The Government intended, within the ensuing five to 10 years, to put an end to "that class of native".  
 In introducing the Bantu Education Bill in 1963, Dr Verwoerd said that if the State paid for Bantu education, it should also control it.  
 This view was to be echoed 23 years later by Dr Andries Treurnicht.

On the day violence erupted in Soweto on June 16 1976, Dr Andries Treurnicht, then deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, told an Afrikaans newspaper the policy that Afrikaans should take place side by side with English in black schools had been applied with great tolerance.  
 "In white areas where the Government provides the buildings, the subsidies and pays the teachers, it is surely

our right to decide on the language dispensation," he said.  
 "Here the matter concerns schools where there is no compulsory education. Why are pupils sent to schools where the language dispensation does not suit them?"

Dr Treurnicht said he had been aware that dissatisfaction was brewing in Soweto. Nobody knew better than the Afrikaner about forcing people to use another language. But it had been felt that a knowledge of both English and Afrikaans would be to the pupils' advantage.

The commission, however, said he had not been fully aware of the nature and extent of the buildup in tension among blacks on the language policy which it singled out as a direct cause of the 1976 riots.

The Minister of Bantu Administration in 1976, Mr M C Botha, said the tragedies in Soweto were caused by misunderstanding and confusion over the application of the "50-50" Afrikaans language tuition principle.

The statement was issued after a meeting held in Pretoria just three days after the eruption of violence in Soweto on June 16.

Dr Andries Treurnicht was not invited to the meeting.

Two days after the unrest started, the then Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster, issued a warning in Parliament that the Government would not allow itself to be intimidated.

Mr Vorster said the riots were obviously not a spontaneous eruption, but a purposeful attempt to polarise people in which various organisations played a role.

The then Minister of Police, Mr J T Kruger, now President of the Senate, told Parliament the Government had not expected the riots in Soweto to result from school strikes against Afrikaans medium instruction.

Two days later, a Sunday newspaper quoted Mr Kruger as saying he had been expecting an outbreak for some time. He had seen the undercurrents and he was prepared. It was precisely for this reason he had armed himself with the new

internal security legislation.  
 A few days later, Mr Kruger accused the then Progressive Reform Party of "smearing" the police and furthering the aims of the "Black Power movement".

But the commission finds, however, that police had to bear collective responsibility for causing the first outbreak of rioting by failing to anticipate violence and to take counter-measures.

Later, giving the official police version of how the riots started, Mr Kruger told foreign newsmen it would definitely appear that the riots were planned to coincide with Mr Vorster's meeting with the then United States Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger.

He said an armed white officer and 30 black policemen, not all armed, had tried to talk the group of about 2 000 angry students into dispersing. "They adopted a very threatening attitude indeed and the crowd's leader was shot dead then," Mr Kruger added.

He turned out to be a "non-student" aged about 25 or 30.

The Cillie Commission has found that the first two people to die were aged 17 and 12.

# Now school and parents choose

By SOPHIE TEMBA

PARENTS can now decide on the language to be used as a medium of instruction for their children in black schools.

A ruling was made shortly after the 1976 outbreak of violence in Soweto that the choice of the medium of instruction from standard five onwards was entirely the decision of the school and the parents.

Until then Afrikaans had to be used as a medium of instruction in black secondary schools on a 50/50 basis with English with virtually no exemptions allowed.

This issue, according to the Cillie Commission report, was a direct cause of the 1976 riots. A spokesman for the Department of Co-operation and Development said yesterday the new rule was one of many meaningful changes and improvements the department believed had been made in black education since 1976.

He said the increase in the budget between 1976 and 1980 for black education has been

higher than the average increase taken from all State departments.  
 The percentage of school-going children in 1948 was 2,5% which rose to 13% in 1979.  
 There was also a notable rise in registered full-time matriculants. There were 957 candidates in 1980 and 23 240 by 1979.

Although the department is viewing these as notable changes, some teachers in Soweto and on the Reef have expressed the need for a complete change in the black educational structure, based on a sound economic background.

One principal said: "Promises have been made as have indications of changes the Government wants to bring, but nothing concrete so far has come off the ground."

A lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand, Mr Mpyake Basil Kumalo said: "There has been some change in the educational structure which is not easily recognisable. Much has still to be done."

RDH 1/3/80



# Treurnicht speech 'tipped the scales'

1/3/80 (214) CT

## Political Staff

JOHANNESBURG — A statement by Dr Andries Treurnicht in Parliament a few days before the Soweto riots started "tipped the scales towards unrest" because it showed the door had been closed to concessions on the Afrikaans language issue.

The Cillie Commission quoted two witnesses as saying this but found that the former minister of Bantu Affairs, Mr M C Botha, and Dr Treurnicht as his deputy, were unaware of the extent of the buildup in tension in Soweto before the June 16 riots.

It said they and the secretary for Bantu Education, Mr J Roussouw, were not kept informed by their officials who were in turn charged by the commission with joint-responsibility for causing the first outbreaks of violence through their failure to assess the situation and take countermeasures.

The commission credited Mr Botha with removing the roof causes of the riots by meeting black school board members three days after violence started and resolving objections to the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50/50 basis with English.

Although Dr Treurnicht was warned by the Institute of Race Relations that tensions were reaching danger point, the commission said his response in Parliament when he understated the extent and nature of tension was justified because his officials had not kept him informed of feelings on the language issue.

But in reaching its conclusions, the commission disclosed that as early as April 1976, the African Teachers Association of South Africa (ATASA) met the secretary for Bantu Education and handed him a memorandum dealing with the Afrikaans language policy.

A month later — on May 25 when students were boycotting classes at a number of schools — the then director of the Institute of Race Relations, Mr Fred van Wyk, spoke to the regional director of education in Soweto about the authorities' lack of action on the language issue.

Mr Van Wyk was not satisfied with the answer that the language issue was being used for "other purposes" and then sent the following telegram to Mr Rene de Villiers, former Progressive Federal Party MP for Parktown.

"Deeply concerned Afrikaans medium controversy black schools. Position Soweto very serious. Could

you discuss matter with minister concerned?"

Mr De Villiers conveyed the contents of the telegram to Dr Treurnicht, who was then deputy minister in charge of Bantu Education.

"Dr Treurnicht replied that he was unaware of any real problem but that he would investigate," the commission said.

According to the commission, Dr Treurnicht sent the following note to Mr De Villiers "a day or so later".

"The problems in connection with the strikes by students in Soweto are now being handled at a lower level and apparently negotiations have not reached deadlock. It has also not been referred to the secretary of the department for a decision.



Dr Treurnicht

"Later perhaps, we will establish what the contributing causes are, but at the moment it can be mentioned that children are striking because teachers (according to the children?) are not qualified to instruct in Afrikaans. Perhaps it is not that simple."

The commission added: "According to the secretary, he (the secretary) knew about the students' actions, but that school boards had been instructed to negotiate with students for them to return to school. He understood that some children had already returned to school.

"The information available to the deputy minister therefore was that a solution was being sought at the local level and that there had been a measure of success.

"In fact, six schools were at that stage involved. At two of them, students went back to school but were being threatened. On that evening windows at Belle School were damaged."

Outlining the buildup of tension in Soweto, the commission said that by May 31 there were not only newspaper reports on class boycotts but general articles on the language issue and unrest.

The commission singled out a report in Beeld, headlined "Don't Force Afrikaans on Black Schools", and quoted the Rev Sam Buti, scribe of the black Ned Geref Kerk, as saying that there were still good race relations but it should be remembered that the time for unilateral decision-making was over.

By June 4 unrest at Belle School had still not calmed down and according to the commission "the atmosphere was tense".

Stone-throwing had taken on such dimensions that police were called in.

Replying to questions in Parliament on that day, Dr Treurnicht said students at five schools were boycotting classes but school boards were negotiating with them. Students in Standard Five and in Form One had given as reasons for the boycotts the fact that they were opposed to the language policy. By June 7 the Urban Bantu Council was discussing the unrest and emphasizing the "seriousness and danger of the situation".

On June 11 — five days before the riots started — Dr Treurnicht said in reply to questions in Parliament that five schools had applied for exemption from the 50/50 language policy.

"The five schools had been named the week before as among the six where boycotts were taking place."

The commission noted, "Their applications for exemption were turned down because it had been found that after investigation teachers were qualified to give instruction in both official languages."

Referring to Dr Treurnicht's reply that applications for exemptions had been turned down, the commission says: "A witness told the commission that this answer tipped the scales towards unrest because it showed that the door had been closed and that there would be no concession.

"In the Urban Bantu Council, a

speaker deplored the refusal for the same reason."

The commission did not make an immediate judgment on the opinions of the witness and the UBC member, but recalled that on the same day — June 11 — the minister, unnamed in the report but presumably Mr M C Botha, said he had no knowledge of a demonstration at Naledi High School.

The commission commented "The commission investigated the circumstances relating to this and found the following. The incidents enjoyed a reasonable amount of publicity, particularly because they took place on two consecutive days. The Rand Daily Mail referred to 'demonstrating students' and to the incident as a 'demonstration'."

The commission said, however, that the secretary for Bantu Education had asked officials for full details of the incident, but these were not available.

"A report was made to him and he in turn informed the minister," the commission said. "The minister's reply in Parliament agrees with the information the secretary gave him."

On the same day this was happening, the director of the Institute of Race Relations sent a second telegram to Mr De Villiers.

"The situation Soweto schools over Afrikaans as medium apparently deteriorates daily. Violence has already taken place and can easily be repeated. Sincerely trust Dr Treurnicht is on top of situation."

The commission said Mr De Villiers conveyed the contents of the telegram to Dr Treurnicht and received the reply that he, Dr Treurnicht, was not aware of any escalation in the dispute over the language issue but that he would make inquiries.

"Later he informed Mr De Villiers that he had been in contact with his officials, that he had no reason to believe that the issue could not be resolved and that talks were going on."

The commission reported "Mr De Villiers was under the clear impression that the deputy minister did not expect any violent confrontation."

The commission said that on investigation it found that Dr Treurnicht had asked the secretary for Bantu Education for information, but that the information the secretary had obtained from officials did not indicate any escalation of the dispute.

"The deputy minister was therefore justified in giving Mr De Villiers the reply which he did give him."



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# Counting the cost of the violence

**HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.** — Damage estimated at R29,7 m. was sustained by Bantu Affairs Administration Boards in the country-wide disturbances sparked off in Soweto in June 1976, according to the Cillie Commission.

When totalling all the estimates of damage contained in the report, a figure of about R47 m. is arrived at, but Mr Justice Cillie feels very strongly that these figures should not be added together to determine a final bill for the nation-wide unrest.

"The amounts listed in the report cannot be regarded as complete and accurate for two reasons.

"Firstly, not all persons and instances reported their losses, and in cases where they did, flaws were found in some of the returns. The second reason is that estimates of damage are not and sometimes cannot always be exact.

"The losses of private individuals and instances are

virtually impossible to determine, although evidence before the commission estimates these at more than R10 m.

"Throughout the country the property of Bantu Affairs Administration Boards was the target of vandals and it is not surprising that these 22 boards suffered more damage as a group than any other group.

"During the disturbances, 114 beerhalls, 74 bottle-stores and 124 BAAB buildings were gutted or damaged by fire. The contents of the buildings were destroyed in all, 222 board vehicles were destroyed.

"The Department of Co-operation and Development sets the total damage to the boards at R29 662 870.

"To ascertain the final damage figures for Soweto as a separate area would have been too costly, but the damage figure for the West Rand Administration Board, under which Soweto falls, is R16 338 525.

"Losses sustained by the Department of Education

and Training total R650 000.

"Damage done by rioters to schools and official buildings in the black states totals R632 250. This amount excludes the damage done in the Moretele district of Bophuthatswana and damage to the University of Zululand in Kwazulu.

"A total of 224 police vehicles were damaged or destroyed at a cost of R33 182. The operational expenses incurred by the police in trying to curb the riots came to R782 435.

"Damage to trains, station buildings, tracks and signal boxes cost the Railways R934 600. In addition, protection which had to be afforded to trains, lines, installations and buildings, set the railways back another R160 224 in extraordinary administrative costs.

"Damage to official vehicles of the Department of Transport came to R7 965.


"Within the first six months of the disturbances, 37

post offices were damaged, most of them in black and coloured residential areas. One was damaged by a petrol bomb in the white residential area of Kalk Bay and another was damaged by fire in Kimberley. Total damage to the Department of Posts and Telecommunications was R168 000.

"Losses totalling R1 587 831 were sustained by the Department of Public Works mainly as a result of damage to coloured schools and colleges.

"The Administration of Coloured Affairs had to pay R926 915 for damage to buildings at 164 coloured schools throughout the country.

"A survey covering the period to the end of 1976 shows that 264 private concerns were damaged or destroyed. Of these, 43 were in Soweto and 86 were in the Cape Peninsula. Among them were 10 factories, five commercial banks, five cinemas, four petrol stations and several hotels." — Sapa





# Buildup to riots began in fifties

## Political Staff

JOHANNESBURG — The buildup to the Soweto riots took place over a period of 20 years, starting with the imposition in black schools of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction and culminating in the outbreak of violence in June 1976.

The Cillie Commission takes up the history of confrontation on the language issue in the fifties when the government took over black education from the provinces and churches.

Its initial language policy was that the mother tongue would be the medium of instruction up to standard six. The mother tongue would only be used for non-examination subjects in secondary schools while Afrikaans and English would be used where possible in the remaining subjects.

But because of a shortage of teachers qualified in Afrikaans, the Department of Bantu Education sent the following directive to regional directors in 1959:

## Backlog

"Because of the backlog in Afrikaans and particularly the inability of certain Bantu teachers to use this language as a medium of instruction most of the secondary schools have asked for exemptions from this requirement during the past three years. These exemptions were granted in most cases.

"From 1960 exemptions from us-

ing Afrikaans as a medium will not be so easily granted and it is expected that everything possible will be done to ensure that Afrikaans as a medium of instruction will take its rightful place."

The only exception to the rule would be a lack of teachers qualified to instruct in Afrikaans.

But the directive also made the following stipulations: Students' lack of knowledge of, for example Afrikaans, will not be accepted as an excuse. If there is a teacher on the staff who can, for example, teach agriculture in Afrikaans, then this must be done regardless of the pupils' knowledge of this language. It has already been shown on an experimental basis that this can be done successfully.

## Question

Without giving a judgment, the commission comments: "The question arises as to whether a student educated in this way could not after 15 years or more have sympathy for those people who allege that Afrikaans is being forced down their throats?"

A few weeks later, regional directors were informed in another circular that the conditions laid down in the previous circular should only be applied to form one class in the coming year and in the higher forms on a yearly progressive basis.

The 50/50 language policy was emphasized in numerous circulars after this, but in 1973 another directive was circulated stating in "commanding language" that the medium of instruction should be exclusively in Afrikaans or exclusively in English or on a 50/50 basis.

If the decision was to instruct exclusively in either Afrikaans or English, then the language not being used as a medium of instruction would have to be given two extra periods each week when it was taught.

## The test

The directive added: "To establish whether Afrikaans or English or both should be used as medium of instruction in a specific secondary school, the test must be which one of the two languages is the dominant language of the white community in the town, city or area in which the school is situated."

School boards and inspectors could make recommendations on the implementation in their areas of the policy but the final decisions would rest with the Secretary for Bantu Education.

A survey then showed that school boards and inspectors were overwhelmingly against instruction exclusively in Afrikaans and that the majority would choose instruction in either English or in both languages on a 50/50 basis.

Faced with the survey, the minister, then Mr M C Botha, issued the following directive: "That the status quo for the use of both official languages should, where possible, be maintained on a 50/50 basis at secondary level and departmental approval must be obtained for any deviation from the rule for the equal use of the official languages, and that approval will be determined mainly by the availability of teachers qualified to teach a particular subject in an official lan-



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# Police share blame

## Political Staff

JOHANNESBURG — Police had to collectively bear responsibility for the first outbreak of violence in Soweto on June 16, 1976, the Cillie Commission has found.

The commission said that although the direct cause of the riots was the organization by students of an illegal mass protest march, the inability of police to anticipate the threatened rebellion on June 16 and to take counter-measures was a "concurrent circumstance" causing unrest.

"This means that the police must collectively bear responsibility for this special incident," the commission said.

It disclosed that while students were widely organizing for at least three days, police first got to know of the planned June 16 protest march late on the afternoon of the 15th.

At about 4 pm, Major G J Viljoen, commanding officer at Jabulani police station, received information that students at Naledi High School were going to protest the following day.

At the same time, a black lieutenant unnamed in the report told Colonel J A Kleingeld, commanding officer at Orlando police station, of a rumour that students were planning to hold a meeting at one of the high schools in Orlando.

Later in the evening, a black sergeant unnamed in the report told

Colonel Kleingeld that he had spoken to a student from Orlando North High School.

The student had said that five scholars from Matsike High School arrived at his school and said that scholars should first go to school the following day and should then march. People other than students should be off the streets and cars on the streets would be burned.

"All this information, no matter how vague and incomplete it was, was never conveyed to the divisional commissioner or headquarters," the commission said.

It was only at 7.45 am on June 16 that Colonel Kleingeld told his men to ready themselves at his police

station. Later, he patrolled the area and realized he needed reinforcements as students massed on their protest march.

The Divisional Commissioner of Police in Soweto, Brigadier S W le Roux, gave evidence that until that morning, he had still not received any report on the planned demonstrations.

The commission explained that the SAP argued that because there was no compulsory education, it could not take action when children boycotted classes.

"It should be accepted that the force in Soweto should be informed about matters regarding possible unrest in the area," the commission

commented.

"Nevertheless, clear signs of simmering unrest were ignored in the last few weeks before the outbreak.

"There were numerous cases of violent opposition testifying to growing tension, but the police did not realize the importance of the warning signals.

"It would appear that the police did not make further or sufficient investigations.

"For this reason, a group of young people could for at least three days make intensive preparations for a demonstration involving 15 000 or more students in schools throughout Soweto."

The commission said police were "completely unprepared" when they received first reports of trouble.

The police had no plan of action to combat the first day of unrest and patrols first had to go out to establish what was happening," the commission said.

"The divisional commissioner's orders that students should be confined to their school grounds were incapable of execution because most of them had already left their school grounds.

"The police halted the demonstration, but they could not control the rebellious crowds. Unrest started and spread through Soweto.

"It wasn't long before there was unrest in many parts of the country."





# Events of first violent Unrest: 575 killed

## Political Staff

JOHANNESBURG. — The Cillie Commission has attempted to reconstruct the events in Soweto on June 16, 1976, leading to the dramatic first violent confrontation between police and students which culminated in 575 deaths around the country.

The confrontation started early on June 16 after police had heard on the previous evening that students were planning an illegal mass protest against the imposition in black secondary schools of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction.

"A major point of difference is who was responsible for the first act of violence," the commission says.

The confrontation took place in front of Orlando West High School where students were gathering for their protest march which, according to the report, had been planned for the past three days without police knowing about it.

On his way to the protest point, the officer commanding Orlando police station, Colonel J A Kleingeld, accompanied by his men, met a crowd of students near Uncle Tom's Hall in Khumalo Street.

### Stones

"He climbed out of his car to talk with them," says the commission. As he approached stones were thrown at him and he had to retreat to the relative safety of his vehicle. "He threw two teargas canisters at the crowd and they moved away."

From Khumalo Street, the police unit drove up Pela Street and turned into Vilakazi where they came up against a crowd of stu-

dents. The groups moved closer together and the colonel, positioned in front of his vehicle, put his hands up in the air and shouted at the crowd to stop.

It was Colonel Kleingeld's opinion that the big noise of the throng and the stone-throwing made his words inaudible.

The commission quotes a witness, Miss Sophie Tema, a reporter on World newspaper, which was later banned, as saying that students whistled and waved placards at the police, and one policeman "lost his cool" and threw a teargas canister among the students.

According to Miss Tema, the crowd stoned the police who then used their weapons.

### 'Exceptionally dangerous'

"According to Colonel Kleingeld, the crowd moved closer and closer to the unit and vehicles," the commission says. "Police were stoned. It was exceptionally dangerous for members of the unit."

Colonel Kleingeld radioed for reinforcements and to win time he decided to storm the crowd with dogs and batons.

Before doing so he fired two warning shots and no one was injured.

Police succeeded in driving back the crowd, but when they started returning to their vehicles they were pursued.

"Because reinforcements had still not arrived, Colonel Kleingeld decided he had to use firearms. He was afraid that indiscreet shooting could cause a bloodbath and therefore ordered his men not to shoot. He decided to act himself.

"He fired three more warning shots in front of and over the crowds. This stopped the crowd for only a moment and then they came closer again. Then several other members of the force used their firearms."

In the shooting, 17-year-old Hastings Ndlovu and 12-year-old Hector Peterson, were killed.

## No victimization

### Own Correspondent

JOHANNESBURG — The Cillie Commission found that although potential black and coloured witnesses did fear victimization by the security police, it was convinced that there had been none.

The commission also found that the arrest of two people shortly after they had given evidence was not an act of victimization. Their arrest was unconnected with their evidence, the commission said.

The findings were contained in a chapter which disclosed that the majority of people who gave evidence before the commission were whites. The report said 563 people had given evidence — 340 whites, 194 blacks and 39 coloured people.

The total included 127 white, black and coloured policemen. Only 15 people who gave evidence on the student uprising were under-18.

## Unrest: 575 killed

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. — Altogether 575 people were killed and at least 3 907 injured in disturbances throughout the country between June 16, 1976, and February 28, 1977, according to the Cillie Commission tabled in Parliament yesterday.

Evidence before the commission was the principal source of information concerning the identity and particulars of the dead and injured. The compilation of the statistics was a formidable task and many problems were encountered.

"There were cases where people were reported dead and later found to be alive. Some of them had been seriously wounded, admitted to hospital and later discharged.

"Names were duplicated, not only on different lists but sometimes on the same list. Some people on the lists died of natural causes and others committed suicide.

"Nevertheless, the commission exercised strict control over these lists so that genuine cases were not missed."

The identification of bodies was also a problem.

"Because conditions at the place where a body was found or taken to were sometimes chaotic, the commission does not intend blaming anyone for failing to obtain certain information about the dead and for not exercising better control.

"Under these circumstances, it is impossible to be 100 percent sure of the death statistics." — Sapa

Deereed  
But in 1974 another directive was sent out declaring: "In the Southern Transvaal region Afrikaans and English will be used on a 50/50 basis."

However, the directive then decreed that in standard five and forms one and two English would be the medium for "general science and practical subjects", Afrikaans would be the medium in mathematics and social studies, and the mother tongue would be used in non-examination subjects.

The commission comments "It is noteworthy that this circular does not mention deviations from the rule of equal use and therefore not of previous exemptions which makes further applications unnecessary. In the formulation of the policy even the words 'where possible' have been omitted."

The commission says that when it asked the Southern Transvaal regional director why the possibility of deviations from the rule was not mentioned, he replied that inspectors were aware of the possibility of concessions.

It adds that the circular created among many people the impression that deviations would no longer be allowed and that schools which had been granted exemptions would now be forced to impose the 50/50 rule.


### Misunderstandings

"The circular caused misunderstandings and dissatisfaction in Southern Transvaal resulting in a deterioration of relations between official and parent, and official and school board," the commission says.

After dealing at length with confrontations on the language issue between school boards and officials, the commission states that exemptions from the language policy were in fact being made and that Afrikaans was not being used as medium of instruction in 110 of Soweto's 357 schools.



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Cillie Commission of Inquiry into the 1976 riots

# Police behaved well in danger

Chief Reporter

THE POLICE acquitted themselves well in difficult and dangerous circumstances during the outbreaks of violence in the Cape Peninsula in mid-1976, but there were certain policemen who went too far and who were too quick to open fire, says the report of the Cillie Commission tabled in Parliament yesterday.

It says investigation of allegations of purposeful assault and indiscriminate shooting by law-enforcement personnel did not produce sufficient evidence on which to base a finding in this regard.

The commission found that police action was not the cause of the first wave of violence and unrest in the Peninsula, and adds that evidence before the commission does not justify a finding of purposeful and unjustified assaults on people by the police.

It was the policy of the police to resort to force only when this was found necessary to restore order, to protect lives and property and to effect arrests.

The policy was to handle rioters firmly, not roughly. In this connection it happened that certain policemen, on account of their psychological make-up or because of particular circumstances, went too far.

## Quick to open fire

It was not the policy of the police to shoot rioters indiscriminately. There were exceptional cases where a few members of the force, as a result of a wrong assessment of the situation, or of tension, over-reaction, force of circumstances and even fear, were too quick to open fire.

There were further instances where policemen opened fire before making sure that uninvolved people would not be hit — particularly where the use of fire-shot was concerned.

The report says a coloured girl, Sandra Peters, died during the riots as a result of a bullet wound in the head. At a subsequent inquest, the magistrate found Sandra was shot by police during the storming of vehicles and the looting of a shop.

According to evidence before the commission, Sandra's mother

sent her and her little brother to the shop. They saw looters break into the shop and ran away when the police arrived. After the police had withdrawn, Sandra and her brother walked with other children back towards the shop. Apparently the looting started again and shots were fired at the looters by guards who had not at first been noticed.

The commission accepts that she (Sandra Peters) was not one of the looters.

## Police unsure of adults' support

Chief Reporter

THE CILLIE COMMISSION in its report that while some parents and other adults helped in efforts to stop the rioting in the Peninsula in 1976, the police could never be certain of the support of the community in the maintenance of order.

"Cold neutrality was usually the reaction of the adults present. Witnesses emphasized that the police must arrest those who had committed serious offences such as arson, dangerous assault, looting, public violence and sabotage.

"These offenders were not alone, they were among their friends. They gained more

courage to resist arrest after witnessing the behaviour of others. They could count on help, and they knew that if they were caught they could expect severe sentences.

On the other hand, says the report, there were cases where demonstrators did in fact heed warnings and commands and where arrests were made without violence — but this was exceptional.

When all the relevant facts are taken into consideration, and in the realization that it is easy but dangerous to condemn in retrospect, the commission took decisions concerning the correctness of the action taken by the police in the Cape Peninsula.

The report adds it was not always possible to obtain full details of cases such as this one, where it was claimed that a victim had no part in the disturbances.

In the Peninsula, as elsewhere, it happened that passers-by and inquisitive people came to be wounded, even killed, by police in their efforts to contain the rioting.



The commission says a number of witnesses testified to the extremely difficult circumstances in which the police had to carry out their duties.

As an example, evidence was given of how the police, after being summoned to deal with the first public unrest at the University of the Western Cape, were asked by the rector, after discussions, to leave the campus.

To do this the police had to drive past a crowd of students according to a witness, they were mocked, sworn at and abused as they drove by their vehicles were kicked and beaten with objects and with fists.

When the police wanted to restore peace and order, the report says, they had to deal not only with innocent schoolchildren, there were wild and unruly elements who refused to heed lawful commands.

Instigators popped up in many different places and when they did the stone-throwers were always nearby. The police were under constant threat. Whether they were on patrol, trying to restore order, protecting workers who did not wish to strike, or arresting offenders, they did not know where the next stone was going to come from.



# Gang caused Nyanga riots

Chief Reporter

THE CILLIE COMMISSION, in its report tabled yesterday, found that the direct cause of the Christmas weekend riots in Nyanga in 1976 was the militant activities of a township group known as the 'Cobra' and of

denis for adopting a protective attitude towards their youngsters when they clashed with the Migrants, the group from the single quarters.

Although the Migrants had not instigated the riots, their warring Resident and Migrant factions)

The commission says police action at Nyanga during that Christmas weekend was aimed at restoring peace and protecting lives and property. The police did not, as was also suggested, train the Migrants in the manufacture and use of petrol bombs.

In the week before Christmas, the Comrades stepped up their campaign against she-

given police protection on their way to and from work. The Comrades forbade Christmas festivities in the township, and removed Christmas presents and bottles of liquor from people in the streets. They also ordered the whites to the

memorial service, there was a flare-up of violence — and the Christmas riots at Nyanga had begun. According to available pamphlets, the report adds, the Comrades were strongly opposed to the whites to the

Political Staff

JOHANNESBURG — The Cillie Commission charges officials responsible for black education with joint responsibility for causing the first outbreaks of violence in Soweto on June 16 1976.

It castigates them for an arrogant attitude and singles out the former regional director of education in Soweto, Mr. W. C. Ackermann, for particular censure.

Mr. Ackermann who was transferred out of Soweto shortly after the riots began is accused of adopting a 'take-it-or-leave-it' attitude towards objections to the imposition in black secondary schools of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50/50 basis with English.

The commission finds that the cause of the first unrest was the application of the language policy, the organized resistance in Soweto against the policy, the ineffective handling of opposition by officials and the failure of education and police officials to anticipate threatened violence and to take counter-measures.

Students 'used'

The officials believed there were agitators behind all the rebelliousness and also that students were being used as a so-called pressure group, the commission says.

They did not realize that students were so dissatisfied that they could easily become riotous.

This attitude had the following important consequences. Firstly, avenues of communication were closed and there was no opportunity to discuss policy and to explain reasons for the policy.

"There was no exchange of ideas and the impression was created that the authorities were inaccessible and forbidding.

Further officials never knew

# Education officials censured

## Officials censured

what was going on among rebels or how determined their opposition was. They could also not establish the nature of objections against the policy.

Danger signals

They were not in a position to warn the secretary or the minister about the threatened danger and when requested they could not supply the important details for answers in Parliament.

The commission says that even without having contact with Soweto there were sufficient danger signals to officials on their guard. Already in February 1976 students were causing trouble over Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. At one point 1 000 students boycotted schools.

Questions were also being asked in Parliament on boycoits and on applications by schools for exemptions from the language policy.

Officials were asked for details but advised the secretary (of Bantu Education) that the problems were still at a very low level, the commission says.

The report explains it appeared that implementation by officials of the language policy became more rigid an impression bolstered part-

ly by increasing applications for exemption from the policy and a subsequent increased numbers of refusals.

Officials felt that only the policy-makers in government had any say over the language issue and they therefore felt it was unnecessary to discuss it with parents and other people involved in education.

Students' actions were a matter for the black school boards which had been given instructions to negotiate on the dispute over the language issue and to ensure that they returned to school.

It is not clear what room for manoeuvre school boards had in such negotiations because concessions on the policy were out of the question, the commission says.

As examples of how officials handled the language issue, the commission cites two meetings attended by Mr. Ackermann on June 7 and 8.

At the first meeting organized by the chief director of the West Rand Administration Board, Mr. Ackermann spoke to a delegation from the Urban Bantu Council.

The chief director of WRAB unnamed in the report, came under

the impression that Mr. Ackermann was unwilling to meet the UBC delegation.

The second meeting was organized by the chief Bantu affairs commissioner and attended by Mr. Ackermann, WRAB's chief director and three police officers.

Mr. Ackermann believed that the meeting was organized to criticize his department's handling of opposition to the language issue but the commission says this was not the case.

At the first meeting Mr. Ackermann declared that school boards accepted responsibility to end boycotts of classes and that his department could therefore do nothing about the issue.

His attitude was that the policy of equal use of Afrikaans and English was instituted because white taxpayers financed Bantu Education and that tax paid by urban blacks went to the homelands.

"This attitude of take-it-or-leave-it could decidedly not calm down feelings," the commission says.

'Chain-reaction'

At both meetings, Mr. Ackermann also said students' demands could not be met because this would create an unending chain-reaction.

"Other officials showed this same attitude in the period before the outbreak of violence," the commission says.

The Urban Bantu Council also requested that education department circulars should be sent to the committee on education. The request was turned down because the education department did not regard the committee as a part of the education system.

"In conclusion it is clear that official actions did not in any way help to avoid rebellion or to postpone it," the commission says.

Commission quotes the betrayal, Mr. Fredo Mutwa, as saying in evidence that the agitator does not himself create a grievance, he uses available facts and exploits a situation.

# Activists used govt

Intimidation. Although intimidation of blacks by riot organizers was not a cause of unrest, rebels used this powerful instrument to create and prolong unrest. Because of this, intimidation and the wide extent of it, together with the way intimidators disguised their motives and final objectives, it cannot be

JOHANNESBURG — Key aspects of government policy caused dissatisfaction which activists exploited to create unrest in the 1976 riots, the Cillie Commission has found.

It has also delivered a damning indictment of the police and education officials in its analysis of 31 possible causes of unrest which led to rioting after June 16, 1976.

Summarizing its findings, the commission says the factors which jointly caused the first riot were the application of the Afrikaans language policy in black secondary schools, the organized campaign

of government policy caused dissatisfaction which activists exploited to create unrest in the 1976 riots, the Cillie Commission has found.



fluence of this group

But, the report says, it was not clear what the Comrades' objectives were. In contrast with what had happened elsewhere, there was no demonstration of black power, and it was a feature of the riots at Nyanga that there were no demonstrations against the authorities and no attempt to bring grievances to the attention of the outside world.

It can however be said that they (the Comrades) wanted to cause chaos, strengthen their position and show their solidarity with the black people of Soweto.

The commission, which conducted a separate inquiry into the Nyanga riots at a special sitting in Cape Town, also blames in part the group known as the Residents — permanent inhabitants of Nyanga — for not keeping their children and other militant youths' in check.

It also criticizes the Res-

certain witnesses, responsible for the tension between the Migrants and the Residents.

The police, says the report, carried out their duties in spite of personal danger to themselves in the steps they had to take. They fulfilled their task in an impartial manner and did not deliberately favour one group against another.

The commission says the

no alleged shebeen, and destroyed buildings, furniture and liquor. Some even helped themselves to liquor and robbed the shebeen owners of their money.

The commission says the Comrades instigated strikes and set out to damage the South African economy. The Migrants, who did not wish to take part in the strikes called for by the Comrades, had to be

canemery. The Migrants refused to attend. The commission says it is unlikely that the Comrades were not connected with another bigger organization which exerted its influence to achieve its ends through unrest and chaos.

The memorial service and the period of mourning called for by the Comrades were indications that solidarity or sympathy with the people of Soweto was a contributory cause or even an excuse for the riots. It was not however as important a factor as in most riots in other areas.

There was no evidence that participants in the unrest were under the influence of liquor, and in contrast with what had happened elsewhere, there was no demonstration of black power at Nyanga.

According to the evidence, the well-known salute and shouted slogans were noted only once or twice during the whole of December.

to education and police officials to anticipate unrest and to take countermeasures.

Riots were then carried on by organizers of protests, boycotts and strikes. Many other factors did not cause riots but contributed to them by creating a mood of unrest.

The analysis of possible causes and a summary of the findings in each case are presented in the order the commission sets them out in its report.

● Imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50-50 basis with English. The causes of the first riots on June 16 was the application in black secondary schools of the language policy which provoked misunderstanding and dissatisfaction among the people of Soweto, the organized resistance in 1976 against the implementation of the policy, the ineffective handling of the campaign by officials, and the failure of education and police officials to anticipate the threat of violence and to take countermeasures.

● Black organizations. The black consciousness movement, a philosophy almost a religion, present in virtually all black political and community organizations has as its purpose to make blacks proud and conscious of being blacks and to create greater solidarity among blacks.

African National Congress. Although difficult to establish the extent of the ANC's role in the riots, the commission nevertheless has no doubt that the organization was continually active during the unrest and that its activities had a decided effect on the investigation and continuation of unrest.

SA Communist Party. Regarded by the ANC as a revolutionary ally in the fight to overthrow the government.

Pan African Congress. It attempted to revive itself by working through religious youth organizations it established and helped to plan attacks on government buildings in Kagiso on June 17, 1976.

Black Peoples Convention. Its greatest contribution towards unrest was its attempt to make black youths conscious of their position as blacks through the philosophy of black consciousness.

SA Students Organization. Established to further the cause of black consciousness, its members included school children and helped to get coloureds to side with blacks.

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● Lack of amenities. This did not in itself give rise to unrest, but to a limited extent could have contributed to dissatisfaction along with stronger factors.

● Race relations. Relations between the races did not cause unrest but the deep seated hatred of certain rioters against white people probably because they were regarded as the suppressors, was a direct and contributing cause of unrest.

● Communications. The handling of opposition to the language policy and failure to communicate adequately were direct and contributing causes of unrest.

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Publicity given to riots by the press and radio influenced some readers and listeners to the extent that they could turn to unrest after the most limited stimulus. There can be no doubt that black youths did excessively use the press to bring to public attention their grievances, actions and aspirations, but there was insufficient evidence to establish whether this could be considered a cause of unrest.

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● Attacks on liquor outlets and shebeens. Reasons for these were not clear and not causes of unrest but plundered alcohol that was consumed resulted in unrest becoming more intense.

● Black solidarity. By using the concept of solidarity, joint and uniform action on such issues as strikes, school boycotts and African action as a medium of instruction was obtained.

# Rector spoke as community leader

Chief Reporter

CRITICIS of the actions of the Rector of the University of the Western Cape, Professor R. E. van der Ross, during the unrest seemed to have lost sight of the fact that he spoke and wrote as a leader of his community, and in the context of circumstances within the ambit of his life-work, says the Cillie Commission report.

If he did not take cognisance of the grievances and frustrations of his own community, it he did not appreciate the effect these things could have on the university community, then he would indeed have been guilty of dereliction of duty, and unfit for his high office.

The commission says one of the difficulties encountered by Professor Van der Ross was that he found himself with a divided staff, some of whom openly supported the students

and others who accused him of not acting strongly enough against them.

The facts show that the rector at all times tried to maintain a rapport with his students. For instance, he addressed some of their meetings, he replied in writing to demands contained in memoranda drawn up by students, and he undertook to convey their grievances to the authorities.

From them, and from their troubled campus came the inspiration, the incitement and planning and agitation. It adds that there was evidence that teachers at Peninsula schools played an important role in creating an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and unrest among youngsters, and there had been testimony that many teachers had in fact incited their pupils to violence, had given sympathetic treatment to trouble-makers and had closed a blind eye to happenings that were not normally permissible

to other educational institutions.

This is how the disturbances occurred not only in the Peninsula, but also spread to other towns in the southern Cape.

The commission says the evidence before it shows that the disturbances at the Cape did not occur spontaneously, but were the violent outcome of planning and agitation. It adds that there was evi-

## Students made UWC flashpoint

Chief Reporter

THE CILLIE COMMISSION says in its report that the demonstration by students of the University of the Western Cape of their solidarity with Soweto and with the objectives of black people in the Republic made the UWC the flash-point of the disturbances in the south, in 1976.

The part played by the UWC students in the Peninsula riots must not be underestimated, it adds.

The commission says it could find nothing to substantiate charges made in camera to the commission by a group of witnesses that the Rector of the UWC, Professor R. E. van der Ross, had through his actions created "a climate of unrest" at the university.

These witnesses, who had appeared together before the commission, had not been identified. They had said that Professor Van der Ross, through certain utterances and actions, had brought students under the impression that their unruly behaviour was acceptable.

They had said the rector had taken no steps to curb the unrest at the university after the trouble had started there.

One of the charges that had been made against Professor Van der Ross was that he had not acted on the recommendations of a commission which had investigated unrest on the UWC campus a few years previously.

He had, according to these witnesses, failed to take even minimal disciplinary action against students and lecturers guilty of certain behaviour. The names of a professor and of two students were mentioned in this connection.

The report says Professor Van der Ross, in testifying to the commission after these allegations had been made, had said that while action had been necessary against leaders of groups that were disrupting classes, he was of the opinion that precipitate and untimely action against such people could in the circumstances have aroused more anger and caused an even greater disturbance.

The rector had in fact taken certain measures later on.

## Unrest often followed religious meetings

Chief Reporter

THE CILLIE COMMISSION says in its report it is significant how often rioting and acts of violence in the unrest in the Cape Peninsula in 1976 followed the holding of prayer meetings or memorial services, where solidarity with the parents and children of Soweto was demonstrated.

At schools, this often led to a refusal to return to classrooms, demonstrations, processions and ultimately to rioting.


A number of such religious or pseudo-religious gatherings were held in the Peninsula.

The commission accepts that these gatherings were used by others to bring large numbers of people together and

then to act collectively. There is no direct evidence that the pamphlets and inflammatory documents found on churchgoers and sometimes in church buildings were distributed by church bodies.

The commission says some people connected with churches and theological institutions clashed with the law during the disturbances and were detained. Church leaders had in certain documents sent abroad used language that had not been carefully weighed, with the result that critics could conclude that the conduct of the trouble-makers was being praised.

Its report deals at length with allegations made against



Mr. Justice Cillie, second from left, with his three Cape advisers, Mr. D. R. Ngo, left, Mr. P. M. Sonn and Mr. J. F. Malherbe right

of education and police officials to anticipate unrest and to take countermeasures.

Riots were then carried on by organizers of protests, boycotts and strikes. Many other factors did not cause riots but contributed to them by creating a mood of unrest.

The analysis of possible causes and a summary of the findings in each case are presented in the order the commission sets them out in its report.

● Imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50-50 basis with English. The causes of the first riots on June 16 was the application in black secondary schools of the language policy which provoked misunderstanding and dissatisfaction among the people of Soweto, the organized resistance in 1976 against the implementation of the policy, the ineffective handling of the campaign by officials, and the failure of education and police officials to anticipate the threat of violence and to take countermeasures.

● Black organizations. The black consciousness movement, a philosophy almost a religion, present in virtually all black political and community organizations has as its purpose to make blacks proud and conscious of being blacks and to create greater solidarity among blacks.

African National Congress. Although difficult to establish the extent of the ANC's role in the riots, the commission nevertheless has no doubt that the organization was continually active during the unrest and that its activities had a decided effect on the investigation and continuation of unrest.

SA Communist Party. Regarded by the ANC as a revolutionary ally in the fight to overthrow the government.

Pan African Congress. It attempted to revive itself by working through religious youth organizations it established and helped to plan attacks on government buildings in Kagiso on June 17, 1976.

Black Peoples Convention. Its greatest contribution towards unrest was its attempt to make black youths conscious of their position as blacks through the philosophy of black consciousness.

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Parliament

# Unrest: Some Nat MPs showed ignorance

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By Tom Duff

EVIDENCE of how ignorant some Government MPs were about unrest and anger in Soweto emerges from remarks they made in Parliament in the week after the riots started.

The Cillie Commission has found that the imposition of Afrikaans as a teaching medium was an immediate cause of the unrest and has also listed a number of contributing factors which include key Government policies such as influx control and the Group Areas Act.

Mr Tom Langley, Nationalist MP for Waterkloof, seemed to be a bit puzzled about the cause of the riots when he spoke on June 21 1976.

### POSITIVE

'Where do those riots come from all of a sudden, now that we should be reaping the fruits of the years of positive work to establish a model state in South Africa?' he asked.

Mr F Hernan, Nationalist MP for Potgietersrus, made it very clear that he knew who was at fault: 'The riots which recently occurred are

largely due to the communist Press in South Africa.'

He referred to a caption appearing in one English-language newspaper which said: 'The Reds are not a danger, apartheid is a danger.'

Said Mr Hernan: 'If this is not absolute blatant incitement of those people in Soweto and of the black masses, I do not know what incitement is.'

### PRACTICAL

A little later he added: 'Now it is said that the language issue caused this trouble. If one wants to use one's own commonsense and be practical, one will see that the language issue had nothing to do with it.'

Said Mr W J C Rossouw, Nationalist MP for Stilfontein: 'It is the English Press that indoctrinates these people every day and suggests things to them.'

He singled out two newspapers and said: 'They are the inciters: they are the people who fan the flames of violence.'

(The Cillie Commission has found no evi-

dence that any actions of the Press were directly responsible for the unrest. Although it has found that Radio and Press coverage of unrest could impress people so much that they could rebel as a result of a slight provocation, it does not believe there were deliberately false reports or reports with a specific aim behind them.)

### TRIGGER

Some Nationalist MPs appeared to believe that the Progressive Reform Party was in some way responsible — an opinion which is not shared by the Cillie Commission.

During a speech, Dr Alex Boraine, PRP MP for Pinelands, said he accepted that the language issue was the trigger.

Said Mr J P A Reyneke, Nationalist MP for Boksburg: 'Which one of you pulled the trigger?'

Mr P H J Krinawu, National Party MP for Koedoespoort, said: 'The time has arrived for the policy of the party (the PRP), its public actions, as well as its actions in Soweto to be properly examined.'

Mr A J Vlok, the NP representative for

Verwoerdburg, agreed. 'I think it would be a good thing if South Africa could know what the role of the PRP and certain of our Press media in South Africa was in those unfortunate events which took place in Johannesburg,' he said.

The Cillie Commission has listed several factors contributing to the unrest, among which are grievances related to a lack of civil liberties enjoyed by blacks.

### RIOT SQUAD

After many months of unrest, a special riot squad was finally formed. Its members wore helmets with visors, had special clothing and carried shields and large batons.

But when he was asked in Parliament a few days after the start of the riots why such methods could not be used, the then Minister of Police, Mr Jimmy Kruger, ridiculed them.

He said: '... to have our policemen running around like knights of the middle ages, heavily armoured with coats-of-mail and visors, and goodness knows what else — a policeman in such a garb pursuing feet-footed little Bantu all over the veld — is something I can hardly imagine.'

Not only would it be ridiculous, it is also completely unnecessary. In any case, a police officer will hardly be able to handle his rifle if he is also wearing a heavy flak jacket and a face guard.

A singular feature of speeches in Parliament by some PRP and United Party MPs is how accurately they highlighted grievances both before and after the start of the unrest.



# 'NO RULES' MULDER STILL HAUNTS NATS

Weekly review by  
Frans Esterhuysen

DR Conrè Mulder's 'no rules' philosophy for survival still seems to be haunting the Government in strange and diverse ways.

The ghost arose once more when the Government was confronted in the Assembly this week about official spying on its political opponents.

Stongly reminiscent of the Mulder era was the Government's reaction that it was 'not in the public interest' to disclose whether the official spying on MPs was done legally or illegally.

The official Opposition's persistent questioning which drew the response could have been put like this: Do the rules apply or do they not? That was what it amounted to and it was the curx of the matter.

The Government would not say. Opposition fears, therefore, remained that the rules (of the law) might not apply when it came to spying on politicians.

And it was 'not in the public interest' for the Opposition or the public — to know.

This was like an echo from Dr Mulder's attempted cover-up before the Information scandal was cracked wide open.

The Botha Government's attitude to its political

opponents was shown during a remarkable exchange between Mrs Helen Suzman (PFP Houghton), backed up by her parliamentary colleagues, and the Deputy Minister of National Security, Mr Kobie Coetsee.

The episode lasted only a few minutes.

On the surface it seemed a trivial matter.

There were questions from Mrs Suzman and answers or non-answers from the Deputy Minister. Also a few heated exchanges.

Then it was all over.

But those few minutes showed more than many hours of debate might have shown on other occasions.

It began when Mrs Suzman asked in a long question whether MPs had had their telephones tapped and their mail intercepted.

She wanted to know whether this had been done in terms of the Post Office Act, and, if so, which MPs had been affected.

She also wanted to know who had requested the surveillance, what were the grounds stated by the applicant, as required in terms of the Post Office Act, and when it had been done.

The Deputy Minister replied to the effect that it was not in the public interest to make further disclosures about the tapping of telephones and the interception of correspondence of members of Parliament.

In response to further questions from Mrs Suzman and Dr Alex Boraine (PFP Pinelands), the Deputy Minister stood by this reply and refused to budge.

At one stage Mrs Suzman asked specifically whether any interception of mail or telephone tapping had been done or was being done in terms of the relevant provision of the Post Office Act.

But again she did not get a reply.



# Police had 'pop-guns' to quell rioters

Crime Reporter

Police did not have enough weapons to control rioters in the 1976 violence, says the man who was in charge of Soweto police at the time.

Retired Brigadier Schalk le Roux, who was Divisional Commissioner of Police for Soweto in 1976, said from his home in Johannesburg today that he supported the Cillie Commission's statement that

## 'So wrong, so long'

Political Staff

CAPE TOWN — Everyone could see that little had been done since the June 76 riots to "put right what has so patently been so wrong for so long," said Mr Rene de Villiers, president of the South African Institute of Race Relations.

Mr de Villiers was reacting to the Cillie Report on the causes of the riots which was tabled in Parliament yesterday.

He said the question many reasonable people would ask in the wake of the report was whether "a just and peaceful society can be built on the foundations of present State policy, or whether it would be necessary to dismantle the separate development structure before creating something just and durable in its place."

What emerges with frightening clarity from the report is the almost total absence of effective communication between the authorities and black people, he said.

the police were not properly armed or prepared for the riots.

He says he has government property account figures to back what he says — that there were not enough firearms or teargas grenades to cope.

"We did not have enough stuff to control a Sunday school picnic," he said.

Brigadier le Roux said that after he had given evidence to the commission he was asked by the then Commissioner of Police General Gert Prinsloo, why he had told the commission that the police were under-supplied with arms.

He then wrote a letter — of which he has a copy — saying that he had 16 Sten guns and hand machine carbines, 310 handguns, 160 "private issue" firearms (belonging to members of the force) and 160 teargas grenades and cartridges in stock.

"Rhodesian military officers visited us and told us that our hand machine carbines were 'pop guns' and were useless," Brigadier le Roux said.

Police had great difficulty getting their stocks replenished as there were "red-tape" snarl-ups constantly, the brigadier said.

"In November 1973 there was a request from Soweto police to the quartermaster in Pretoria for more teargas. At the time of the riots the gas had still not arrived — nearly three years later."

And, Brigadier le Roux added, the gas canisters the police had in stock were dated 1942 and 1943 in many cases and were so old that they would not go off.

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# Why the riots started — and spread

KEY aspects of Government policy caused dissatisfaction which activists exploited to create unrest in the 1976 riots, the Cillie Commission has found.

It has also delivered a damning indictment of the police and education officials in its analysis of 31 possible causes of unrest which led to rioting after June 16, 1976.

Summarising its findings, the commission says the factors which jointly caused the first riot were the application of the Afrikaans language policy in black secondary schools, the organised campaign against the policy and the inability of education and police officials to anticipate unrest and to take counter measures. Riots were then carried on by organisers of protests, boycotts and strikes. Many other factors did not cause riots but contributed to them by creating a mood of unrest.

The analysis of possible causes, and a summary of the findings in each case, are presented in the order the commission sets them out in its report.

**Imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50/50 basis with English**  
The cause of the first riots on June 16 was the application in black secondary schools of the language policy which provoked misunderstanding and dissatisfaction among the people of Soweto: the organised resistance in Soweto against the implementation of the policy; the ineffective handling of the campaign by officials; and the failure of education and police officials to anticipate the threat of violence and to take counter-measures.

**Black organisations**  
Black Consciousness Movement: A philosophy, almost a religion, present in virtually all black political and community organisations. Its purpose was to make blacks proud and conscious of their being as blacks and to create greater solidarity among blacks; black consciousness led to polarisation between black and white and created a useful climate for agitators.

**African National Congress**. Difficult to establish the extent of the ANC's role in the riots, but the commission nevertheless has no doubt that the organisation was continually active during the unrest and that its activities had a decided effect on the instigation and continuation of unrest.

**SA Communist Party**. Regarded by the ANC as a revolutionary ally in the fight to overthrow the Government.

**Pan Africanist Congress**. Attempted to revive itself by working through religious youth organisations it established. Helped to plan attacks on Government buildings in Kagiso for June 17, 1976.

**Black Peoples' Convention**. Its greatest contribution towards unrest was its attempt to make black youths conscious of their position as blacks through the philosophy of black consciousness.

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**SA Students Organisation**. Established to further the cause of black consciousness; during unrest its members incited school children and helped to get colourists to side with blacks.

SA Students Movement: Members were involved in school boycotts from April 1976, SASM meeting on June 13 decided to hold the mass protest on June 16; the Soweto Students Representative Council was a sub-committee of SASM which must therefore accept co-responsibility for unrest which began on June 16.

**Political and military developments outside SA**  
Such developments as the Frelimo and MPLA takeovers in Mozambique and Angola and events in SWA and Rhodesia were not a direct cause of unrest. But they were undoubtedly a factor which contributed to a mood conducive to a fostering of unrest.

**There was considerable dissatisfaction over Bantu education among blacks, particularly in Soweto** Sometimes there were good reasons for this, sometimes not. With the exception of the language issue and compulsory and free education, Bantu education was not a cause of unrest. It was to an extent a cause of dissatisfaction which was encouraged and exploited by people who wanted to cause unrest.

**The homeland system**  
The policy was never a direct cause of unrest, differences of opinion over the policy were sometimes the reason for actions which gave rise to unrest, dissatisfaction over the policy and a feeling of frustration with certain aspects of it contributed to a general mood of resistance and unrest.

**Although influx control and issues related to it were not directly responsible for unrest, they were contributing factors, a mood was created which could have caused many to turn to unrest or to act illogically and vandalistically in an unrest-situation**. Important changes in the system have taken place since the unrest, says the commission.

**General dissatisfaction caused by the group areas policy among blacks and colourists most decidedly contributed to a mood which was susceptible to an "instigating-stimulus"**

**No evidence to show that ethnic grouping, whether enforced or chosen, was a direct cause of any unrest or gave rise to unrest or which together with other factors led to unrest.**

**No black person or black organisation raised objections to the laws in evidence before the commission. The laws did not cause unrest or contribute to it.**

**Don't force Afrikaans on black schools'** and quoting DS Nank Buti, scribe of the black SNGK church, as saying that there were still good race relations but it should be remembered that the time for unilateral decision-making was over.

**By June 4 unrest at Belle school had still not calmed down and according to the commission "the atmosphere was report in Beeld headlined "Don't force Afrikaans on black schools"** and quoting DS Nank Buti, scribe of the black SNGK church, as saying that there were still good race relations but it should be remembered that the time for unilateral decision-making was over.

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Administration and advisory boards  
Dissatisfaction with administration boards was of such a magnitude that many black residents were activated to the extent that they could turn to rioting.

**Urban blacks**  
The fact that blacks had no say in the executive and administrative functions of official bodies was a source of dissatisfaction and frustration. Although most urban dwellers did not want to break their ties with homelands, many found as unacceptable the policy that they should be citizens of homelands and not of South Africa in which they want to be permanent residents and citizens.

**There is no instance in which these issues, separately or jointly, caused unrest**. They did, however, create a mood of opposition and dissatisfaction. People in this mood easily turn to rioting particularly if they have no democratic method of redress available.

**Nearly all legislation relating to relations between the races is coloured as unjust and is regarded by the black man and the always considered unjust did not only cause dissatisfaction but among many a great hate**. This dissatisfaction and hate was one of the foremost creators of a spirit of unrest.

**No evidence to show that housing conditions led directly to unrest**. Commission, however, agrees with those witnesses who said that inadequate housing facilities and related inconveniences contributed to a certain extent to frustration which could easily become unrest and resistance.

**Salary discrimination**  
Giving examples of salary disparities between groups in the health departments, commission says this was undoubtedly a factor in the creation of unrest.

**For so long the feeling towards transport services and the people responsible for them was so bad that only limited further frustration was necessary to create unrest**. It is also a situation exploited by agitators.

**Lack of amenities**  
Did not in themselves give rise to unrest, but to a limited extent could have contributed to dissatisfaction along with stronger factors.

**Race relations**  
Relations between the races did not cause unrest but the deep-seated hatred of certain rioters against white people, probably because they were regarded as the suppressors, was a direct and contributing cause of unrest. This hatred was sometimes exploited and encouraged by agitators.

**The handling of opposition to the language policy and failure to communicate adequately were direct and contributing causes of unrest.**

**Local circumstances in exceptional cases like the detention of fellow-students could have been a direct cause of unrest**. Local grievances were sometimes blown up by agitators into a cause but this was mostly only a factor which contributed to a climate of resistance and revolt.

**There was no case in which a lack of discipline directly gave rise to unrest but the absence of discipline undoubtedly in many cases contributed to unrest and the extent of it.**

**Hatred towards people and institutions**  
Rioters attacked whites out of hatred regardless of their positions or associations. Unfair handling by officials in certain cases filled blacks with hatred.

**Agitation and incitement**  
There was hardly any area of unrest where agitation and incitement was not present. The purpose of agitation was to further unrest. Agitation was an important immediate and contributing cause of unrest. Commission quotes the herbalist Credo Muvwa as saying in evidence that the agitator does not himself create a grievance, he uses available facts and exploits a situation.

**Although intimidation of blacks by riot organisers was not a cause of unrest, rebels used this powerful instrument to create and prolong unrest**. Because of this intimidation and the wide extent of it, together with the way intimidators disguised their motives and final objectives, it cannot be said that the unrest expressed the black man's will or that he was raising his voice against suppression and for a more democratic system in the Republic.

**Detention without trial was the cause of a limited dissatisfaction among blacks and colourists, but the extent of it could not be established**. Detentions and dissatisfaction was a contributing cause of unrest.

**Police action**  
The inability of police to foresee threatened unrest in Soweto before June 16 and to take countermeasures was a concurrent circumstance which caused unrest. This means that the police must collectively bear responsibility for these special incidents.

**The force was not in a position to halt the breach of the law**. The demonstration on June 16. Excluding police failure to anticipate unrest and to take countermeasures, there was no acceptable evidence that police action was responsible for the further development of unrest or any unrest incidents. There were cases in which police action in halting unrest led to unrest becoming stronger and wider.

**The Press**  
Publication of reports about unrest could in themselves have had consequences that were neither intended nor desired. After examination of all the available evidence the commission has come to the conclusion that it cannot be said that the dissemination of news on unrest directly caused any unrest or allowed it to continue.

**There is not evidence that any action of the Press or of certain newspapers was responsible for unrest**. Publicly given to riot by the Press and radio influenced some readers and listeners to the extent that they could turn to unrest after the most limited stimulus. There can be no doubt that black youths did excessively use the Press to bring to public attention their grievances, actions and aspirations, but there was insufficient evidence to establish whether this could be considered a cause of unrest.

**Administration of justice**  
This has not created in the black community attitudes which could give rise to unrest or which in any significant way could contribute to a climate of opposition and rebellion.

**Dr Henry Kissinger**  
Organisers were responsible for unrest in Soweto on September 17, 1976 when Dr Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, visited Pretoria and also on October 22 when Mr John Vorster, former Prime Minister, visited Kimberley.

**Labour**  
The migrant labour system was not a cause of fights and unrest but the actions of youth organisers who wanted to prevent labourers from doing what they were entitled. No evidence to show any connection between job reservation and unrest. The only connection between unemployment and unrest was that a large number of vagrants who did not want to work took part in unrest.

**Attacks on liquor outlets and shebeens**  
Reasons for this were not clear and not causes of unrest but plundered alcohol that was consumed resulted in unrest becoming more intense.

**Black solidarity**  
By using the concept of solidarity, joint and uniform action on such issues as strikes, school boycotts and Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was obtained.

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# 'Treuernicht's statement

on the language issue

But in reaching its conclusions, the commission reveals that as early as April 1976, the African Teachers Association showed the door had been closed to concessions on the Afrikaans language issue.

The Cillie Commission quotes two witnesses as saying this but finds that the former Minister of Bantu Affairs, Mr M C Botha, and Dr Treuernicht as his

on the language issue. But in reaching its conclusions, the commission reveals that as early as April 1976, the African Teachers Association showed the door had been closed to concessions on the Afrikaans language issue. The Cillie Commission quotes two witnesses as saying this but finds that the former Minister of Bantu Affairs, Mr M C Botha, and Dr Treuernicht as his

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# 262 is official Soweto toll

THE official death toll in the country-wide riots from June 16 1976 to February 28 1977 was 575, the Cillie Commission has found.

Damages estimated at R44-million was caused and 5 980 people were arrested. The commission said it was impossible to give an accurate figure for the number

of deaths. The commission says, however, that the Secretary for Bantu Education had asked officials for full details of the incident, but these were not available.

"A report was made to him and he in turn informed the Minister," the commission says. "The Minister's reply in Parliament agrees with the information the Secretary gave him."

# Deadly 20-year build-up . . .

THE building to the Soweto riots took place over a period of 20 years, starting with the imposition in black schools of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction and culminating in the outbreak of violence on the issue in June 1976.

The Cillie Commission says the immediate cause of the riots was the imposition of the Afrikaans language policy which caused dissatisfaction; the organised resistance in Soweto against the policy; the ineffective handling of the opposition by officials; and their failure to anticipate unrest.

Without giving a judgment, the commission comments, "The question arises as to whether a student educated in this way could not after 15 years or more have sympathetically for those people who allege that Afrikaans is being forced down their throats?"

A few weeks later regional officials were informed in an agriculture in Afrikaans, then should, where possible, be maintained on a 50-50 basis at secondary level," and: "Departmental approval must be obtained for any deviation from the official language use of the official languages, and that approval will be determined mainly by the availability of teachers qualified in an official language."

But in 1974 another directive was sent out declaring: "In the Southern Transvaal region Afrikaans and English will be used on a 50-50 basis."







1976

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1/3/80  
and now

It did not seem likely that the Cillie Commission would shed much light on the disturbances of 1976, particularly with its report appearing three and a half years after the events.

But, against all expectations, the report proves to be a document of significance: its recording of those traumatic and tragic happenings, and its analyses and findings, have acute relevance for where we are now and where we might be going.

Cutting through the wordiness of the report, these salient features emerge:

First, the myth about the causes of the riots, carefully cultivated by Government spokesmen at the time, is exploded: there was no sinister conspiracy by communists, agitators, the ANC, the PAC or anyone else — whatever advantage political activists might have sought later.

Second, the blame must instead be laid squarely with key aspects of Nationalist racial policy, allied with the behaviour of officials and the police.

What is striking, and depressing, in the report's description of events, is the arbitrariness with which policies were applied; the vast communication gap between the rulers and the ruled; the arrogance and blindness of officials in carrying out the decrees of their political masters.

And at the heart of it is the commission's statement on discrimination, which in summary reads:

Nearly all legislation relating to relations between the races is divisive by nature and is regarded by the black man and the coloured as injustice and discriminatory. Discrimination, which is always considered unjust, did not only cause dissatisfaction but among many, a great hate. This dissatisfaction

spirit of unrest.

Can there be any other final conclusion than that of an indictment of Nationalist rule and those who devise and implement it?

As far as the report is concerned, this relates to 1976. Yet, now in 1980, the same Government is in power pursuing the same racial policies and most of the same people are around.

Can it be said that, in the interim, there has been such change, in policy and personnel, as to relieve the Nationalists of their burden of responsibility and guilt? And which can inspire all of us with confidence in the future?

It is hard to believe it. The Cillie report tells the story — and offers the warning.



# Riot judge damns ap

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By MARTIN SCHNEIDER, Political Editor

MR JUSTICE Piet Cillie has damned apartheid, blaming key Government policies for creating dissatisfaction and even hatred, culminating in the nationwide 1976 riots which claimed 575 lives.

The former Judge-President of the Transvaal, whose 760-page report on the rioting was tabled in Parliament yesterday, said fundamental Nationalist policies had caused frustrations which were exploited by black activists.

Discrimination had caused "great hate" said the judge, who has since been appointed to the Appeal Court bench.

"This dissatisfaction and hate was one of the foremost creators of a spirit of unrest."

Policies causing dissatisfaction included Bantu Education, the homelands system, influx control, group areas, administration boards, denial of South African citizenship to blacks, salary discrimination, labour restrictions and detention without trial.

Declaring that intimidation had not started the violence but had created further unrest, the judge quoted the Soweto herbalist Mr Credo Mutwa, a former employee of the Government's West Rand Administration Board, as saying that agitators did not themselves create grievances.

They used available facts to exploit a situation, Mr Mutwa said in his evidence before Mr Justice Cillie, who acted as a one-man commission of inquiry appointed by the Government to establish the causes of the riots.

The judge exonerated Cabinet Ministers from all blame for the rioting, but his report led yesterday to concerted Opposition calls for the dismissal of Dr Andries Treurnicht, the Transvaal Nationalist leader who was Deputy Minister of Bantu Education when the violence broke out.

Dr Treurnicht was directly involved with the imposition, in black secondary schools, of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50-50 basis with English.

The commission found that this policy was the immediate cause of rioting and that it had provoked misunderstanding and dissatisfaction leading to organised resistance, particularly by the SA Students Movement.

Equally to blame for the first outbreak of violence in Soweto was the failure by education officials and police to anticipate the threat of violence and to take counter-measures.

Police had to collectively bear responsibility for causing the first riots, and education officials had failed to keep the then Minister of Bantu Affairs, Mr M C Botha, and Dr Treurnicht, informed of the extent of

- How the riots started — and spread: Page 4
- June 16 hour-by-hour: Page 5
- How 575 people died: Page 6



MR JUSTICE CILLIE

# apartheid



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however, the report discloses in details of urgent telegrams sent to Dr Treurnicht by the Institute of Race Relations only weeks before the outbreak of violence, urging him to attend to black grievances over the language issue.

Judge Cillie finds that Dr Treurnicht was not properly informed by his officials when he made inquiries in response to the Institute's warnings.

But the judge quotes two witnesses as saying that a statement by Dr Treurnicht a few days before rioting started "tipped the scales towards unrest" because it showed the door had been closed to concessions on the Afrikaans language issue.

Dr Treurnicht is likely to bear the brunt of criticism when the Cillie report is debated in Parliament next Friday.

The report also clears the Press of any malicious involvement in the riots — after numerous Government spokesmen had attacked newspapers as instigators.

"Publication of reports about unrest could in themselves have had consequences which were neither intended nor desired," the commission says.

"After examination of all the available evidence, the commission has come to the conclusion that it cannot be said that the dissemination of news on unrest directly caused any unrest or allowed it to continue."


Black educationists were particularly upset by the report yesterday.

A leading Soweto school principal, Mr Wilkie Kam-bule, differed strongly with the commission's finding that with the exception of the language issue and free and compulsory education, Bantu Education in itself was not a cause of unrest, but had contributed to dissatisfaction leading to unrest.

"Soweto is still in ferment over education today despite the fact that Afrikaans is no longer a compulsory language for tuition," he said.

"Separate education is still regarded as inferior."





# An indictment of government policy

**CAPE TOWN** — Key aspects of government policy caused dissatisfaction which activists exploited to create unrest in the 1976 riots, the Chile Commission has found.

It has also delivered a damning indictment of the police and education officials in its analysis of 31 possible causes of unrest which led to rioting after June 16, 1976.

Summarising its findings, the commission says the factors which jointly caused the first riot were the application of the Afrikaans language policy in black secondary schools, the organised campaign against the policy, and the inability of education and police officials to anticipate unrest and to take counter measures.

Riots were then carried on by organisers of protests, boycotts and strikes. Many other factors did not cause riots but contributed to them by creating a mood of unrest.

The analysis of possible causes and a summary of the findings in each case are presented in the order the commission sets them out in its report.

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satisfaction among the people of Soweto, the organised resistance in Soweto against the implementation of the policy, the ineffective handling of the campaign by officials, and the failure of education and police officials to anticipate the threat of violence and to take counter-measures.

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Its purpose was to make blacks proud and conscious of their being as blacks and to create greater solidarity among blacks: black consciousness led to polarisation between black and white and created a useful climate for agitators.

**African National Congress:** Difficult to establish the extent of the ANC's role in the riots, but the commission nevertheless has no doubt the organisation was continually active during the unrest and that its activities had a decided effect on the instigation and continuation of unrest.

**SA Communist Party:** Regarded by the ANC as a revolutionary ally in the fight to overthrow the government.

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through religious youth organisations, it established. Helped to plan attacks on government buildings in Kagiso for June 17, 1976.

**Black Peoples' Convention:** Its greatest contribution towards unrest was its attempt to make black youths conscious of their position as blacks through the philosophy of black consciousness.

**SA Organisation:** Established to further the cause of black consciousness, during unrest its members invited school children and helped to get couriers to side with blacks.

**SA Students Movement:** Members were involved in school boycotts from April 1976. SASM meeting on June 13 decided to hold the mass protest on June 16: the Soweto Students Representative Council was a sub-committee of SASM which must, therefore, accept responsibility for the unrest.

**The Comrades:** Consisted mainly of black high school students on the peninsula: caused great damage and dissatisfaction in their campaigns against shebeens: organised strikes.

**Political and military developments outside SA:** Such developments as the Frelimo and MPLA takeovers in Mozambique and Angola and events in SWA and Rhodesia were not a direct cause of unrest,

but they were undoubtedly a factor which contributed to a mood conducive to a fostering of unrest.

**Bantu education:** There was considerable dissatisfaction over Bantu education among blacks, particularly in Soweto. Sometimes there were good reasons for this, sometimes not.

With the exception of compulsory and free education, Bantu education was not a cause of unrest. It was to an extent a cause of dissatisfaction which was encouraged and exploited by people who wanted to cause unrest.

**The homeland system:** The policy was never a direct cause of unrest: differences of opinion over the policy were sometimes the reason for actions which gave rise to unrest: dissatisfaction over the policy and a feeling of frustration with certain aspects of it contributed to a general mood of resistance and unrest.

**Influx control:** Although influx control and issues related to it were not directly responsible for unrest they were contributing factors: a mood was created which could have caused many to turn to unrest or to act illegally and vandalistically in an unrest situation. Important changes in the system have taken place since the unrest, says the commission.

**Group areas:** General dissatisfaction caused by the group areas policy among blacks and coloureds most decidedly contributed to a mood which was susceptible to a "rioting-stimulus".

**Ethnic grouping:** No evidence to show that ethnic grouping, whether enforced or chosen, was a direct cause of any unrest or gave rise to unrest, or which together with other factors led to unrest.

**Immorality and Mixed Marriages Act:** No black person or black organisation raised objections to the laws in evidence before the commission. The laws did not cause unrest or contribute to it.

**Administration and Advisory Boards:** Dissatisfaction with Administration Boards was of such a magnitude that many black residents were activated to the extent they could turn to rioting.

**Urban blacks:** The fact that blacks had no say in the executive and administrative functions of official bodies was a source of dissatisfaction and frustration. Although most urban dwellers did not want to break their ties with homelands, many found as unacceptable the policy that they should be citizens of homelands and not of South Africa in which they want to be permanent residents and citizens.

**Housing in urban areas:** No evidence to show that housing conditions led directly to unrest. Commission, however, agrees with those witnesses who said inadequate housing facilities and related inconveniences contributed to a certain extent to frustration which could easily become unrest and resistance.

**Salary discrimination:** Giving examples of salary disparities between groups in the health departments, commission says this was undoubtedly a factor in the creation of unrest.

**Transport:** For so long the service towards transport services and the people responsible for them was so bad that only

limited further frustration was necessary to create unrest. It is also a factor that caused by compulsory residence in separate areas.

Modern urban blacks are deeply affected by all forms of discrimination and they see no difference between major and petty or irritating discrimination.

There is no instance in which these issues, separately or jointly, caused unrest. They did, however, create a mood of opposition and dissatisfaction. People in this mood easily turn to rioting, particularly if they have no democratic method of redress available.

contributed to unrest and the extent of it.

**Agitation and incitement:** There was hardly any area of unrest where agitation and incitement was not present. The purpose of agitation was to further unrest. Agitation was an important immediate and contributing cause of unrest.

**Race relations:** Relations between the races did not cause unrest, but the deep seated hatred of certain rioters against white people, probably because they were regarded as the suppressors, was a direct and contributing cause of unrest. This hatred was sometimes exploited and encouraged by agitators.

**Communications:** The handling of opposition to the language policy and failure to communicate adequately were direct and contributing causes of unrest.

**Local grievances:** Local circumstances in exceptional cases, like the detention of fellow students, could have been a direct cause of unrest.

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to take countermeasures and aspirations, but there was insufficient evidence to establish whether this could be considered a cause of unrest.

**Administration of justice:** This has not created in the black community attitudes which could give rise to unrest or which in any significant way could contribute to a climate of opposition and rebellion.

**Dr Henry Kissinger:** Organisers were responsible for unrest in Soweto on September 17, 1976, when Dr Kissinger, former US secretary of State, visited Pretoria, and also on October 22, when Mr John Vorster, former Prime Minister, visited Kimberley.

**Labour:** The migrant labour system was not a cause of fights and unrest but the actions of youth organisers who wanted to prevent labourers from doing what they were entitled. No evidence to show any connection between job reservation and unrest. The only connection between unemployment and unrest was that a large number of vagrants who did not want to work took part in unrest.

**Attacks on liquor outlets and shebeens:** Reasons for these were not clear and not causes of unrest, but plundered alcohol that was consumed resulted in unrest becoming more intense.

**Black solidarity:** By using the concept of solidarity, joint and uniform action on such issues as strikes, school boycotts and Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was obtained. P.S.

There can be no doubt that black youths did extensively use the press to bring to public attention their grievances, actions

and wider

of this intimidation and the wide extent of it, together with the way intimidators disguised their motives and final objectives, it cannot be said the unrest expressed the black man's will or that he was raising his voice against suppression and for a more democratic system in the Republic.

**Discipline:** There was no case in which a lack of discipline directly gave rise to unrest, but the absence of discipline undoubtedly in many cases

contributed to unrest and the extent of it.

**Agitation and incitement:** There was hardly any area of unrest where agitation and incitement was not present. The purpose of agitation was to further unrest. Agitation was an important immediate and contributing cause of unrest.

**Race relations:** Relations between the races did not cause unrest, but the deep seated hatred of certain rioters against white people, probably because they were regarded as the suppressors, was a direct and contributing cause of unrest. This hatred was sometimes exploited and encouraged by agitators.

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# Police failed to heed the warning signals

CAPE TOWN — Police had to collectively bear responsibility for the first outbreak of violence in Soweto on June 16, 1976, the Cillie Commission has found.

The commission says although the direct cause of the riots was the organisation by students of an illegal mass protest march, the inability of police to anticipate the threatened rebellion on June 16 and to take counter measure was a "concurrent circumstance" causing unrest.

"This means the police must collectively bear responsibility for this special incident," the commission says.

It discloses that while students were widely organising for at least three days, police first got to know of the planned June 16 protest march late on the afternoon of the 15th.

At about 4 pm Maj G. J. Viljoen, commanding officer at Jabulani police station, received information that students at Naledi High School were going to protest the following day.

At the same time, a black lieutenant, unnamed in the report, told Col J. A. Kleingeld, com-

manding officer at Orlando police station, of a rumour that students were planning to hold a meeting at one of the high schools in Orlando.

Later in the evening a black sergeant, unnamed in the report, told Col Kleingeld he had spoken to a student from Orlando North High School.

The student had said that five scholars from Matsike High School arrived at his school in a green kombi and said scholars should first go to school the following day and should then march. People other than students should be off the streets and cars on the streets would be burned.

"All this information, no matter how vague and incomplete it was, was never conveyed to the Divisional Commissioner or headquarters," the commission says.

It was only at 7.45 am on June 16 that Col Kleingeld told his men to ready themselves at his police station.

Later, he patrolled the area and realised he needed reinforcements as students massed on their protest march.

"The Divisional Commissioner of Police in

Soweto, Brig S. W. le Roux, gave evidence that until that morning he had still not received any report on the planned demonstrations," the commission says.

It explains the SAP argued that because there was no compulsory education, it could not take action when children boycotted classes.

"It should be accepted that the force in Soweto should be informed about matters regarding possible unrest in the area," the commission comments.

"Nevertheless, clear signs of simmering unrest were ignored in the last few weeks before the outbreak.

"There were numerous cases of violent opposition testifying to growing tension, but the police did not realise the importance of the warning signals.

"It would appear the police did not make further or sufficient investigations.

"For this reason, a group of young people could for at least three days make intensive preparations for a demonstration involving 15 000 or more students in schools throughout Soweto"

The commission says police were "completely unprepared" when they received first reports of trouble.

"The police had no plan of action to combat the first day of unrest and patrols first had to go out to establish what was happening," the commission says.

"The Divisional Commissioner's orders that students should be confined to their school grounds were incapable of execution because most of them had already left their school grounds.

"The police halted the demonstration but they could not control the rebellious crowds. Unrest started and spread through Soweto.

"It wasn't long before there was unrest in many parts of the country."

The commission adds that excluding police failure to anticipate unrest and to take counter measures, there was no acceptable evidence that police action was responsible for the further development of rioting or for riot incidents.

There were, however, cases in which police action led to unrest becoming more intensive. — PS.

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# Education officials were arrogant says Cillie

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CAPE TOWN — The Cillie Commission charges officials responsible for black education with joint responsibility for causing the first outbreaks of violence in Soweto on June 16, 1976.

It castigates them for arrogant attitude and singles out the former Regional Director of Education in Soweto, Mr W. C. Ackermann, for particular censure.

Mr. Ackermann, who was transferred out of Soweto shortly after the riots began, is accused of adopting a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude towards objections to the imposition in black secondary schools of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction of a 50/50 basis with English.

The commission says that even without having contact with Soweto there were sufficient danger signals to officials on their guard. Already in

February 1976 students were causing trouble over Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. At one point 1 800 students boycotted schools.

Questions were also being asked in parliament on boycotts and on applications by schools for exemptions from the language policy.

"Officials were asked for details but advised the Secretary (of Bantu Education) that the problems were still at a very low level," the commission says.

The report explains it appeared that implementation by officials of the language policy became more rigid.

Officials felt that only the policy-makers in government had any say over the language issue and they therefore felt it was unnecessary to discuss it with parents and other people involved in education.

Students' actions were a matter for the black school boards which had been given instructions to negotiate on the dispute over the language issue and to ensure they returned to school.

"It is not clear what room for manoeuvre school boards had in such negotiations because discussions on the policy were out of the question," the commission says.

As examples of how officials handled the language issue, the commission cites two meetings attended by Mr Ackermann on June 7 and 8.

At the first meeting, organised by the Chief Director of the West Rand Administration Board, Mr Ackermann spoke to a delegation from the Urban Bantu Council.

The chief director of WRAB, unnamed in the report, came under the impression Mr Ackermann

was unwilling to meet the UBC delegation.

The second meeting was organised by the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner and attended by Mr Ackermann, WRAB's chief director and three police officers.

Mr Ackermann believed the meeting was organised to criticise his department's handling of opposition to the language issue, but the commission says this was not the case.

At the first meeting, Mr Ackermann declared that school boards accepted responsibility to end boycotts of classes and his department could therefore do nothing about the issue.

His attitude was that the policy of equal use of Afrikaans and English was instituted because white taxpayers financed Bantu education and tax paid by urban blacks went to the homelands.

"This attitude of take-it-or-leave-it could decidedly not calm down feelings," the commission says.





At both meetings, Mr Ackermann also said students' demands could not be met because this would create an unending chain-reaction.

"Other officials showed this same attitude in the period before the outbreak of violence," the commission says.

The urban Bantu Council also requested that Education Department circulars should be sent to the UBCs committee on education. The request was turned down because the Education Department did not regard the committee as a part of the education system.

"In conclusion, it is clear that officials actions did not in any way help to avoid rebellion or to postpone it," the commission says. — PS.





DAILY DISPATCH, SATURDAY, MARCH 1, 1980 — 7



# 575 died; 3 097 injured

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**THE ASSEMBLY** — Altogether 575 people were killed and at least 3 097 injured in disturbances throughout the country between June 16, 1976, and February 28, 1977, the Cillie Commission reported.

"Of those killed, 494 were blacks, 75 were Coloureds, five were whites and one was an Indian.

"Of the total, 451 died as a result of police action and 124 as the result of actions by other people."

Soweto had the highest number of deaths, namely,

262. Of these, 208 blacks died as a result of police action and 50 blacks and four whites through the actions of other people.

The second highest number of fatalities, 117, occurred in the Western Province. Here police action claimed the lives of 54 blacks, 53 Coloureds and one Indian. A total of 29 people were killed through the actions of other people.

Statistics showed that of the total of 575, 134 were under 18 and 431 were over 18. The ages of ten of the dead could not be determined.

"The commission was informed by the South African Police that 2 389 people were injured in the riots as a result of action by members of the force. A further 1 518 were injured by other people."

A total of 262 people died in the riots in Soweto.

Of these, 208 were killed as a result of police action and 54 as a result of actions of private individuals.

Of the 208 killed by the police, 106 died in the first three days of the initial riot which started on June

16. The remainder died in subsequent incidents.

From August 4-8 five blacks died; 48 were killed from August 23-26 and 18 from September 13-15. During the rest of the trouble period, 31 people died.

The report says the 208 died from bullet wounds.

Altogether 234 black men, 22 black women, two blacks of unknown sex, three white men and one white woman died.

Of those killed, 199 were over 18 and 59 under 18. The ages of four were not known. — SAPA.

Eleven children not yet in their teens were shot dead in the riots, according to the Cillie report, which gives details of where all those killed died, the place, the date, the circumstances and the findings, if any. The 11 were:

**Khambule, Godfrey, 12 yrs;** bullet wound in neck; Kwezi railway station, August 24; killed by Railway police when police and public were stoned; no one to blame.

**Leroke, Herimna, 12 yrs;** bullet wound in chest; Diepkloof, June 17; killed while running away from helicopter; source of shot unknown; no police observed in area; no finding.

**Mabaso, Noble, 10 yrs;** bullet wound in abdomen; Naledi, August 24; killed during stoning of police; no finding.

**Madinwane, Dawid, 11 yrs;** bullet wounds; Diepkloof, September 14; found dead on premises where he lived; no finding.

**Mmutle, Dennis, 11 yrs;** bullet wound in chest; Orlando West, June 17; circumstances unknown; no finding.

**Moathudi, Agnes, 10 yrs;** bullet wound in chest; Meadowlands, November 22; was a spectator while police were firing on rioters; killed by accident; no one to blame.

**Mokoene, Vincent, 11 yrs;** multiple bullet wounds; Soweto, June 16; no finding.

**Ndhlovu, Jimmy, 12 yrs;** bullet wound in abdomen; Soweto June 17; presumed killed during looting of Klipspruit shop; no one to blame.

**Nubane, Aaron, 11 yrs;** bullet wound in head; Thabisile School, Diepkloof, June 17; circumstances unknown, no finding.

**Pleterson, Hector, 12 yrs;** bullet wound in back and neck; Orlando West High School, June 16; shot by police during confrontation at Orlando West Secondary School; no finding.

**Radebe, Wilson, 12 yrs;** bullet wounds; Zola, August 26; killed by police during attack on police; no one to blame.

The list also includes 13 dead as "unknown," but the ages given range between 23 years and 51 years. — DDR.



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# icy blamed

# 1976 Riots: Stools: Rod

**JOHANNESBURG — Mr Justice Piet Cillie has damned apartheid, blaming key government policies for the 1976 riots which left 575 dead.**

The former Judge President of the Transvaal said in his 760-page report tabled in Parliament yesterday that government policies had created dissatisfaction and even hatred that culminated in the nation-wide riots.

Nationalist policies which had caused frustration had been exploited by black activists, he said.

The judge, who has been appointed to the Appeal Court, said discrimination had caused "great hate" and the "dissatisfaction and hate had been one of the foremost creators of a spirit of unrest".

Policies causing dissatisfaction included Bantu education, the homelands system, influx control, group areas, administration boards, denial of South African citizenship to blacks, salary discrimination, labour laws and detention without trial.

Declaring that intimidation had not started the riots but had created further unrest, the judge quoted the Soweto herbalist Credo Mutwa as saying agitators did not create grievances themselves.

They used available facts to exploit a situation, Mr Mutwa said in his evidence before the judge who acted as a one-man commission of inquiry appointed by the government to establish the causes of the riots.


The judge exonerated Cabinet Ministers from all blame for the rioting, but his report led yesterday to concerted opposition calls for the dismissal of Dr Andries Treurnicht, the Transvaal Nationalist leader who was Deputy Minister of Bantu Education when the violence broke out.

Dr Treurnicht was involved directly with the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50-50 basis with English in black secondary schools.

The Cillie Commission found that the policy was the immediate cause of

grievances over the language issue.

Judge Cillie found Dr Treurnicht was not informed properly by his officials when he made inquiries in response to the institute's warnings.



But the judge quotes two witnesses as saying a statement by Dr Treurnicht a few days before rioting started "tipped the scales towards unrest" because it showed the door had been closed to concessions on the Afrikaans issue.

Dr Treurnicht is likely to bear the brunt of criticism when the Cillie report is debated in Parliament next Friday.

The report also clears

the press of any malicious involvement in the riots after numerous government spokesmen had attacked newspapers as an instigator.

"Publication of reports about unrest could in themselves have had consequences which were neither intended nor desired," the commission says.

"After examination of all the available evidence, the commission has come to the conclusion that it cannot be said that the dissemination of news on unrest directly caused any unrest or allowed it to continue."

Black educationists particularly were upset by the report yesterday.

A Soweto school principal, Mr Wilkie Kambule, differed strongly with the commission's finding.

"Soweto is still in ferment over education today despite the fact that Afrikaans is no longer a compulsory language for tuition," he said. — DDC.

MPs react, page 5. Editorial opinion, page 8.

provoked misunderstanding and dissatisfaction leading to organised resistance, particularly by the South African Students Movement.

Equally to blame for the first outbreak of violence in Soweto was the failure of education and police officials to anticipate the threat of violence and to take counter measures.

Police had to bear responsibility collectively for causing the first riots and education officials had failed to keep the then Minister of Bantu Education, Mr M. C. Botha, and Dr Treurnicht informed of the extent of black tension over the language issue.

The report, however, discloses details of urgent telegrams sent to Dr Treurnicht by the Institute of Race Relations urging him only weeks before the outbreak of violence to attend to black



CDM 1/3/80

# Le Grange's reservations

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By HELEN ZILLE  
Political Correspondent

THE ASSEMBLY. — Mr Louis le Grange, Minister of Police, said yesterday that on the whole, the police had "come off very well" in the Cillie Report — and suggested there were certain findings he did not support.

Mr Le Grange was commenting on the report, tabled in Parliament yesterday, which attributed "joint responsibility" to the police for the outbreak of rioting on June 16.

The commission also

found that in other cases there was no acceptable evidence that police action was responsible for the outbreak of rioting.

Commenting on the report, Mr Le Grange said: "There may be certain aspects where I may not agree with the judge.

"But I do not think the police came off badly at all. On the contrary, I believe they came off very well. I am thankful that people can now see under what extremely difficult circumstances the police had to

work."

He said it was "logical" there would be some criticism of the police as they had been particularly vulnerable.

"They were the force between law and order and chaos. Everything considered, I think the report confirmed that to the greatest extent the police acted properly."

Mr Le Grange said he would reserve his main comment for the snap parliamentary debate on Friday.



Political Correspondent

See pages 3, 10, 11 and 15

**APARTHEID** injustices, official bungling and bitterness and frustration among blacks about the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black secondary schools contributed to the 1976/77 riots, according to the Cillie Commission's report which was tabled in Parliament today.

In the Soweto conflagration which spread to the rest of the country 575 people were killed. The death toll in the Peninsula was 137.

The only member of the commission was Mr Justice P M Cillie, who sat with assessors in various areas. He was appointed in June 1976.

The reports states that racial discrimination bred great hatred and discontent among blacks, which contributed strongly to creating a spirit of revolt that flared in Soweto in June 1976 and flamed through the country.

### Afrikaans

It confirms that Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in the schools was the immediate cause of the unrest.

A feeling of solidarity with the people of Soweto among blacks and coloured is given as the root cause of unrest in the Peninsula.

The report maintains that the riots were to a large extent instigated by students of the University of the Western Cape and says that UWC was the 'combustion point' for the riots.

In at least two cases grievances about group areas led directly to riots.

The commission found that the initial outbreak of unrest in Soweto was not spontaneous, but the result of organisation, agitation and intimidation.

As far as the rest of the country was concerned it was found that there was virtually no unrest area where there had not been agitation or violence.

Evidence of bungling by education officials and a lack of police preparedness are contained in the long-awaited report.

### Corner stones

It finds that some corner stones of the apartheid policy contributed to the riots. Factors which contributed to black feelings of bitterness and anger include influx control laws, the Group Areas Act, the homelands sys-

tem, and official and unofficial race discrimination.

Bitter feelings among the coloured people about discrimination are also highlighted in the report.

### Coloured

Coloured people, according to evidence given to the commission, felt that most of their grievances were caused by discrimination.

Alienation from the white man developed among coloured peoples



Mr Justice P M Cillie

and with it a feeling of solidarity with blacks.

The report, which runs to over 1000 pages, was tabled only in Afrikaans. An English translation will only be available in a few months.

It makes findings only not recommendations.

### Agitators

While finding that bitterness against whites was exploited by agitators, it is critical of police who were caught unawares by the outbreak of trouble in Soweto and of Bantu Education officials who did not inform Ministers properly of growing unrest.

It also finds that there was uncertainty, misunderstanding and dissatisfaction over the implementation of the language policy.

The police are largely exonerated from blame, but it concedes that there could have been over-hasty police actions in some cases.

The total damage caused during the unrest

(Continued on Page 3, col 2)

# Call on PM to dismiss Treurnicht

Political Staff

LEADING members of both main opposition parties have called for the dismissal of Dr Andries Treurnicht from the Cabinet for his mishandling of events that led to the 1976 riots.

Mrs Helen Suzman, Opposition spokesman on black affairs, said that as the Deputy Minister responsible, Dr Treurnicht had shown himself to be incompetent and uncaring and therefore should go.

'No person who is not prepared to keep a watchful eye on the department for which he is responsible should be left in the Cabinet,' she said.

### VAUSE RAW

In a statement issued today the New Republic Party leader, Mr Vause Raw, said in the face of warnings from both the former United Party and Progressive Federal Party as well as homeland leaders and the Institute of Race Relations Dr Treurnicht as Deputy Minister in charge of education was 'guilty of complete failure to make it his business to get accurate information on the situation.'

'The Cillie report is the most damning indictment of the Government's total failure to understand let alone deal with the problems of urban black South Africa.'

### UNFORGIVABLE

'The incredible handling of the immediate causes of the riot by Dr Treurnicht and certain officials, the refusal to heed warnings and the apparent complete lack of intelligence is unforgivable.'

Mr Raw said Mr P W Botha now had no option but to dismiss Dr Treurnicht from the Cabinet 'for his responsibility for allowing the language issue to get so out of hand as to spark off the riots.'

### MRS SUZMAN

The Cillie Commission seemed to have taken pains to hold officials — and not Ministers — responsible for the initial cause of the riots, Mrs Helen Suzman said today.

However, some of the commission's comments were a significant indictment of the Government's policy in fundamental aspects, she said, commenting on the commission's report which was tabled today.



Dr Andries Treurnicht

## 'Injustices'

Argus 29/2/80  
(Continued from Page 1)

could be higher than R45-million, but the commission emphasised the difficulty of making estimates.

The report points out that several changes have come about since the riots which have affected the way of life of many blacks, but says it was not in the ambit of the commission's mandate to say whether these changes were the result of the disorders.

Changes were made in respect of Afrikaans as a medium of education at black schools and it was announced that compulsory and free education was being instituted.

### Councils

Community councils replaced advisory and urban Bantu boards and took over certain functions from administration boards.

Great changes were made in urban housing and provision is being made for electricity in Soweto.

Restrictive trade regulations in black urban residential areas were modified and there were changes regarding attendance at theatres and cinemas, the use of hotels and restaurants, the sale of beer by traders and other affairs.

The Assembly is scheduled to debate the report next Friday.



08/2/62  
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The usefulness of the report was greatly decreased by its tardy appearance, by the fact that the commission's terms of reference did not include the making of recommendations, and because so few young blacks gave evidence to the commission.

**OFFICIALS**


One is left with the impression that the commission seems to have taken pains to place responsibility at the level of officials rather than at ministerial level for the initial cause of the riots.

Thus the dismissal by the then Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Dr Andries Treurnicht, of warnings he had received about rising anger over Afrikaans as a teaching medium from several sources — was played down. All the blame was placed on the Regional Director of Bantu Education.

# INJUSTICE RIOTS, SAYS

# CAUSED CHIEF





Soweto's Mofolo Hall damaged by fire in June 1976 — still stands as evidence.

From Page 1

The deprivation of citizenship for blacks goes on unrelentingly, and the Government still believes in the myth of the existence of a white South Africa.

And according to Dr Francis Wilson, professor in the University of Cape Town's School of Economics, there is no indication of a relaxation of the pass laws — which he says constitute the most serious barrier to a peaceful future in this country.

While the streamlined influx control measures introduced after the Rieffers report might reduce the numbers slightly, the "illegals" would not necessarily move into the rural areas. They would just live more tricky and poorer lives in the urban

# June 16 warning - it could happen again

areas, said Dr Wilson. Urban blacks were not seeing the better deal everyone was talking about, and despite all the talk of change there was a real blindness on the part of the Government.

His words were echoed by Rev Allan Hendrickse leader of the coloured Labour Party, who said: "I've never heard so much talk of violence as I'm hearing now."

Mr Hendrickse said the Cillie report did to an extent highlight the causes of unrest. But it was no

good recognising the causes without positive moves to remove those causes.

"I don't think there has been real movement, real change since 1976," he said. "There has in fact been a hardening of attitudes on the part of black youngsters and a greater militancy among black youngsters."

"My concern is that the Government is not able to read the signs of the times," he said.

Joyce Harris, national secretary of the Black Sash, says that the pass

laws are in fact being more strictly administered than before — and supports her claim with statistics.

Ms Harris said that whereas around 1976 the Black Sash advice office in Johannesburg was seeing about 40 cases a day, there were now about 100 a day.

"And that's only the tip of the iceberg."

In the Eastern Cape, Rhodes University anthropologist Prof Mike Whisson said that Port Elizabeth, where there was massive unrest in 1976/77, there was a feeling among the people that there had been no significant changes.

"The tensions are as great now as they were in 1976," he said.

Dr Marianne Roux, of the Rhodes Sociology Department, said that if the people of Port Elizabeth decided to take

action on these issues, that action could well take the form of a strike. This was evidenced by the Ford strike in which the workers supported Pebco rather than the union because of the union's "apolitical" line.

A leading theologian, Dr Allan Boesak, said that because the Cillie Commission was a Government commission blacks could not expect the truth "as they experienced it in 1976."

"Many of the young people did not give evidence before the commission. Their side of the story still has to be told."

Dr Nthato Motlana, chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten said: "There is only one change that has a meaning to black in this country, the abandonment of the discredited and evil policy of apartheid."

## WHAT PEOPLE SAY

SUNDAY POST Reporter

IN a spot survey conducted by SUNDAY POST yesterday, people called on the Government to give immediate and real solutions to the Cillie Commission's findings on the June 1976 revolt that shook the country.

Mr Dukes Nhlapo, of Senoane said: "Whatever change has been effected now is nothing to shout about at all. There is still inequality between black and white education.

"And if there was any

change, our children would have been the first to know about it and there wouldn't be threats of boycotts like we have had in the past few weeks."

Mr Frederick Selepe, a former private teacher in Soweto, said: "The changes that have been brought about are not commensurate with the price the students had to pay to draw the authorities' attention to their plight.

"This is now the fourth year after those riots but how many children do you see selling

newspapers in the streets when they should be in the classroom."

A 64-year-old widow, Mrs Josephine Ntuli broke down in tears when approached by SUNDAY POST on the findings of the Cillie Commission.

She said her two sons were shot by police during the riots. One died in hospital and the other was injured in the leg.

The dead son, Samuel Ntuli, was a pupil at Vukani Lower Primary School.



# Vindicated . . . after three years in hell

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• From Page 1

been saying all along the line. Instead of being thanked for bringing to our countrymen the real grievances of our people, we were given the eternal National Party treatment reserved for those who dare tell the truth.

The ensuing hate campaign against the newspapers, and against me personally, was spearheaded by people like Mr Kruger and Mr Vorster, articulately abetted by that power specialising in character assassination — the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

In the wake of the emotional aura they managed to create against us at that time, none of them dared tell the country that:

● Alarmed by the rising wave of anger I, at the expense of my newspapers, flew to Cape Town and had long consultations with members of the opposition parties who subsequently persuaded the then Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Dr Andries Treurnicht, to see me.

● I desperately appealed to this man to at least postpone the implementation of the Afrikaans directive until the air was cleared and the parents and children given an opportunity to discuss the matter fully.

In spite of the grave dangers I tried to bring to the attention of the Minister, his final and definitive attitude was, and I quote: "Surely, Mr Kwabuzza, if we pay for the education of your people, we must at least be given the right to decide how and what they are taught."

● In utter desperation, I attempted to appeal directly to the Prime Minister. With the help of my colleague, John Patten, who was our Parliamentary Correspondent, an appointment was clinched for me that afternoon in Mr Vorster's parliamentary office. I told the Prime Minister the very same thing I had told his Cabinet colleague.

Half listening to me and half watching the proceedings in Parliament through the closed-circuit television, he gave me what was to be my most shattering statement: "Mr Kwabuzza, rest assured that law and order will be maintained at all costs."

There was no question of ditching the Afrikaans directive.

Just a few days later Soweto exploded, just as I had warned Dr Treurnicht and the Prime Minister it would. But instead of saying that I had warned them of this, they

saw me as the great villain. I was the guy who was fomenting all the trouble. They then turned all the state agencies, including their ever faithful newspapers like Die Beeld, against us.

As I stand in our newsroom today, seeing all those men and women pounding away at their typewriters, the question I ask myself is not which of these young and dedicated men and women has been to jail, but which of these young men has NOT been to jail.

The majority of them, in one way or another, have been tossed into jails at various times. They accept this philosophically. It is the price they have to pay for believing in a free Press and the right of their people to know.

I still remember the hurt and agony of going to their various families assuring them they were all right — and I was damn lying because I had no way of knowing they were all right — and that everything was being done to secure their release.

Days turned into weeks, weeks into months and in some cases, months into 18 months. At the end, their families did not have me any more feeding them with hollow consolation. I too was taken away. Five and a half months of my life was arbitrarily taken away from me. Like my colleagues, not because I had committed any crimes but because of lies, lies and more lies being spread deliberately across this nation by some politicians. The last three years while we were waiting for the report of the Cillie Commission have been sheer hell.

We were like accused waiting for three years for the sentence to be delivered. It has now been delivered through Judge Cillie. He has found us not guilty. He has vindicated our integrity and has supported our honourable intention to tell the people exactly what is happening.

As we look back, we are not ashamed of our role. If the Government had intended to intimidate us, it was a bad miscalculation. Press freedom is such a noble and worthy cause that going to jail for it is the most honourable thing to do in the experience of any self-respecting journalist.

In the light of the Cillie report, the most honourable thing left for the government to do is unban THE WORLD and WEEKEND WORLD. As long as these remain banned, it remains an ugly blot on this nation. Particularly because the reasons for banning them were based on lies.



# THIS IS ANOTHER WARNING

'76 can happen  
again, say  
country's experts

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SUNDAY POST

Reporters

SOME of the country's leading experts and politicians yesterday issued the Government with a grim warning: things are worse now than they were in June 1976 - and it could all happen again.

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If the Cillie Commission into the 1976 and 1977 countrywide uprising is right, they say, then the pass laws, group areas, the homelands system, administration boards, the denial of South African citizenship, labour restrictions and detention without trial continue to provide the explosive conditions for another June '76.

And they agree the commission is right about those things.

**Tabled**

Judge Piet Cillie says in his 760 page report, which was tabled in Parliament this week, that there have been a number of improvements in the way of life of many blacks in Soweto since the unrest.

These included the installation of Community Councils, improvements in respect of home ownership, arrangements for the provision of electricity and the scrapping of Afrikaans as medium of instruction in schools.

But experts this week told SUNDAY POST that there has in reality been no significant change, and that some of the conditions that existed in Soweto before the unrest are beginning to repeat themselves.

They warned that the Government would have to take positive steps away from its doctrine of apartheid - or face the bloody consequences.

Mr Leonard Mosala of the Soweto Committee of Ten said: "The major causes of dissatisfaction are still there. The structures of apartheid are still intact and being enforced in a brutal manner."





Editor Qoboza 2/3/80

# Not guilty: that's the verdict<sup>Abst</sup> of Judge Cillie

## COMMENT

AND so the Cillie Commission report has finally been tabled. It is a horrifying report and it carries with it ominous warnings about the possible conflicts facing the nation as long as the Government pursues its present political path.

For newspapers and pressmen — particularly black pressmen — the report is a final and sweet vindication from the legacy of lies hurled against them, the torture of being thrown into jail without trial, and the ultimate price of having two innocent newspapers banned and wiped off the streets.

Those two newspapers remain banned up to today. The Cillie Commission report has categorically stated that their investigations showed Press reports and editorial comment at the height of the conflict were well balanced and responsible. The only small item Mr Justice Cillie had misgivings about was that some of the reports may have helped to encourage acts of irresponsibility. But on the whole his commission came out strongly in favour of what the Press did in general at the time.

How pathetically far from what we were told by the then Minister of Justice, Mr Jimmy Kruger, to be joined later by the former Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster.

Casting my mind back three years I am filled with horror. Horror that the lives of nearly 600 people and damage amounting to millions of rands has had no impact on this nation.

We continue on a day-to-day basis as if nothing has happened. We mock the forces of social change and political repentance with shameless insensitivity. While we indulge in semantics, the clouds — very dark clouds — are gathering around us. Just the same as I warned they were just before that fateful morning of June 16, 1976.

This entire holocaust could have been avoided — if only the politicians had been sensitive. The Cillie Commission has in fact found there were far too many people in Government who had prior warning of the worsening situation. They did nothing. Their arrogance took the upper hand.

They kept on indulging in fantasies and dreams of a happy, content black community out there. They blamed the unhappiness on communists, agitators and their fellow conspirators. Well, the Cillie Commission looked very hard for these communists and agitators and came to the conclusion that the riots were not sparked off by these faceless and indeed non-existent men, but by genuine grievances and reaction to a vicious system that denigrates men and strips them of their dignity.

What the judge is saying is in fact what THE WORLD and WEEKEND WORLD had



# SUNDAY POST

Sunday, March 2, 1980

## Cillie — opportunity sadly squandered

THE findings of the Cillie Commission, set up to investigate the unrest of 1976, are at the same time both satisfying and frustrating.

On the one hand, Judge Cillie will earn praise for articulating in unmistakable terms the fact that Government policy was the prime cause of black discontent. This, stated as it was, by a highly respected Afrikaner judge acting in an official capacity, leaves whites with no further excuse to pretend they "do not know" about the hurtfully destructive consequences of their legislative actions.

On the other hand, the findings are frustrating in the extreme. While they go further than any before them to accurately pinpoint errors of the past, they are at the same time seriously off-target about "improvements" since then.

An investigation by this newspaper, which consisted of soliciting informed opinion from a variety of social experts, suggests that the lot of the average black has not improved since 1976 but has in fact become worse.

The obvious implications for the future, in the light of some of the Cillie Commission's findings, are horrifying.

It can be argued that predictions about future circumstances were not part of the commission's brief. But if not, why not?

Surely the question the country wants answered first is: "Can it happen again?"

It is our view, one based on actual experience, that the commission could have dealt with this with the absolute minimum loss of time and effort; all it had to do was to speak to the right people.

In our opinion, however, it seems that it spoke mostly to the wrong people. The riots involved young black students protesting about conditions in our community which have long been insufferable. Yet of the 563 witnesses who gave evidence before the commission, only about a third — 184 — were black of which only 15 were below 18 years old. The rest were white, many of whom were policemen.

This composition of witnesses displays, we believe, an appalling lack of insight and understanding about what the unrest was really all about.

The result has been, that a largely white view of the riots has been presented in the final report at the expense of a more complete black view. The effect can only be that whites will be deluded into thinking that there is a higher degree of satisfaction among blacks now than there was in 1976 and therefore that there are good possibilities of stability in the future.

This exercise of appointing a commission to investigate the Soweto unrest may have been wasted.

Not only did it fail to canvass the opinions of more of those who were closer to the riots than whites were, but it failed to give an adequate picture of what lies ahead if existing policy is not changed.

Of course it is true that we all know what could happen if there is no change, but whites require to hear it from some "official" source before they will believe, and thus act on, it.

It is because of this that the Cillie Commission could have been a highly potent instrument of change. Alas, the opportunity has been squandered.



# A day etched in

JUNE 16, 1976, is a date South Africa will always remember, for that day — almost four years ago — is etched in blood in the nation's history.

For it was on that sleepy Wednesday morning that Soweto exploded

The ensuing violence that swept across the country left 575 dead, at least 3 907 injured and resulted in the arrest of at least another 6 000 as police attempted to crush the unrest which caused damage estimated at no less than R45-million.

This week the most authoritative account to date was published in the report of Mr Justice P M Cillie, the one-man commission of inquiry into the unrest which was tabled in Parliament on Friday.

And the report, though predictable in its main finding, that it was the policy of using Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in Soweto schools that sparked the conflagration, makes some startling findings.

The most important of these is that official bungling — specifically by the police and education authorities — made the situation even worse.

It finds too that some of the foundations of the Government's apartheid race policies added to black anger which boiled over on June 16.

In his criticism of the police and educa-



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bungling and ineptitude.

This includes the fact that the police only found out about the planned June 16 Soweto demonstration the night before it took place — although it had been planned for at least three days and the meeting which mooted the idea took place "within a stone's throw of a police station".

Judge Cillie also found that intrasigent Bantu Education officials in Soweto did not properly inform the Minister of Bantu Education, Mr M C Botha, or his deputy, Dr Andries Treurnicht, or the secretary of the department of the badly deteriorating situation.

The report is especially critical of the regional director of Bantu Education for the Southern Trans-

# WHEN APARTHEID BORE ITS FRUITS

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vaal, Mr W C Ackermann.

Mr Ackermann is portrayed in evidence before the commission as an intrasigent ideologue. "The regional director's attitude was that equal use of mediums of instruction was introduced because the white taxpayers financed Bantu Educa-

tion." Summarising his findings at the end of the report, which runs to about 1 000 pages, Judge Cillie says: "The factors which together caused the first unrest were the

policy of the language of instruction in black secondary schools, the organised resistance in Soweto to this application, the handling of the resistance and the fact that the education authorities and the police, who did not see the danger coming, neglected to take precautions.

"The unrest was continued by the organisers of demonstrations, boycott and strikes, by the distributors of inciting pamphlets, by the speeches of inciters and by rioters who wanted to share in the violence and the plundering or who wanted

to create chaos to cripple the Government."

Dealing with the police, Judge Cillie discloses that because of their lack of foreknowledge only 48 policemen were on hand to face the crowd of thousands which had gathered to march to Orlando Stadium on the first day of the unrest.

"Although Colonel Kleingeld, commander of the unit of 48 gave no order to his men to fire, because he was afraid of a war on use of firearms, they opened fire after he did. Two people were killed in this incident,

one of them 21-year-old Hector Petersen, shot in the back.

Judge Cillie also noted that the police only found out about the planned June 16 Soweto demonstration the night before it took place — although it had been planned for at least three days. Police officers received information from two sources on the night before the June 16 demonstration.

Yet the information was only passed to the divisional headquarters which had to correlate information after the demonstration had begun.

Judge Cillie finds that although it is easy to be wise after the event it is "difficult to understand how a group of young people can prepare for three days for a demonstration by 15 000 or more scholars at schools throughout Soweto and that the police should receive the first, incomplete reports, about it only on the night before the demonstration was to take place.

Although some witnesses said the unrest was spontaneous Judge Cillie finds "convincing" evidence that the outbreak of violence in Soweto was in fact the result of the organisation and agitation.



# Could the 1976 happen again? and judge for

## CAN it all happen again?

Death in the streets. Gunfire. Slaughter of innocents. Weeping mothers. Homes in flames making a black pall of smoke over South Africa like the shadow of doomsday.

June 16, 1976. And after.  
Can it happen again?

On Friday — three years, eight months and 12 days after the day many regard as the most traumatic in South Africa's history — the report of the Cillie Commission into the unrest in Soweto and elsewhere was tabled in Parliament.

A major section of the report analyses the causes of the riots. The commission says it kept in mind that not all grievances were necessarily causes. Some were trivial.

Using the commission's own conclusions, the Sunday Express today takes a look at how the situation has altered since June 16, 1976. Much has changed, steps have been taken to remove or alleviate grievances, promises have been made.

Has enough been done?

According to the commission's findings, the core of the trouble was the fact that many Black children felt Afrikaans was being thrust down their throats.

The riots were caused by the way this policy was applied, the organised resistance to it by pupils, and the inability of either officials or the police to foresee the danger of the situation and act effectively.

The language issue was resolved within days of the outbreak of the unrest, but the trouble continued for two years. From the commission's report it seems clear that the issue was but a dangerous spark that, though inept handling, set fire to a powder keg.

But the report makes it clear that other factors created a climate of dissatisfaction, frustration, even hatred. Could one of these issues become another spark?

Below are some of the commission's main findings. With them are published recent incidents reported in South African newspapers involving the same or similar issues, as an indication of what the situation might be like NOW — in contrast to how the commission found it to have been THEN.

Can it happen again? Judge for yourself...

□ □ □

## ● THE LANGUAGE ISSUE (and how it was handled):

THEN: The enforced use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in Soweto schools was an immediate cause of the unrest.

Schools could obtain exemption but circulars from the Department of Bantu Education and the way in which applications were handled created confusion and uncertainty.

"Keeping (school) board members and parents in the dark promoted dissatisfaction... and created opportunity for false speculation and rumours," says the report.

The language issue led to confrontation between pupils and teachers. Police were called in. The protests spread and became more violent.

The Black People's Convention decided that the South African Students' Movement and other Black consciousness organisations should seize the issue to make Blacks aware.

Pupils met and planned a massive protest march on June 16.

On June 7 the Regional Director of Bantu Education was invited to meet a delegation of the Urban Bantu Council. The commission was told that the Chief Director of Wrab, who organised the meeting, got the impression the regional director was unwilling to attend.

At the meeting the regional director took the view that it was the responsibility of the school boards to end the boycotts. The language rule existed, it was said, because White taxpayers paid for Bantu Education.

The commission said that was not the only time this point was made.

"Sometimes, as happened at the second meeting, it was also stated that if Black children were not satisfied with the system they could stay away.

"On other occasions it was said that parents could send



● Flashback to 1976. Students people protest at the "poison" of Bantu Education

By J C VIVIERS  
and  
MARIAN SHINN


their children to the homelands suffice it to say that such allegations and an attitude of 'take it or leave it' would definitely not calm feelings."

At both meetings the regional director insisted that demands by pupils could not be met since it would lead to a chain reaction.

But this approach held the danger that legitimate grievances might not be dealt with on merit, the commission points out.

"The officials believed agitators were behind the ferment. They did not realise that the pupils were so dissatisfied and inspired that they could easily revolt."

Through their attitude the officials cut themselves off, so



they did not know what was really happening. They were unable to give warning to higher levels.

The police in Soweto were in a similar position. Apparently they failed to appreciate the seriousness of the warning signs.

"That is why a group of young people could for at least three days make intensive preparations for a demonstration of 15 000 pupils of schools throughout Soweto," states the commission.

The police, said the commission, received their first, incomplete reports of two separate marches on the evening before the demonstrations were to take place.

That meant the police were completely unprepared in terms of manpower, equipment and state of mind. They themselves were largely responsible for their unpreparedness.

A good judge of the circumstances would have realised that such a large illegal procession constituted a major threat and would have organised coun-

ter measures.

The police stopped the march but could not control the rebellious crowd. Riots broke out and spread.

NOW: The language issue was resolved days after the unrest started.

But dissatisfaction, caused by some official attitudes and behaviour, continues.

A woman of 82 was evicted from her home by a tenant who had been allocated the house by Wrab officials. When she went to find out what was happening she was told her file had been lost.

The action boiled down to a presumption by Wrab officials that the woman was the ward of her son, with whom she no longer had contact. Her son had agreed to move out of the house.

The officials finally arranged for her daughter to move to a bigger house which she could share.

Blacks have complained about being badly treated at New Canada's offices. They said they arrived at 4.30am and the offices only opened at 8am.

Wrab agreed to open its offices an hour earlier, but Blacks complain officials waste time gossiping among themselves.

On the East Rand the regional director for education and training warned the East Rand Administration Board that unless it used the money budgeted for building schools, these funds would be forfeit. East Rand community councillors were unaware this money was available.

Mr Manie Mulder, the Wrab chairman who was claimed to be blocking changes to the system and treatment of urban Blacks, has been forced out and replaced by Mr Jan Knoetze, who has a reputation for trying to improve the lot of urban Blacks.

Blacks also complain about treatment by some policemen. In January women who had been arrested on a pass raid complained they were insulted and fondled at Hillbrow police station. They are suing the Minister of Police for wrongful arrest.

## ● ORGANISATIONS:

THEN: Various organisations, including the African National Congress, the South African

Communist Party, the Black People's Convention, Saso and the Comrades were found by the commission to have contributed to the unrest.

It says the ANC's main, if not only, aim is to overthrow the Government through force and it probably anticipated that supporting the students would help.

The organisation helped the students in various ways including spiriting selected youths away for insurgency training.

NOW: Both the ANC and the South African Communist Party have stepped up their onslaught. Two armed ANC guerrillas have been arrested in northern Natal. Police said they were refugees from Soweto trained in Angola.

The three men in the Silverton bank siege were ANC members, the police claimed. ANC headquarters in London denied this.

The public has been warned that there will be further attacks and attempts to trigger off and promote unrest.

## ● THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT:

THEN: The commission reported that it was not so much a movement as a philosophy, almost a faith, found in almost all Black political or community organisations.

Its purpose is to make every Black man aware and proud of his Blackness. The commission found that for most of those in the unrest, especially the schoolchildren, Black consciousness meant Black solidarity or Black power.

Black consciousness led to Black-White polarisation, the commission found, and thus



created a climate useful to agitators.

NOW: Various Black organisations have been formed recently to fight for Black rights. Azapo was formed last year and is undergoing a leadership crisis. Black students' organisations have been reborn.

Black writers and poets are becoming the spearhead of Black consciousness and write every day about the grievances and aspirations of the Black people. Their works are frequently banned.

The SA Black Alliance, with Inkatha, is gaining momentum to fight apartheid using Government-created platforms.

## ● POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOP-

## MENTS OUTSIDE SA:

THEN: Developments such as the Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola and international support for guerrilla forces were not a direct cause of the riots. But they undoubtedly contributed to a state of mind in which insurrection could easily be encouraged, the commission found.

NOW: On Tuesday a Black Zimbabwe will be born out of violent struggle. It will give further stimulus to Black movements to step up their fight inside South Africa.

Joshua Nkomo has said he will help the ANC if he comes to power. Political observers believe Robert Mugabe will do the same.

If that happens South Africa and South West Africa will be surrounded by countries aiding the ANC.

Swapo, guerrillas regularly cross into South Africa; South Africa has accused Mozambique of allowing ANC guerrillas to have bases there.

● BANTU EDUCATION: THEN: Apart from the language issue, other aspects of Bantu Education were given by witnesses as the cause of great dissatisfaction.

One important complaint was that it was not free and compulsory. Parents were disillusioned that the education levy went to the homelands. Pupils had to buy their own books while Whites received theirs free.

"This could undoubtedly have been a source of considerable dissatisfaction," the commission says.

It considered the complaint about lack of compulsory education was justified.

As far back as 1974, says the commission, it was decided to have compulsory education and free books.

But when in 1976 it was announced that the two decisions were going to be carried out, the "Comrades" group in the Cape Peninsula declared that was not enough. They wanted a new system because Bantu Education was inferior.

"The commission does not express an opinion on whether earlier announcement of the decision to make education free and compulsory could have had any effect," the commission states.

Government educationists who gave evidence were adamant that Bantu Education was in no way inferior, but conceded that less qualified teachers may not put it over well.

The commission dismissed the argument that the standards of White and Black education could be judged by comparing the cost per head.

The commission concluded that there was considerable dissatisfaction about Bantu Education — some of it well-founded. In some cases parents were misled by unjustified criticism.

With the exception of the language issue, compulsory schooling, and free education, Bantu Education was not a cause of the unrest. It caused some dissatisfaction, and was used by those who wanted the riots to take place.

NOW: There have been many changes, including the name, but the system remains separate from national "White" education.

In Parliament this week it was announced that 48 new schools would be completed by April and there was a 17% increase of possible matriculants over the 1979 figure.

There is also an increase in the number of teachers further-

ing their training. Compulsory education for Blacks would be introduced as soon as possible. Until then thousands of Black children will not go to school.

## ● THE HOMELANDS SYSTEM:


THEN: Black attitudes were divided. Organisations such as the ANC and Saso denounced those who participated in the homelands system.

More moderate critics attacked unequal distribution of land, enforced citizenship, and prohibition on Black land ownership in White areas.

The commission found that many urban Blacks wanted to maintain links with their homelands. The homeland system was nowhere a direct cause of unrest, but dissatisfaction over aspects led in a lesser degree to an inclination towards unrest.

NOW: The Southern African Catholic Bishop's Conference reported this month that since 1948 two million Blacks have been moved in implementation of the homeland policy.

The report said apartheid was having a profound effect on



the lives of people — leading to misery and suicide.

There are still about 175 000 families (about one million people) to be moved.

In May, Blacks in Port Elizabeth's Walmer township will be moved while there is a shortage of 12 000 Black homes in the area.

There have been sporadic arson attempts and stonings.

Near Pretoria about 200 000 Black people who are not Tswana citizens will probably be moved soon from Winterveid, which is in Bophutha-Tswana.

They refuse to take up Tswana citizenship. They also fear if they lose their South African citizenship they will lose their jobs in Pretoria.

The removal of 10 000 people from Fingo village near Grahamstown was stopped by the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet Koorhof.

Families of Soweto students jailed under security laws have been told to move to the homelands if they want to give these youngsters a home when they leave prison.

## ● INFLUX CONTROL:

THEN: The purpose of influx control was both protective and preventive, the commission stated. But many Blacks considered it a system of inexplicable, discriminatory and thus objectionable measures, intended to make the Black man's stay in White areas as troublesome as possible.

Other Black people believed scrapping the measures would result in serious problems but they, too, felt aspects could be removed.

Features that caused dissatisfaction it split families, limited labour opportunities, restricted visits to White areas.

"Unfortunately, according to witnesses, some officials are not as sympathetic as their heads intimated in evidence," the commission stated.

Things like the taking of fingerprints when reference books are issued and the "callous behaviour" of the police when arresting people create anger.

There was dissatisfaction over the attitudes of some White officials whose impa-

# Officials and police did not fully understand the seriousness of the situation



# Inspector feared attack by pupils

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By Yusuf Nazeer  
A white school inspector

visiting an Indian school hurriedly telephoned the riot police because he believed a group of slogan-chanting pupils were going to attack him, a spokesman for the regional department of Indian education said.

Chief Indian school education spokesman in Pretoria, Mr Otto Beyer, said his circuit inspector Mr G R Schwarz was on a

time visit to Lenasia schools yesterday when the incident happened.

"Mr Schwarz called on the Lenasia High School and was in conference with the acting headmaster when a group of chanting pupils converged on the office.

"They were hysterical and in the circumstances, Mr Schwarz feared for his safety and telephoned the police," said Mr Beyer. The police arrived and

arrested 260 pupils who had fled to their classes.

Students gave a different version of the incident. They said when they saw Mr Schwarz arrive at the school, they felt this was an opportunity to speak to him personally about their problems.

A teacher confirmed this. He said the children had indicated that they wanted to tell Mr Schwarz, first hand, about

their plans to return to classes and to have the current examinations postponed to another date.

They said they had no intentions of resorting to violence. Their chanting was done to draw attention to the gravity of their problems.

They claimed they had already left the office after the inspector refused to speak to them. Minutes later the police

arrived and they fled into the classrooms.

Parents expressed their anger today at the police action and some annoyed teachers said they were ready to resign from the Department of Indian Education.

The children were released without being charged after parents, relatives and legal consultants converged on the Protea police station.



# Thousands join crush to see track stars

**By MARSHALL WILSON**  
**KYALAMI** resembled Rio at carnival time yesterday as more than 100 000 people shoehorned into the circuit to watch the bid by South Africa's world champion Jody Scheckter to earn his first points of the 1980 Formula 1 Grand Prix season.

After a heavy overnight flow of

fans from the coast, long lines of cars queued at the gates from early yesterday morning.

One alert security guard asked the driver of a vehicle to open the boot — and found inside a sheepish fan who proffered a R20 note.

Helicopter services ferried in fans from Jan Smuts airport and Megawatt Park. The Escom HQ was

used by many race-goers as a convenient place to leave their cars and dodge traffic problems with an airlift into the circuit.

Hundreds of people paid up to R200 to fly into Kyalami and watch the action from the comfort of several marquee tents at Club House bend.


The crowd greeted Jody

Scheckter's arrival with a roar of welcome and the champion smiled and waved as he acknowledged their "Go Jody" banners.

The crowd had a good laugh when an Air Force Alouette helicopter landed on an emergency helipad alongside the control tower and blew over the colourful umbrella of a family picnicking on the roof of a

out-building. There was a frantic grab for food and drinks and the father just managed to collar the sun umbrella before it took off in a cloud of dust.

Eight ambulances and 36 doctors stood by in case of emergency. They were backed up by two helicopters and about 50 first-aiders from several organisations.



● The scene outside one of the entrances at Kyalami yesterday morning as more than 100 000 fans converged on the Grand Prix.

# Guard dogs bite 8 GP fans in boozy night of lechery

**EIGHT** people were bitten by guard dogs at a brawling, boozing pre-Grand Prix night at Kyalami on Friday. They were trying to sneak into the most sought after area of the circuit — the pits.

A security guard told me the men who were bitten by the dogs were taken for first aid to the pits. They were trying to sneak into the most sought after area of the circuit — the pits.

For the rest, the night smells of daggas and boerewors — the hundreds of braais — burning to provide a pall of smoke all over the area which became, for one night, the biggest camp site in South Africa. A group from South West Africa — about five carloads of them — had two giant speakers mounted on their vehicles, blaring out disco music until the early hours of the morning.

At dawn, hundreds of diehards were woken by a blazing sun — a great many of them moaning about their hangovers.

**By GABI MAASTRECHT**

The litter — mainly beer bottles — was already carpeting parts of the track.

The stands were filled by Friday night with fans, drunk and otherwise, bundled into sleeping bags — it was a case of anything to reserve a seat for the big race, and the booze helped stave off the discomfort.

One of the groups on the stand were national servicemen with only a bottle of rum to keep them warm. "It's pretty uncomfortable, but I'm forced to do this to keep my place," said Piet Bezuidenhout, who was stretched out on an army blanket on the cold concrete stands.

The Kyalami gypsies, bands of revellers scattered round the course, became night-time Jody Scheckter pretenders. Many of them, in between the carousing and whooping, climbed on board their bikes or into their souped-up cars, and tore around the roads surround-

ing the track — taking part in their own midnight Grand Prix.

About 64 security guards, some of them armed and most of them schoolboys and students, patrolled the track on foot and motor bike.

"We get paid R15 per shift," said Johnny Nicolau, an 18-year-old matriculation student who worked a 12-hour-shift on Friday night. "They gave us a Coke and a hamburger at 11pm, and if we work three nights running we get to see the race free."


Asked how he felt keeping drunken rowdies from the pits, Johnny said "I can always run away if they get heavy," and then the dogs will get them. I feel quite safe."

While I was talking to him a group of youths came up to us and tried to break through. They swore, offered the guards bribes in the way of free booze, and then tried to "get heavy." They left after two more security guards arrived.

"See what I mean," said Johnny. "They should make racing like cricket, there is too much booze here."

Walking round the dark track on my own was a frightening experience. Everywhere I went I was approached by drunken men and youths who made suggestive comments to me.

I was repeatedly warned by guards and officials not to continue walking by myself as they said they could not be held responsible for my safety.



● With a mattress atop the scaffolding, this man has a bird's eye view

"I wouldn't risk it if I was you. There are a lot of bad people here tonight," a guard told me.

Eventually, after the remarks became increasingly obscene, I took his advice and was escorted by him across the track, where I found my colleagues at the Press offices.

The evening, at first quite

fun and carnival-like, became, as the booze and drugs took effect, potentially nasty.

It was nice to see friendly newspapermen after several hours of abuse from the hundreds of drunks.

Early morning arrivals, including a gleaming motorcade of vintage sports cars, were handed programmes and tick-

ets by a brigade of leggy majorettes.

T-shirts advertising everything were the main uniform of the day. Apart from the T-shirt and jeans, which dominated the scene there were several girls providing glamour in almost shorts and skimpy scarves across their tops.

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
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● It's a long, uncomfortable night, but his seat in the stands is guaranteed.



# age — or gloss over it — at our peril

nation) that is important here, and not the grounds or fairness of that accusation.

“Almost all legislation concerning the relations between races is divisive and is seen by Black and Coloured as unfair and discriminatory.”

There it is then. The legislation required to underpin the policy of separate development is promoting the anger; the very policy created to avert racial friction actually created racial hatred. It could not come out more plainly in the report.

It does not matter that the Government may have genuinely believed that its policy would improve race relations; that things like the Group Areas Act and the pass laws and removals would ultimately contribute to harmony within South Africa. It does not even matter particularly that Black people may have a distorted view of the objectives of Government policy.

The stark reality is that they reject separate development — and White South Africa cannot now simply proceed along a path rejected by more than 80% of its peoples.

Is it possible that mere adaptations may avert future trouble?

Separate development cannot exist without some form of discrimination; this is not challenged by Nationalists. Indeed they argue that there can be fair discrimination too.

Again, the Government's own commission of inquiry — the commission it appointed to tell it what caused the riots — gives an answer.

“Discrimination, which is always considered as unfair, not only caused dissatisfaction but also, in many, a great hatred. This dissatisfaction and hatred was among the most important causes of the environ-

ment and spirit of revolt.”

AND: “It does not appear as if special differentiation is made (by urban Blacks) between important and unimportant discrimination and that which is merely irritating.”

In other words, the “necessary discrimination” of Nationalist policy is going to be just as unacceptable, just as capable of arousing hatred, as what the Government terms “unnecessary discrimination”. Clearly, it is not going to be sufficient merely to tinker around with apartheid.

South Africa has wasted more than a quarter-century pursuing a policy that led inexorably to the Soweto riots.

We are lucky it was not a fatal mistake. But our luck will not hold if the mistake is not acknowledged. And rectified.

18 SUNDAY EXPRESS March 2, 1980

## We ignore the Cillie Commission's mess

THE Sunday Express believes that the conclusions drawn below are irresistible, and frightening in their implications. It does not see that the Cillie Commission findings can be interpreted in any other way.

But the issues are too important to play party politics over. This is no time to score debating points.

If our conclusions are wrong then they should be refuted now. If they are right then South Africa will have to take immediate action to avert a crisis worse than the 1976 riots.

Accordingly, we invite any concerned Nationalist to tell us — and our readers, for we will publish what they say — why the Cillie Commission report does not mean what we think it means.

IT IS sorely tempting to believe that the lessons of

**Sunday  
EXPRESS**

1976 have been learnt; that out of riot and turmoil new wisdom was born that will make it impossible for such riots ever to happen again. Tempting — but dangerous.

Certainly, much has been done to blunt some of the harsh edges of apartheid. Some grievances have been removed. There has been progress towards removing some discrimination. The Prime Minister has made important efforts to promote racial goodwill.

If Mr Justice Cillie is right, it will not be enough. The single most urgent message that comes out of the Cillie Commission report is that separate development itself, the fundamental policy of the Government, lies at the heart of the deep grievance felt by Blacks.

The country ignores this message or glosses over it at its peril.

In chapter 14, paragraph 14, the judge spells it out: “According to witnesses most urban Blacks, Coloureds and Indians regard apartheid and separate development as discrimination in the sense of unjust differentiation in treatment. Many perceive in all race segregation discrimination against the above racial groups even if such was never intended.

“Because the commission's investigation centres on causes of the unrest, it is the accusation (of discrimi-

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# AN OBITUARY LEGACY OF RACIAL

Discrimination which is always regarded as unjust, not only caused dissatisfaction, but in many a great hate. This dissatisfaction and hate were mainly responsible for the milieu and the spirit of revolt. — Mr Justice P M Cillie, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the unrest in Soweto and elsewhere.

On June 16, 1976, the hate boiled over. The children of Soweto took up arms and their weapon was the "African bomb"; the stone of the township streets. It was a deadly missile.


Within weeks townships throughout South Africa, from major industrial centres to sleepy Karoo hamlets, were ablaze. For eight months the country teetered on the brink of general insurrection.

## Tolerance ended

In the end, 575 people lay dead, thousands were injured, hundreds in jail. Schools, universities, clinics, offices, shops, houses and hostels had been destroyed, the last remnants of international tolerance of South Africa had gone up in the smoke of an township fires, and an alienated and rebellious black youth had been created to haunt the future.

But something else lay in ruins, blown to kingdom come by the "African bomb": the 30-year myth that apartheid was a workable policy applied by a strong and resourceful Government.

This week, in the long-delayed report of the Government's own commission of inquiry into the causes and the course of the riots, apartheid stands revealed not as a solution to South Africa's racial problems, but as the cause of black hatred.



## FLEUR DE VILLIERS

looks at the Cillie Commission report

tent do the politicians and bureaucrats who prosecuted that policy with vigour. When it all fell apart, the political apostles of apartheid proved themselves inadequate to recognise or meet the crisis their policies had wrought.

The report is a chilling indictment; more so, perhaps, because it is so deliberately diffident and soft-spoken, so carefully phrased by a commission which has assiduously avoided the trap of political judgments or recommendations.

But it is all there, from the first finding that one of the main and immediate causes of the Soweto riots was the Government's blind insistence on Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools, to the final disjunctive analysis of Government policy as a whole and its effect on the temper of the black South African.

And it has left the Government with no defence at all against the charge that it sold the country a bankrupt policy and today has nothing to put in its place.

## Death toll

Even today, nearly four years later, the report makes deeply depressing reading as it examines every action in every incident during South Africa's eight months of trial.

It runs to some 1 114 pages and half a million words. And it closes with

a 117-page page roll-call of the dead, ranging from an 18-month-old baby to men of 80.

Why did they die? The immediate causes of the riots, says the report, were the official policy on Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools, organised resistance to its application, official response to that resistance, and the inability of officials and police to foresee the threatening explosion in Soweto.

But the commission leaves no doubt at all that one of the main causes of resentment was the attitude of the officials of the Department of Bantu Education, from school inspectors to the secretary, who made it clear from the outset that they would brook no opposition.

## School rebels

Black school boards, and a helpless Urban Bantu Council, struggling to keep rebellious children at their desks, were told by white officials that:

● The white population paid for the education of black children in the urban areas and it was the secretary's job therefore to satisfy both the Afrikaans and English-speaking sections.

● School boycotts were the concern of the school board, but the language of instruction was a "professional matter" over which they had no say.

● The 50-50 principle was official policy and would not be abandoned.

● If black children were not happy with the system they could stay at home as school attendance was not compulsory, or their parents could send them to school in the homelands.

From early 1976 alarm signals were sounding all over Soweto until 2 000 pupils stayed home from school.

Worried blacks and concerned whites, including some Wraib officials who tried to alert the Government, were ignored.

Instead a week before the riots, a resentful re-



DAVE GASKILL

gional director of Bantu Education, Mr W C Aker-mann, attended an urgent meeting of police officers and Wraib officials in the firm belief that it had been called for no other purpose but to blame him for the situation.

On the eve of the riots questions in Parliament received laconic answers from an ill-informed Mr M C Botha and Dr Andries Treurnicht.

By the time the Minister met black leaders and announced a change in policy it was too late. Soweto had been aflame for three days.

The department's "take it or leave it policy", its unwillingness to consult with blacks and the failure of its officials to perceive the threat and inform their superiors of the true situation are roundly condemned in the report.

By June 1976 their actions had set the fuse. It was left to the organised resistance of the Soweto pupils and police attempts to contain it, to strike the match.

Some 451 black and coloured South Africans, many of them teenagers, were killed by police bullets in the eight months

that followed, but the commission absolves the police of blame. It does not, however, excuse them for their abysmal ignorance of and lack of preparation for the Soweto storm — which, it finds, might have been avoided if they had taken timely action.

## Protest march

Instead, clear signs of brewing unrest were ignored, as were cases of violent resistance, and frequent warnings went un-

For three days, the report notes, intensive preparations — some within a "stone-throw of a police station" — were made in Soweto for a protest march by 15 000 pupils.

The police received their first incomplete reports on the eve of the march.

It was to prove a disastrous lapse. The next day a small and ill-prepared group of policemen confronted the mob of angry school children in the streets.

Without a loudhailer to

help him, the commanding officer's instructions to disperse went unheard and ignored. Defective teargas grenades were tossed into the crowd, failed to explode and were tossed back.

"African bombs" began to rain on the patrol. A dog and baton charge failed and two dogs were killed.

In fear of their lives and without waiting for their commander's order to shoot, the encircled and now desperate patrol fired into the mob.

For the next eight months those shots were

to echo around the country as the police battled to contain an insurrection that spread from Soweto to Fort Beaufort, from KwaZulu to Swellendam.

But if the Department of Bantu Education had prepared the ground for the revolt, it was not a spontaneous protest, so the commission found.

It had been preface by careful organisation among the Soweto students. And it was quickly fanned by agitators and nationwide intimidation. Totists and other law-

less elements attracted by violence swelled the

## The road to riot

All are found guilty to one degree or another of creating the sense of frustration and grievance that paved the road to riot.

That is bad enough. Some of the results of Soweto, as defined by the commission, are infinitely more chilling.

● There has been an exceptional deterioration — especially in urban areas — of the attitude of black youth to whites.

● The black youth, or a large section of it and its organisations, believes that the riots prepared and inflamed them; they reflect negotiation with the Government and are prepared to continue their liberation struggle by force of arms.

● Soweto and its aftermath was their "baptism of fire" in which they lost their fear of violence.

And that is the legacy South Africa has inherited, the real and enduring cost of Soweto, now at last itemised in careful judicial tones nearly four years after the event.

That is the price of a bankrupt policy.



Chief <sup>(274)</sup>  
RDM

warns <sup>3/3/80</sup>

# on 'the state of tension'

By AMEEN AKHALWAYA  
Political Reporter

THE pent-up feelings of frustration triggered among black youths by the Afrikaans issue on June 16, 1976, still persisted today, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and president of Inkatha, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, warned yesterday.

Reacting to aspects of the Cillie Commission's findings, Chief Buthelezi said the country was still living in a state of tension between ruled and ruler because blacks did not have free expression.

"There is still a lack of communication between blacks and the Government."

Chief Buthelezi made it clear his warning should not be construed as a threat, but rather as an expression of the reality of the situation.

He said similar warnings he had made to the Government before the June 16 outbreak were either ignored or viewed by officials as threats.

"I passed on warnings to the then Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster, and Mr M C Botha (then Minister of Bantu Administration), about imminent violence in Soweto. I was ignored."

Chief Buthelezi agreed with other black educationists and politicians that Bantu education was one of the major causes of the unrest. The Cillie Commission found that Bantu education was not a cause of the unrest — it was to an extent a cause of dissatisfaction which was encouraged and exploited by people who wanted to cause unrest.

Meanwhile, a leading black educationist, Mr Fanyana Mazibuko, said that while Afrikaans was the immediate cause of the unrest, it was merely a symptom of the real problems.

The chairman of the Soweto Committee of 10, Dr Nthato Motlana, who dif-

is a serious danger sign. It is perhaps interprets such a feeling incorrectly. Pity for a man



# The Cape Times

MONDAY, MARCH 3, 1980

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## The Cillie report

THE REPORT of the Cillie commission presents the facts of the South African situation more comprehensively, more clearly, more authoritatively and in more detail than ever in our history. It would be easy enough to indulge the South African capacity for self-deception, to propel the document to a pigeon-hole to gather dust down the decades. All that's necessary is to pass the buck, to shrug off the crisis with simplistic talk about agitators, intimidators, communist agents, tsotsis, skollies, liquor, radical students, subversive organizations, turbulent churchmen. To save our skins it's wiser to look at the report for what it is, a picture of the total failure to sell apartheid to 20 million South Africans. The report sets out the terrifying magnitude of the 1976 disaster, the bitterness and variety of the grievances that tear at the hearts and sap the loyalty of most South Africans, the tensions and flaws in the arrangement of our society, the arrogance and insensitivity of officials and politicians.

### The magnitude

THE SHEER magnitude of the events can only now be grasped. The outburst at Soweto on June 16, 1976, spread in a matter of months to the West and East Rand, the Transvaal homelands, Durban and the University of Zululand, the Ciskei and Fort Hare, Port Elizabeth and the Cape Midlands, the north and south-west Cape, Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape, Nyanga. The killed number 575, 471 shot dead by the police. There were children, youths and adults of both sexes, Africans, coloured people and a few whites. At least 3 907 were wounded. There was murder, grievous assault, arson, rape, robbery, petrol-bombing, sabotage, school and university boycotts and sit-ins, stone-throwing (the "African bomb"), protest strikes, wholesale arrests, burning of motor vehicles, shops and public buildings. Damage to public buildings, beerhalls, schools, buses and private motor-cars was in the neighbourhood of R45 million.

### The grievances

RESENTMENT at the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of school instruction fired the fuse that set off the Soweto explosion that led to countrywide rioting. A dozen grievances added fuel to the flames. Group areas — a direct cause, says the commissioner; "an act of theft", said a witness (coloured pupils moved out of a school that was left to stand empty in a white area; District Six) Bantu education (inferior, not free and compulsory, 10 times more spent on a white than on a coloured child). Rude, arrogant and unsympathetic officials. Different rates of pay for the same work (a white matron gets R8 460, a coloured R6 300, an African R5 100). Lack of sport, theatre and cinema facilities. Denial of citizenship. Detention without trial. Influx control. The homelands system. No say in government for urban Africans.

These interlocking grievances are summed up in the term **DISCRIMINATION**. "Discrimination arouses great hate", says the commissioner. This is the division of South Africans into the privileged and the under-privileged, the enjoyment of life dependent on colour of skin and accident of birth, the process of making people

feel inferior, unjustly done by, humiliated and frustrated

### Our society

THESE are some of the features of our society described by the commission: some of the flaws, tensions and weaknesses in the South African way of life: Far from any hint of loyalty or affection, Afrikaans began by being resented as a medium of instruction, then as a synonym for government, becoming hatred of the Afrikaner as a race and then resentment of the white people as a unit. The commissioner reports "shocking and insulting" references to Afrikaans to measure deteriorating race relations. Sympathy with the Soweto demonstrators became solidarity with Soweto and a rallying cry for nationwide unrest. The police are regarded not as friends and protectors but as the symbol of hated and distrusted authority. There is no routine respect for law and order. The coloured people as a community have become anti-white. Far from safety in ethnic diversity, coloured people and Africans are becoming comrades in arms. Parents are brushed aside by their militant children, a process aided when a father is treated contemptuously in the presence of his children by officials, police officials and white people. Church and religion, far from being a stabilizing force, could be an influence for the contrary. There is an endemic state of deep-seated hostility between residents and migrant workers.

### The authorities

A DAY before June 16, ministers, departmental heads and officials were not aware that a group of youngsters was organizing to parade 15 000 schoolchildren in defiant protest. Specific warnings were ignored. Police were unprepared. Competent administration, the report indicates, might have averted a disaster. For months before the explosion hostility to Afrikaans was visibly growing. The reaction of officialdom was devastatingly insensitive — education is not compulsory and children can stay away if they so choose; take it or leave it; if you want English, go to the homelands; language medium is exclusively a professional matter. The ludicrous fallacy was paraded that all except direct revenue from black taxpayers is "white" money and therefore the whites have a "right" to impose a 50-50 language policy in return for expending "their" money. And the rigid rules about Afrikaans were repealed in the worst of all possible circumstances, under duress a few days after the outbreak of violence.

### The lessons

THE FIRST lesson is: Is there still seething resentment among millions of South Africans, growing hostility, multiplying grievances? Are police unprepared, officials in ignorance? Is there a Dr Treurnicht saying that he is unaware of any problem? The second lesson is probably best stated by Mr David Curry in his evidence to the commission: The present crisis will continue in South Africa as long as the root causes remain. The police will again and again be called in... Agitators will survive if the soil is fertile to sow the seed... Unless constructive steps are taken to defuse, the South African situation will move from crisis to crisis...



**SABC**

3/3/80

**ignores**

*Argus*  
**Cillie's**

**main**

**finding**

(274)

#### Political Staff

IN its regular political commentary, Editorial Comment, the SABC has ignored the Cillie Commission's chief findings on the background causes of the 1976 riots.

According to the latest broadcast, radical individuals and organisations were chiefly responsible for creating the climate for the disturbances.

In fact, the Cillie Commission found that it was racial discrimination and other apartheid injustices which set the background for the riots.

#### SINGLED OUT

The commission conspicuously singled out influx control laws, the Group Areas Act, the homelands system and acts of official and unofficial discrimination as having contributed towards black feelings of bitterness and anger.

It added that discontent over the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools was the immediate spark which set off the unrest.

But after mentioning black feelings about the use of Afrikaans, the commentary concentrated entirely on what it described as a network of organisations which contributed to the outbreak and sustaining of the unrest.

#### CONCLUSIONS

According to the SABC there are two conclusions to be drawn from the Cillie report.

The first was the need to take closely into account the sentiment of black people in developing their educational system.

The second lesson to be learnt from the report is the urgent duty that rests upon the State to curb the activities of radical groups and organisations.

They created the climate for the 1976 trouble and fed its flames, the SABC said.



# POST

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3/3/80 274

**WE HOPE, for this one time, both the Government and Opposition, will deal with the findings of the Cillie Commission, later on this week, with an open mind and a critical analysis of our situation.**

That the report itself makes horror reading, is acknowledged by all right thinking South Africans. The warnings contained in it for the future, makes this report to stand above party political game scoring activities.

The changes that have taken place in this society since that fateful day, are minimal and so inconsequential, they have just not made any impact at all. The spine-chilling attitude of our politicians who behave as if nothing happened in those eventful days, almost feels us with fear for the future of this country.

Yet, in spite of the massive bitterness and hatred that has gone through, it is still not too late to save South Africa. It is never too late to avert any major conflict, provided we acknowledge our mistakes honestly and sincerely and proceed to look for genuine redress and change of direction.

This country has both the resources and the human potential to build a great country, where the colour of a man's skin will become a shameful irrelevancy in assessing his abilities and opportunities.

The report of the Cillie Commission may, against this background, become the most critical debate Parliament ever had to face up to in the last 30 years.



# Treurnicht 'criminally negligent'

5/3/80  
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WM

## Political Staff

**THE SENATE.** — The Minister of Tourism, Dr Andries Treurnicht, was yesterday accused of "criminal negligence" in not establishing the facts before the 1976 riots.

Launching a full scale attack on the former Deputy Minister of Bantu Education during the censure debate in the Senate, Senator Warwick Webber of Natal said he believed the Cille Commission report on the riots had been "extremely tolerant and kind" to Dr Treurnicht.

nicht.

The riots could have been defused in advance if there had been better communication between the officials who had arrogantly decided to take their own action.

However, Dr Treurnicht had been warned by other people about the threatening situation in Soweto but had ignored them.

Accusing Dr Treurnicht of being disinterested in the situation, Sen Webber said he had shown an almost "criminal

negligence" in not following up the warnings which had been given to him.

"It shows a lack of diligence which is criminal," he said

"He failed to take action and did not make it his business to get accurate information.

"It resulted in the worst deterioration in race relations South Africa has ever known"

He said the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, should fire Dr Treurnicht from the Cabinet and from the National Party.

A proper evaluation of the facts could have led to steps being taken to prevent the sad saga of Soweto.

Sen Webber said there would have to be a change in attitude towards blacks in the country if the unrest was not to be repeated.

The Prime Minister had raised expectations of change but had baulked because he was afraid of Dr Treurnicht and other conservative members of the NP.

Dr Treurnicht's statement on

the Afrikaans medium issue black schools — which the report said had been the direct cause of the unrest — tipped the scales towards a revolt.

The blacks had seen his attitude to mean that they not expect concessions of kind from the Government in the future.

Blacks had held out hope of change under Botha, but now they were saying he was "all talk".



# Black education hindered by riots, says Hartzenberg

RDM  
6/3/80

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THE SENATE — Black schoolchildren had suffered most because of the 1976 Soweto riots, Dr Ferdie Hartzenberg, Minister of Education and Training, said in the Senate yesterday.

Speaking to a motion of censure of the Government, the Minister said education was one of the most important aims in the lives of blacks.

In the past 20 years there had been a growing number of candidates who had written Standard 8 and Standard 10. The only exception was in 1976.

Black education had developed with rapid strides, but it could have advanced even further if it had not been for the riots.

The report of the Cilie Commission had found that the riots were not an expression of the political will of the blacks.

Riots by young people had flared up throughout the world in 1976. The young people had rebelled against the governments of the day in many countries.

It was absurd to suggest, as

the Opposition did, that the riots were proof that the Government's policies had failed.

The Opposition had found the then deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Dr Andries Treurnicht, guilty, but the Cilie Commission's report stated that the Minister and his deputy were not to blame.

The driving forces behind the further disturbances were agitation, incitement and sedition.

Afrikaans instruction in schools could not have been a cause in many places where riots erupted because the policy had not been in force in those areas.

Shortly before the riots, 63% of the school committees in Soweto had indicated they preferred the Government policy of 50% instruction in Afrikaans and 50% English.

Three days after the riots had erupted the language issue had been straightened out, yet the disturbances had continued spreading.

Dr Hartzenberg said R181-million had been spent on black education last year.

The building of schools, teachers' training colleges and technical training centres was progressing rapidly.

This year more than twice as many matric pupils were at school than last year.

Soon the stage would be reached where a matric pass would be the minimum entrance qualification to a black teachers' training college.

Meanwhile, about 5 000 teachers had attended adult education centres last year to improve their qualifications.

Black education had a good future if there were no further disruptions, the Minister said.

Sen P J Swanepoel (NRP) said the Minister had tried to whitewash his predecessor, Dr Treurnicht.

There were numerous incidents before the eruption of widespread violence in Soweto.

Dr Treurnicht had been aware of the unrest but had refused to deviate from the language policy.

It was that attitude of Dr Treurnicht which finally tipped the scales — Sapa



# US wants elections accepted

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RDN 7/3/80

By RICHARD WALKER

NEW YORK. — United States' hopes lie in all Rhodesians accepting the judgment of the elections and in neighbouring governments "co-operating in the effort to move the Rhodesians along", United Nations ambassador Mr Donald McHenry asserted.

Mr McHenry made his remarks in a brief respite from the biggest storm since he took over from Mr Andy Young.

"I can't say it's the most comfortable period of my life," he commented wryly after a day of standing by President Carter's claim that a "communications misunderstanding" had led to him wrongly voting in support of a Security Council condemnation of Israeli settlements in occupied arab land.

Privately, it is generally accepted that Mr Carter changed his mind well after the vote — out of fear of a backlash helping his Democratic rival, Senator Edward Kennedy.



*C Times 7/3/80*  
**Lessons of Soweto** (274)

IF SOUTH AFRICA is to survive in peace, prosperity and good order, the lessons of the Soweto troubles need to be understood and applied. Obviously, something is radically wrong when youths are prepared to risk their lives — and unrest breaks out on the scale of 1976, with hundreds of people killed and injured, most of them shot by the police. Four years later, what has been done about it? At times, it has seemed as if Nationalist Afrikanerdom had learnt the lessons of 1976. Mr P W Botha's reformist speeches last year showed that at least some Nationalists knew what was needed. But a speech in the Senate this week by the minister for education and training, Dr Hartzenberg, which may well represent the majority view in Afrikanerdom, still upholds the myopic view that the main causes of the unrest were agitation and intimidation! In Dr Hartzenberg's view, it is absurd to suggest that the Nationalist government was responsible for the 1976 troubles.

In statements such as this, reflecting complacency, ignorance and breath-taking arrogance, verkrampte Nationalists are condemning this country to a dreadful future. Do they never consider the effect of their remarks? For them, it appears, black opinion is of little account. If Dr Hartzenberg's view is truly representative of Nationalist Afrikanerdom, as at times it seems to be, this country is doomed. Dr Hartzenberg's remarks show that he is no better off than the

departmental officials whose insensitive incompetence helped spark off the troubles in 1976. He is out of touch with the mood of the townships, as it was in 1976 — and as it is now. Like Dr Treurnicht in 1976, Dr Hartzenberg has not the faintest notion of the burning resentment of the apartheid system and of the Bantu education system. Like Dr Treurnicht, it appears, he is blissfully unaware of the hatred that is generated each day by the apartheid machine, as it grinds on and on, enforcing a cruel discriminatory system.

But perhaps Dr Hartzenberg does not speak for Afrikanerdom or for the government after all. In today's debate on the Cillie report, we may hope that Mr P W Botha or one of his senior ministers will stand up and repudiate the Hartzenberg-Treurnicht line — and will tell the people the truth. Soweto showed that the black masses will no longer accept the oppression and degradation of a discriminatory apartheid system, which forbids them elementary rights of family life, residential security and economic freedom to sell their labour in the best market. Dr Hartzenberg can go on as much as he likes about agitators. He is beating the air. Of course agitators must be dealt with, and firmly. But this alone will avail little. If blacks are to have a real stake in law and order and if there is to be peace, the need is for radical change — and the recognition of the citizenship rights of black South Africans. There is not much time.



# Slabbert to lead Cillie debate

Political Staff

274  
C. Times  
7/3/80

THE Cillie Commission report — an investigation into the 1976 unrest and a damning indictment of apartheid — is to be discussed in Parliament today in a special debate.

It is being regarded as one of the most important debates for some time by the opposition which will launch a full scale attack on the government for "marking time" on its promises of change.

Senior members of the opposition have already said that nearly four years after the nation-wide unrest sparked off by the Soweto riots, the same basic causes — apartheid and discrimination — remain intact and that it could all happen again unless the government moved.

Dr Andries Treurnicht, the man in charge of black education at the time, and whose statement on the Afrikaans medium in black schools is said to have detonated the unrest, will certainly be under severe pressure.

The debate will be led by the leader of the opposition, Dr

Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and it is expected that he and others will repeat their demands for Dr Treurnicht's dismissal from the cabinet for "incompetence".

Dr Treurnicht believes that he has been exonerated from blame by the commission report on the grounds that he was not fully informed about the situation in Soweto before the riots, but members of the opposition hold him responsible for the riots and have charged that "ignorance" is no excuse.

It is not known if the prime minister, Mr P W Botha, will enter the debate, but it is expected that the government's case will be led by Dr Piet Kooijman, minister of co-operation and development, Dr Ferdie Hantzenberg, minister of education and training, and Mr Louis Le Grange, minister of police.



NPU but

recalls

riot

warning

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CAPE TOWN. — The authorities should have used the Press as an early warning system before the start of the unrest in 1976, the deputy chairman of the Newspaper Press Union, Mr Dawid de Villiers, told the Steyn Commission yesterday.

He said the Cillie Commission had made it clear that the authorities and the police had apparently not taken notice of growing signs of unrest.

This was in spite of the fact that it had been written about prior to the trouble.

The Steyn Commission is conducting an inquiry into the reporting of matters affecting the security of the South African Defence Force and the Police.

Mr De Villiers said the Press was already governed by too many laws. It was unthinkable that further legal restrictions be imposed.

The chairman, Mr Justice M T Steyn, asked: "Would you agree there is already a formidable arsenal of legislation?"

Mr De Villiers: "Absolutely so." He added that the test was whether a published piece could be of use to the enemy and not whether it caused embarrassment to the Government, a general, or a Minister.

It would be in the interests of security to keep the public as fully informed as possible.

The general approach should be that as much as possible, not as little as possible, should be published, Mr De Villiers said.

Police action covered a wide field of day-to-day events affecting the public. "It is important that good relations be maintained."

Unnecessary secrecy created the danger of possible abuse of power. This was particularly important as far as the black community was concerned, he said. — Sapa.



# POST

TRANSVAAL

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*e post 2/1/60* *gax*  
 ANOTHER reason has been added to the long list of causes of the 1976 unrest. The latest comes from Mr Ferdie Hartzenberg, present Minister of Education and Training.

He told the Senate this week that Dr Andries Treurnicht had been vindicated of all blame for the riots, and that no matter what the Government's policies were, there would have been unrest as there was student unrest throughout the world during this period.

Unfortunately, this is exactly the kind of attitude that existed just before the unrest broke out. Nobody would admit that Government policy was fanning unrest. And that includes Dr Treurnicht, who said that whites paid for our education, and therefore had the right to decide what medium of instruction we must use.

Dr Hartzenberg could have done himself a great favour if he had not tried to delve into this matter. It is clear that he still cannot see what the report of the Cillie Commission means. He must be the only person who thinks that the Government has been absolved of blame.

When the debate on the report goes into the House of Assembly today, we can only hope to get better responses from the Nationalist benches. For, no matter what the Government party wants to believe, the days of politicking are over.

Although the Cillie report does not point fingers at Ministers and their deputies, the bungling of that department right under those Ministers' noses can only suggest a total disregard for the feelings of people over whom they are supposed to govern.

Playing games will not help solve South Africa's problem. Playing party politics can only make matters worse. South Africa simply does not have the time for such games anymore.

Everybody who sits in Parliament today must take the Cillie report apart, read it objectively, and contribute constructively towards the elimination of all measures that make the life of the black person in this country unbearable. Create a contented society, and you can stop looking for communists around every corner.



# Public must be informed — NPU

276 Post 7/3/80

THE authorities should have used the Press as an early warning system before the outbreak of the 1976 disturbances, the Newspaper Press Union told the Steyn Commission in Cape Town yesterday.

Advocate Dawid de Villiers, deputy chairman of the NPU, said the Cillie Commission made it clear that the authorities and the police apparently did not take notice of growing signs of unrest.

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# Riot police called to control court crowd

C. Times 7/3/80

PORT ELIZABETH — Riot police were called to control a crowd of people who were unable to attend a Terrorism Act trial here yesterday.

Earlier the trial was adjourned so that the public gallery could be cleared of about 160 people who packed the court room. After the lunch-time adjournment all the doors into the building, except the main entrance in Main Street, remained locked.

While some of a crowd of nearly 300 sang on the pavement and waved black power salutes, police allowed only people directly involved in hearings into the court building. The crowd soon started to disperse without further incident.

The divisional inspector of police in the eastern Cape, Brigadier A F Verwey, said this was the first time he had experienced such a problem.

When the magistrate, Mr P J Botha, adjourned the case, the crowd at first refused to leave the court. An uproar ensued after a man started to argue with the court orderly. Before the court was cleared the crowd rose in unison, chanted and waved their fists.



# 'Apartheid is the powder keg — just waiting for sparks'

270 RDA 8/3/80

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. — Racial confrontation would only be avoided through a change in those aspects of Government policy which contributed to the Soweto riots, the Leader of the Opposition, Dr Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert, said yesterday.

"June 16, 1976, and what followed from it was one of the most polarising events in the history of race relations in our country," he said in the special debate on the report of the Cillie Commission into the countrywide unrest.

He said there were light and dark sides to planned change.

"On the light side are those people who daily exert themselves in an effort to achieve reasonable, peaceful constitutional and socio-economic change.

"On the shadowy side are those people who have lost hope that peaceful change is possible, those who grab for guns and violence in an effort to achieve radical revolution through terror and subversion.

"These two processes of change are engaged in a deadly race and both are present daily in South Africa."

The Soweto riots had darkened the dark side of change and given it greater impetus, Dr Slabbert said.

Thousands of Black youths had left South Africa since June 1976, many of them for terrorist training, and there had been an increase in acts of terror.

"The relation between the immediate and contributory causes (of the unrest) is like that between a spark and a powder keg. If the keg isn't present it can't be exploded by

a spark."

Dr Slabbert said immediate causes could more easily be rectified than the deep-lying contributory causes.

"If the contributory causes are not changed the potential for unrest is always present.

"What is most alarming is that while there has been improvement with regard to some of the immediate and contributory causes, the most important background factors are still present and still form part of the Government's policy.

"Discrimination is still with us, group areas are still with us and influx control is still with us"

Dr Slabbert asked whether the National Party was in a position to make the necessary changes. Several Government-appointed commissions had noted that discrimination, influx control and other separate development measures were a source of polarisation and conflict.

"The NP must decide, and it must do so soon, whether it wants to work in the light or shadow side of change in South Africa.

"This Commission's report makes one thing crystal clear — our fight for survival will not be decided on or outside our borders but in our cities and towns and on our farms where white and black will have to find a peaceful way of life or else destroy each other."

The Minister of Justice, Mr ALwyn Schibusch — who introduced the debate — said the Government would consider steps to prevent repetition of the large-scale organised in-

timidation that ensured the spread of the riots.

He thanked Mr Justice P M Cillie and his assistants for their "skilful" work, and said the commission had found that intimidation in different forms was a major driving force in the riots.

"Even after the initial causes of the riots had ceased to be a reason for their continuation, organised intimidation ensured that the unrest not only continued but spread to other centres.

"The Government will consider ways and means of curbing the occurrence and effect of attempts at intimidation in future.

"I accept that the Rabie Commission at present enquiring into our security legislation will take note of these findings, and consider making recommendations in this regard."

He said a committee investigating individual cases deserving compensation for loss in the riots had completed its recommendations and the Government would soon take a final decision.

A list of such claims and the recommended compensation would then be tabled in the House. — Sapa.



## THE CILLIE DEBATE

### What the Nats said . . .

#### 'The problem's not ours alone'

THE Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, said he did not want to argue with the commission's findings, but felt that attempts should rather be made to put matters in perspective by pointing out what had already been done to satisfy the aspirations of black people. He said the report showed that these were everyone's problems.

#### 'What would you have done?'

MR HENNIE van der Walt (NP Schweizer Reneke) said it was useless for the opposition to attack the Government on the causes of the Soweto riots if it was not prepared to say what other policy could have prevented the disturbances. He said the Government had been attacked in a "calm and responsible" way by the opposition, but they had not spelt an alternative policy.

#### 'They weren't little angels'

THE police, like everyone else, had learnt from the Soweto experience, said the Minister of Police, Mr Louis le Grange. But, he said, he disagreed with the commission's finding that the police had to share responsibility. "We must also remember that the police were not dealing with thousands of little angels," he said. Mr Hennie Smit, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications: "Helen's angels."

### What the opposition said . . .

#### 'We can't just wash our hands of it'

MR VAUSE Raw, leader of the New Republic Party, said that if the debate did no more than pass the Soweto riots on to history with a washing of hands, then Parliament would create a day more tragic than the June 16, 1976. He said: "We must make sure that March 7, 1980 is not more tragic than June 16, 1976." He said the Government's remedies had to be examined for superficiality.

#### 'Hundreds of thousands embittered'

THE 1976 riots had embittered and radicalised hundreds of thousands of young blacks, said Mrs Helen Suzman, Opposition spokesman on black affairs. She said: "If black people go on regarding the police as the enemy then South Africa is doomed. I find the commission's exoneration of the police — except for their ignorance about and incompetent handling of the first day of the unrest — difficult to understand."

#### A 'sneaking suspicion' about Treurnicht

DR ALEX Boraine (PFP Pinelands) said that Dr Andries Treurnicht should resign from the Cabinet before the day was out. If he refused, the Prime Minister should fire him as he was guilty of gross maladministration of the portfolio of Bantu Education, Dr Boraine said. He said he had a "sneaking suspicion" that Mr Botha might well dismiss Dr Treurnicht "for other reasons as well".



# Lessons 'have to be learnt fast'

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8/3/80

C. I. M.

**HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.** — If the debate did no more than pass on the Soweto riots to history with a washing of the hands, then Parliament would create a day more tragic than June 16, Mr Vause Raw, leader of the New Republic Party, said.

"We must make sure that 7 March 1980 is not more tragic than 16 June 1976."

The government had admitted that the report contained good reason for change and had claimed that changes had been made. "But we must find out to what extent these changes get to the root causes of the resentment that sparked the unrest."

The real lessons of Soweto's riots had to be established and learnt faster than ever before, especially in the light of recent events around the Republic.

The remedies spelt out by the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, had to be examined and analyzed to establish whether they were not dealing with superficialities.

## Symbolism

One such measure was the 99-year lease behind which remained a symbolism that blacks could never really own the land on which their home stood

The minister was still prepared to give blacks no more than municipal rights. Policy was still that blacks would have no say in real authority ("geen seggenskap in gesag").

A close look had to be taken at the symbols of apartheid

identified in the report such as influx control, official arrogance, citizenship and the forced connection with the homelands, and hurtful discrimination.

The solutions included the sacking of Dr A P Treurnicht who refused to investigate warnings, to set up a commission to identify black aspirations and involve all race groups in consultations for a constitutional future.

If blacks were excluded from such an exercise it would be an invitation to the recreation of the atmosphere which intimidators could exploit into unrest.

It was important to give moderate leaders weapons with which to fight their own radicals.

"We must act because it is right to act, not because it is a concession to pressure," he said.

The Council of State should be convened with all races brought together to form a plan towards a common destiny for all South Africans.

The prime minister's strategy was doomed unless the festering sores were healed fully.

The debate could result in a waste of time and an admission that South Africa had not learnt its lessons or did hold the key to the secret of a new future, Mr Raw said. — Sapa



# Call for <sup>274</sup> change to stop riots

C. Times  
8/3/80.

MICHAEL ACOTT  
Political Correspondent

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. — Opposition speakers yesterday called for radical changes in government policy to prevent further riots being caused by black anger and frustration.

During the all-day debate on the Cillie Commission's report on the 1976 riots, they said the apartheid policies which caused black grievances four years ago were still being applied today.

There were also several calls for the dismissal of Dr Andries Treurnicht. As the then deputy minister of bantu education, he was blamed by opposition parties for not heeding warnings of increasing tension in black schools before the riots broke out.

Dr Treurnicht, now minister of public works and tourism, said he had no intention of resigning from the cabinet because of the Cillie report. Without referring to the commis-

sion's finding that departmental officials had not kept ministers informed, he accused opposition parties of "playing politics on the ashes of burned-out buildings".

The cabinet minister now dealing with black affairs, Dr Piet Koornhof, said earlier he had already "declared war" on the passbook and intended replacing it with an identity document similar to that issued to other races. He also said statutory discrimination should be removed as far as possible.

The report will have served

a purpose if it inspires us to go out and do the things that need doing in this country," he stated.

The leader of the opposition, Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, said the Afrikaans language issue was the spark that set off the powderkeg of black grievances. Unless aspects such as influx control, group areas, urban black policy and discrimination were altered, the potential for riots would remain.

"How many commissions does the National Party need to convince them their policy is the source of polarization?" He asked.

The leader of the New Republic Party, Mr Vause Raw, said Dr Koornhof's speech at least showed the government recognized the need to change the policies of 1976. While there had been improvements, the basic structure which led to the riots was unchanged.

Replying to government criticism of agitators and intimidation, he said agitators had exploited a situation caused by government policies.

Mrs Helen Suzman (PFP Houghton) and the minister of police, Mr Louis le Grange, both disputed the commission's findings in respect of the police.

Mrs Suzman said she could not accept the complete exoneration of the riot police, nor could she reconcile the enormous number of people killed with the use of minimum force. If police had had protective clothing and riot-control equipment, there would have been fewer fatalities.

Mr Le Grange in turn said he could not accept that the police, because of lack of preparedness and subsequent actions, were jointly responsible for the riots. He praised the police actions during the riots and their efforts to improve race relations in Soweto.



Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert



The House of Assembly yesterday began debate on the report of the Cillie Commission of Inquiry into the country-wide unrest of June, 1976.

(279) C. Times 8/3/80  
**Steps likely on 'intimidation'**

**HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.** — The government would consider steps to prevent repetition of the large-scale organized intimidation that ensured the spread of the 1976 riots, the Minister of Justice, Mr Alwyn Schlebusch, said.

The minister introduced the debate on the report of the Cillie Commission of Inquiry into the riots during and after June 16 in Soweto and elsewhere.

The report resulted from a systematic and meticulous approach. The government thanked Mr Justice P M Cillie and the professional and clerical assistants for the skilful manner in which they carried out their difficult task.

The commission had found that intimidation in different forms was a major driving force in the riots.

### Concern

"Even after the initial causes of the riots had ceased to be a reason for their continuation, organized intimidation ensured that the unrest not only continued but spread to other centres."

That intimidation of such

magnitude was possible and successful was cause for concern.

"The government will consider ways and means of curbing the occurrence and effect of attempts at intimidation in future.

"I accept that the Rabie Commission at present inquiring into our security legislation will take note of these findings, and consider making recommendations in this regard."

A committee investigating individual cases deserving compensation for loss in the riots had completed its recommendations and the government would soon take a final decision on the subject.

A list showing claims submitted to the committee and recommended compensatory payments would then be tabled here.

Criticism had been levelled at the administration of justice, but the Cillie Commission found that there was no evidence to show that the administration of justice was a direct or contributory factor in the unrest, the minister said. — Sapa



# Slabbert: Change can avert conflict

8/3/80

(274) 8/3/80 C. J. J.

**HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.** — Racial confrontation would be avoided only through a change in those aspects of government policy which were important contributory causes of the riots that erupted in Soweto on June 16, 1976, the Leader of the Opposition, Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, said yesterday.

June 16, 1976 and what followed from it was one of the most polarizing events in the history of race relations in our country," he said in the special debate on the report of the Cillie Commission into the countrywide unrest.

There were two sides to deliberate, planned change — a light side and a shadow side.

"On the light side are those people who daily exert themselves in an effort to achieve reasonable, peaceful constitutional and socio-economic change.

"On the shadow side are those people who have lost hope that peaceful change is possible, those who grab for guns and violence in an effort to achieve radical revolution through terror and subversion.

"These two processes of change are engaged in a deadly race and both are present daily in South Africa."

## Darkened

The events in Soweto on June 16, 1976 had darkened the shadow side of change and given it greater impetus, Dr Slabbert said.

"Racial polarization is one of the most difficult conflicts to solve — it is the responsibility of all people who want peaceful change to work to prevent polarization."

Thousands of black youths had left South Africa since June 1976, many of them for terrorist training, and there had been an increase in acts of terror.

Mr Justice P M Cillie in his report distinguished between the immediate causes of the riots and the background or contributory causes.

The immediate causes had been identified as the Afrikaans language instruction policy, the organized resistance to it by black students and the actions or lack thereof by officials in dealing with the resistance.

## Powder keg

Frustration and hatred felt by black people because of the policies of influx control, group areas, administration of black affairs, the policy in respect of the urban black and race discrimination generally, had been



Dr Van Zyl Slabbert

identified as contributory causes of the riots.

"The relation between the immediate and contributory causes is like that between a spark and a powder keg. If the keg isn't present it can't be exploded by a spark."

Dr Slabbert said immediate causes could more easily be rectified than the deep-lying contributory causes.

## Discrimination

"If the contributory causes are not changed the potential for unrest is always present.

"What is most alarming is that while there has been improvement with regard to some of the immediate and contributory causes, the most important background factors are still present and still form part of the government's policy.

"Discrimination is still with us, group areas are still with us and influx control is still with us.

"In other words, aspects of government policy lead to po-

larization between blacks and whites and we can only avoid confrontation if the policy changes."

Dr Slabbert asked whether the National Party was in a position to make the necessary changes. Several government-appointed commissions had noted that discrimination, influx control and other separate development measures were the source of polarization and conflict.

"The National Party must decide, and it must do so soon, whether it wants to work in the light or shadow side of change in South Africa.

"This commission's report makes one thing crystal clear — our fight for survival will not be decided on or outside our borders, but in our cities and towns and on our farms where white and black will have to find a peaceful way of life or else destroy each other."

## Irresponsible

Although the report did not say so, the attitude of Dr Andries Treurnicht, who was Deputy Minister of Bantu Education at the time of the riots, had been irresponsible. He had ignored several warnings that trouble was brewing over the enforcement of Afrikaans-language instruction.

Several days before June 16, Dr Treurnicht had stated that because the government paid for the education of blacks it should have the right to decide how blacks were taught.

"I don't believe any minister who behaves like that is worthy of his job," Dr Slabbert said — Sapa



# You should resign

(274) 8/3/80

~~(256)~~ BORAINE

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. — Dr Andries Treurnicht should resign from the Cabinet before the day was out, Dr Alex Boraine (PFP Pinelands) said. If he refused, the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, should fire him from the government.

Speaking in the debate on the report of the Cillie Commission, Dr Boraine said Dr Treurnicht, Minister of Public Works, Statistics and Tourism, was guilty of gross maladministration of the portfolio of Bantu education.

Less than a week before the riots erupted on June 16 in Soweto a member of Parliament had asked Dr Treurnicht in the Assembly about a protest demonstration by black high school pupils.

The minister had replied that his department had no knowledge of the incident.

In reply to another question, Dr Treurnicht had said he did not keep statistics on applications by Soweto school principals to deviate from the 50-50 language policy.

He also had not deemed the information to be

of such importance that the required statistics had to be obtained.

In newspaper interviews after the riots, Dr Treurnicht had said he had visited Soweto once. He had landed by helicopter during the riots, but the visit had not been thorough.

Dr Treurnicht had added that he had hoped to visit Soweto, but that he had been busy with Parliament at that time.

"This is a clear dereliction of duty. This minister must go.

"He must today do the only honourable thing. He must resign and I call on him to do that before this debate ends.

"If he refuses to do so, then I call on the Prime Minister to sack him in the same way as he dismissed Dr Connie Mulder from the Cabinet — on the same charges of maladministration."

Dr Boraine said he had the "sneaking suspicion" Mr Botha might well dismiss Dr Treurnicht "for other reasons as well". — Sapa



# I will not

— TREURNICHT

274  
C. 1  
8/3/80

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. — Afrikaans was not being forced down the throats of Soweto pupils at the time of the riots, Dr Andries Treurnicht, Transvaal Leader of the National Party, said.

He would not resign as Minister of Public Works, Statistics and Tourism as the Opposition demanded because of the Cillie Commission's report. The report had absolved him from blame for the riots.

He said he would not resign for reasons given by Opposition spokesmen.

"For what reason then?" an Opposition member interjected.

Dr Treurnicht replied: "We are now debating the Cillie Commission report."

His resignation was demanded by the Leader of the Opposition, Dr F Van Zyl Slabbert, the leader of the New Republic Party, Mr Vause Raw, and by Dr Alex Boraine (PFP Pine-lands) during the debate.

To these speakers Dr Treurnicht said: "Cut it out (skel uit). I will not resign." They should also drop such politics which exploited the ashes of ruins.

He had satisfied himself at the time of the riots that Afrikaans was not being forced down the throats of black pupils.

He also denied that Mr Percy Qoboza, editor of the World, had "rushed to Johannesburg to warn me of an impending disaster".

Mr Qoboza had indicated his visit had been a courtesy call and although the question of Afrikaans-medium education was discussed, Mr Qoboza had not left him with the impression that it was a pressing issue which was critical and on the verge of an explosion.

He denied also that he had, as was alleged, told Mr Qoboza that as whites were paying for the education of blacks, they had a right to expect them to speak the whites' (Afrikaans) language. He had told Mr Qoboza that the state had a right to see that its money was correctly spent.

"I told Mr Qoboza that my people knew what it meant to have another language thrust down its throat and that we were not planning to do the same.



Dr Treurnicht

"We were not prepared to commit a language imperialism," Dr Treurnicht said.

In meetings with President Lucas Mangope and other black leaders he had explained at the time that although the 50-50 language medium was policy, it was hardly practised anywhere. The use of both official languages had become policy in 1955 and in 1973 over 60 percent of school boards, which were the parents, approved the use of the official languages as a medium. More than 70 percent of inspectors approved it.

As regards boycotts, the department had had many experiences over years that a variety of minor reasons could spark school boycotts and it had become practice not to over-react to such incidents. — Sapa



# Treurnicht 'wa off unrest sign

(274) RDM 8/3/80

By HELEN ZILLE  
Political Correspondent

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

FOUR months before the 1976 rioting in Soweto, Dr Andries Treurnicht told Parliament that the question of the Afrikaans-language policy in black schools was not important enough for his department to waste time investigating.

This was recalled in Parliament yesterday by Dr Alex Boraine, the Progressive Federal Party MP for Pinelands.

Parliament is debating the Cillie Commission Report into the riots — Dr Treurnicht was Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education

at the time and is now facing Opposition calls for his dismissal for dereliction of duty.

The report was a damning indictment of apartheid, but found that Dr Treurnicht and Mr M C Botha, then the Minister of Bantu Administration, could not be blamed because they had not been told of the situation by their officials.

Yesterday Dr Treurnicht said: "Cut it out. I won't resign for this reason." And added that the commission had absolved him from blame.

Drawing an apparent parallel between himself and black schoolchildren, Dr Treurnicht said he did not know a word of English before going to school.

"But I didn't burn my school down and rise in protest," he said.

Replying to Dr Treurnicht, Mr Andrew Pypers (NRP, Durban Central) said: "You must get out of the political scene. South Africa cannot afford you."

In a blistering attack on Dr Treurnicht, Dr Boraine said that in February 1976 — four months before the rioting broke out — he asked Dr Treurnicht to tell Parliament how many an-

exemption from Afrikaans policy had been refused, and why.

Dr Boraine said Dr Treurnicht had replied: "I do not deem the requested information of such importance to instruct my department to undertake this time-consuming task to obtain the required information."

Ten days before the rioting, in reply to another question, Dr Treurnicht said 2 250 Soweto schoolchildren were boycotting classes because of the language issue, and he had left it to school boards to do the necessary negotiating.

Five days before the rioting, he told Parliament he had no knowledge of violent incidents at Soweto schools.

Dr Boraine said: "This is a clear dereliction of duty... I call on the Prime Minister to dismiss Dr Treurnicht in the same way he dismissed Dr Mulder for maladministration of his department."

Dr Boraine reminded the House that Dr Treurnicht had received telegrams from the Institute of Race Relations and urgent warnings in Parliament, but ignored the issue.

Dr Boraine also pointed out that the Cillie Commission served as a clear warning that the policy of apartheid was leading blacks into a situation of utter desperation which could only end in uncontrollable anger.

"The Nationalist Government stands condemned by the Cillie Report

● See Page 3

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**CILLIE COMMISSION**  
**Apartheid the cause**

On a motion of Justice Minister Alwyn Schibusch the Assembly will discuss on Friday the findings and implications of the Cillie Commission report on the 1976 riots.

The report exonerates the police for their extremely tough suppression of the black student revolt in which 451 people

died under fire.

The report says apartheid was the major cause. While defending the right of the police to meet violence with violence, the report is nevertheless highly critical of the SAP, and of senior education officials for failing to identify and defuse the unrest.

Judge Cillie also blames widespread agitation and intimidation within the black community for the spread and duration of violence across the country.

The report makes no recommendations and criticises no senior members of government or the administration. To that extent it fails as a socio-political document which otherwise could have formed the basis for reforms aimed at avoiding a recurrence of trouble.

It fails to establish or identify what black people are thinking, particularly young blacks of whom very few were interviewed by the commissioner.

It fails to condemn the arrogance and indifference of former Bantu Administra-

tion & Development Minister Michiel Botha and his deputy, Andries Treurnicht. Although uncritical of such attitudes, the report admits that a string of laws fundamental to the apartheid system were responsible for the climate of "frustration, resentment and resistance" which led to the riots.

Judge Cillie says: "Virtually all legislation regarding relations between the races is separationist, and seen by blacks and coloured people as unjust and discriminatory." He singles out the homelands policy, influx control, group area laws and the broad issues of housing, wage differentials, transport and recreational facilities.

There is little comfort for government in the report, for many of the grievances identified by Cillie persist today.

Cillie urges the fullest use of channels of communication between the races and warns. "This is no guarantee that discontent and rebellion will not occur, but if these channels are not used it will be virtually impossible to avoid revolt."



**JUDGE PETRUS CILLIE**

274 FM 7/3/80

# Politics and the law

Controversy and sensation are no strangers to Mr Justice Petrus Malan Cillie, former Judge-President of the Transvaal.

Nor is the political limelight, which he has occupied since defending Robey Leibbrandt, the Nazi sympathiser who was sentenced to death for high treason during the last war but was later released by the Nationalist government which swept to power in 1948.

His most recent contribution to the political history of SA — the report on the Soweto disturbances of 1976 — is, however, probably the work for which he will best be remembered.

Indeed, its influence on government thinking cannot be underestimated, coming, as the report does, from the pen of a man whose credentials with the authorities could not be higher. An indefatigable worker for the National Party as a young man, he was one of the central figures in the Nusas mock "political parliament," in which he sat as leader of the NP faction.

The political adventures of Cillie in the early days of the NP regime have led to plenty of anecdotes told by his former colleagues at the Bar — some flattering, others less so. But, according to those close to him, the affable and impeccably polite jurist has always shrugged off the shafts.

Sitting in Pickwickian surroundings in an office behind the Old Synagogue in Pretoria, the judge is busy with the English translation of the Cillie Report. "I'm sorry," he tells the FM, "but I am not prepared to discuss my findings. Some of my colleagues on the Bench talk about their judgments, but that's simply not my style.

"I've said in print what I want to, and that's that. All I can say is I'm glad the whole thing is now out in the open."

His next job? "I've already started work on the new delimitation of political

constituencies (he's been involved with the Delimitation Commission for some 23 years, of which seven have been spent as chairman), and this is going to be quite a business."

The 65-year-old judge's curriculum vitae describes a career of some brilliance. He took his BA Llb, at Wits, and an MA Llb at Cambridge. He worked for a time as an announcer on the BBC in London and, on returning to SA, became an announcer on the SABC. The judge's well-modulated voice is perhaps a legacy from those days.

Appointed to the Transvaal Bench in 1955, very soon after becoming a Queen's

Counsel, it is as a trial judge of sensational political and criminal cases that he is fixed in the mind of brother lawyers.

His conviction of the former Anglican Dean of Johannesburg, the Very Reverend Gonville Aubrie French-Beytagh, on three counts under the Terrorism Act, was reversed by the Appellate Division. The 60-year-old Dean was sentenced by Judge Cillie to five years imprisonment in 1971.

The Judge-President also presided at the marathon trial of Lawrence Gandar, former editor-in-chief of the *Rand Daily Mail*, and Benjamin Pogrund — then a re-

porter, now RDM deputy editor — who were charged under the Prisons Act. Convicted of publishing false information about prisons, Gandar was fined R200, and Pogrund was sentenced to three months' jail, suspended for three years.

Another highlight was the trial of David Protter and his brother, Charles, after the Fox Street siege. Protter received a sentence of 25 years, and his brother 30 months. Judge Cillie also jailed the poet, Breyten Breytenbach for nine years.

Now Cillie, recently appointed to the Appellate Division will be back to the grinding, but controversial work of the

Delimitation Commission. The Commission will make the necessary changes to the boundaries of many constituencies — probably before the next election

But not before the judge has listened to the heated arguments of the political parties involved — and taken a number of decisions which are bound, once again, to bring him into conflict with the thinking of at least some of the country's leading politicians



Judge Cillie . . . shrugging off the shafts



# R10,5m claims after riots

By MARTIN WELZ

COURT cases in which several administration boards are claiming R10,5-million from Santam insurance company for damage caused in the 1976 riots, will probably be heard by the Supreme Court only next year — four years after the unrest.

Lawyers for the boards and Santam agreed to await the Cillie Commission's report before proceeding with the cases. This week, they confirmed that they were studying the 1 000-page report and that they had started negotiations for a date to be set.

Lawyers believe the hearings could be among the longest in South African legal history.

## Big Comp

In what was regarded as a major coup for Santam at the time. The company secured the contracts for the comprehensive insurance of 17 of the 22 Bantu Administration Boards in 1975.

Within days of the outbreak of riots in Soweto, Santam cancelled the boards' riot cover with one month's notice.

Later, the boards claimed R10,5-million from Santam, which refused to pay out.

The Cillie Commission estimates that the total damage caused in the riots could be R45-million.

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# Cillie report a vote of confidence in SA Press

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THE Soweto riots of 1976 and the country-wide disturbances that followed were an anxious time for the South African Press.

On the one hand newspapers owed it to their readers to provide a detailed and accurate picture, however unpleasant, of what was happening in the townships and elsewhere. On the other hand they had to be careful that their reporting of the disturbances did not foment, or appear to foment, further disturbances and thus widen the vicious circle of unrest, riot and suppression.

How well did they succeed in striking a balance between these two conflicting factors? To judge by the report of the Cillie Commission, at least as well as could have been expected.

After its searching inquiry, the commission concluded that it "could not be said that the dissemination of news of the disturbances directly caused or prolonged any disorders."

The commission did, of course, find cases where the news of rioting and destruction fell on fertile ground and encouraged young dissidents to follow the example of their peers. This should surprise nobody.

It is an accepted fact that suicides, for instance, spur other suicides. The recent series of family murders in South Africa illustrates, too, how a latent impulse is sparked off, with ghastly consequences, by the power of example.

Yet no sane person suggests that newspapers should suppress the news of suicides and murders. All that can be asked is that they are not reported in such a way as to be a direct encouragement to others.

The commission found cases of inaccurate reporting and of

one newspaper and another, on the same incident. But it recognised the difficulties and pointed out that eye-witnesses of an incident often give conflicting evidence in court. Indeed, the same applied to evidence given before the commission itself.

The commission found no evidence to convince "gahb-erately, or with a specific aim in mind, or selectively. Nor was there any evidence that inaccurate reports led directly to disorders."

Generally, it said, editorials on the disturbances showed "balance, impartiality and a clear insight".

It is, I believe, not an exaggeration to see the Cillie report, despite its reservations and nuances, as a vote of confidence in the South African Press. This could not have come at a more opportune time.

In the shadow of the Silverton bank outrage, officials are urging restrictions on the free-

tive course by placing trust and confidence in the work of the media. This plea, it seems to me, gains additional force from the Cillie report.

Mr Stuart suggested a committee of Defence Force officers and newspaper editors, along the lines of the American Committee on Censorship, to deal with military and police reporting involving national security.

The Newspaper Press Union and the Commissioner of Police



Rand Daily Mail Ombudsman  
**James McClurg**

takes a critical look at the media.  
If you have any complaints against the Rand Daily Mail, or suggestions for the Ombudsman to take up, write to the Editor, PO Box 1138, Johannesburg.

do this.

It would, it felt, be wrong to open up old wounds unnecessarily and possibly revive fading resentments on both sides. Although this made for duller pages, I think it was the right decision.

What, then, of the solid page devoted to the death-roll in the disturbances? Was this not an

WAS IT timorousness or ineptitude that made the SABC ignore almost entirely, if not entirely, the Cillie Commission's finding that the Government's discriminatory policies were among the key causes of the disturbances?

No one expected the SABC to put these uncongenial conclusions at the top of its list. But to cast them aside verged on the ludicrous. Quaintest of all, perhaps, was the news commentary, allegedly on the report, that devoted a major part of its time to outlining the improvements in black education since 1972?


Since I said some harsh things a week or two ago about SABC-TV's news graphics, it is only fair to say that in the case of the 8 pm bulletin featuring the Cillie report, they were excellent.

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A READER is affronted by Gum's "Joeys" cartoon (see illustration) in the Rand Daily Mail of February 28. Was this in bad taste? Specifically was it racially offensive?


As the title indicates, Joeys is a caricature of the (supposedly) typical, hard-bitten Johannesburg citizen. Would we expect urbane and sophisticated wit from such a source — or the rather rancid cynicism represented in this cartoon?

I am sure it is the latter kind of humour we should look for in Joeys. Anyone who doesn't care for that sort of thing would be wise to give it a miss.



JOEYS

by Jim



In some cases, the commission thought, newspapers placed too much emphasis on black grievances, "important though these may be". It also believed some newspapers criticised black education and police so persistently as to deprecate their image.

Nevertheless — and this is remarkable considering the depth of feelings at the times and the wide chasm between the thinking of Government and Opposition newspapers — the commission could find no fault with the tone of editorial comment during those troubled months.

dom of the media to report on any similar incidents, vitally though they concern the public. In the latest submission of this kind to the Steyn Commission of inquiry into Defence and police reporting, a senior officer of the Security Police proposed what was virtually a blanket ban on publicity for any aspect of police action against terrorists.

From this it is refreshing to turn to the plea to the Steyn Commission by Mr Kelsey Stuart, legal adviser to SA Associated Newspapers, that the authorities should take the posi-

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unnecessary reminder of past suffering? I am told that this was provided, after careful consideration, as a service exclusively, to black readers.

This is the first time an authenticated list has been made available. Meanwhile the information gap had been filled, as it always is, with wild exaggerations and suppositions.

These have now been laid to rest. So although the list may have caused pain, it also served a useful purpose.

## STOP PRESS

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Any advance on that?

"It would appear," continues Mr Melville, "that not only the headline writers, but (as I have said before) the sportswriters are faulty grammarians."

Even faultier, I fear, that Mr Melville realises. His keen eye does not seem to have alighted on another sentence lower down: "I've showed him how much power and strength he's really got."

□ □ □

LONDON. — Zimbabwe-Rhodesian guerrilla leaders demanded that a Commonwealth peacekeeping force of seven thousand armed men — or with teeth — be set up to enforce a cease-fire in the warring between their forces and wit- led troops of the government of Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa. — Los Angeles Times (20.11.79).



ARGUS 11/3/80 (274) (54)  
**Inquiry evidence 'noted with dismay'**

THE University of the Western Cape Staff Association has reacted to evidence given to the Cillie Commission in camera which tried to blame the Rector, Professor R E van der Ross for unrest on the campus.

In a statement today the chairman of the Staff Association, Mr J C Elhs said: 'The Staff Association of the University of the Western Cape has noted with dis-

may the conduct of people who, in testifying to the Cillie Commission, have tried to discredit the Rector, Professor R E van der Ross

'The association wishes to dissociate itself entirely from conduct of this nature'

It was reported that several witnesses, giving evidence in camera, had alleged that Professor van der Ross had fostered unrest on the UWC campus



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# Black Sash warns of civil war in SA

Own Correspondent

JOHANNESBURG - If the government failed to act on black grievances about influx control as revealed in the Gillie Commission report, the Zimbabwean experience of "civil war and terror" would be unavoidable in South Africa, the Black Sash has warned.

The warning has come in a report released at the organization's annual conference yesterday.

day.

The document, the annual report of the Black Sash Advice Office in Johannesburg, claimed that conditions for blacks had become immeasurably worse since promises of change had begun to be made.

It also found that the pass laws had never been more rigidly enforced and had never been more efficient.

It said the Gillie Commission

had reported something of the way in which black people regarded influx control, the West Rand Administration Board, the taking away of their citizenship and the discrimination which was fundamentally the basis of the pass laws. In fact, the whole structure of oppression.

It continued: "Black people have been saying these things for decades. If the government does not hear and act the time there will be no avoiding the horror of the Zimbabwean experience of civil war and terror."

As a minimum starting point for reconstruction the government could demonstrate its intention to negotiate by stopping all resettlements, allowing anyone who had a job to keep it and by putting all available energy and resources into massive site and service housing schemes in urban areas.

"If they were to respond to this we might just be able to begin to hope again," it said.

## 8 000 families to lose breadwinners

Own Correspondent

JOHANNESBURG - Up to 8 000 families in the Ciskei and Transkei may lose breadwinners in the Western Cape through the higher fines for illegal employment of blacks, according to a report released at the Black Sash annual conference yesterday.

In a report on the activities of its Athlone Advice Office, the Cape Western region of the organization said permit problems had increased to 100 in February this year compared to 20 during February last year.

### Employers had appealed

This was due to the 500 percent increase in the fine for illegal employers of blacks who had not applied in the Western Cape. The report said many employers had appealed for registrations, citing special reasons.

A few had been successful but the rest had been refused permission and many felt they had no option but to dismiss employees of many years standing.

During an interview with Dr Piet Koorhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, a figure of 8 000 illegal female domestics in Cape Town had been quoted.

## Sash congratulates Mugabe on victory

JOHANNESBURG - The "overwhelming election victory" of the new Zimbabwe prime minister-designate, Mr Robert Mugabe, has relit the lamp of hope in the hearts of the majority of South Africans, says one of three resolutions passed at the Black Sash's 25th annual conference here yesterday.

The second resolution called on the South African Government to return the passport of the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, Bishop Desmond Tutu, while the third protested against the government's arbitrary refusal to open all restaurants to all races.

The national conference congratulated Mr Mugabe for winning the election and sent best wishes for the future of Zimbabwe.

Sapa

### Doubled

According to the report the number of people the advice office had dealt with from June to October last year had doubled in relation to the previous year. Interviews with people seeking help had increased from 7 936 to 11 811 for the same period.

This increase is a measure of the way in which conditions have become immeasurably worse since promises of change and relaxation began to be made, it said.

The report also noted a dramatic increase in the number of people for whom files were not opened because there was no point in doing so.

Among the reasons were the continuing excessive obstructiveness of officials of the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) and the fact that many people now had no hope of registration because of the increased rigidity of influx control.

The report, compiled by Mrs Sheena Duncan, director of the advice office, criticized in detail operators of WRAB labour bureaux and influx control offices and contain numerous case histories.

### Riekert report

Dealing with the Riekert report on the utilization of manpower and its consequences including sharply increased penalties on employers of non-registered workers - the report said it had recommended greater freedom of movement for



# Retoria lost the struggle in 1976

THE Cillie Commission report on the June 1976 riots causes even those of us who will never forget those dark days, to recall those events in detail and reconsider the implications.

My own mind is immediately drawn to what John Kane Berman wrote in his excellent book, *Soweto: Black Revolt White Reaction*.

Everyone who has read that book will have no illusions as to what the rulers of the country have in mind for us.


I quote: "... while any people see apartheid as little more than quaint anachronism requiring segregation in lavatories or beds, closer examination shows it to be a modern and methodical as the latest computer. George Orwell would have understood it perfectly."



We have always suspected that the Government is the actual policy of moving towards a mere just dispensation in South Africa, but of merely making it appear so to sufficient people.

Thus they will be permitted to conduct their actual policy of mounting a holding operation, awaiting what they consider to be an inevitable East-West confrontation.

The idea is that the latter would of course then be the cue for South Africa to re-enter the ranks of respectable Western countries.



Whatever the politicians in this country may say, there is no doubt at all that they are not bringing about a change in their policies in the direction that many whites seem to hope, but are continuing along the road on which they set themselves 30 years ago.

I quote John Kane Berman again: "There can be few countries where dominant elites talk so much of the need of change, but do so little to bring it about."

"Talk of change has indeed become a political tactic in itself, designed on the one hand to keep blacks quiescent, and on the other to stave off foreign pressures against apartheid."

"The English language Press, as we have seen, has tended to set great store by the Afrikaner verligtes in the faith and hope that they will somehow be the salvation of South Africa. In so doing, it has misled many of its readers

"For not only are their numbers small. They are

Government lost it forever.

In simple acts, one of which I personally witnessed, when Dr Koornhof addressed the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Government leaders have shown that they have already lost the struggle.

Dr Koornhof's address was delivered in a very friendly manner, with the Minister lapsing into Zulu from time to time, cracking carefully prepared, but expertly delivered jokes, but not highlighted with any great erudition.

In fact, it was rather pedestrian and the promises and predictions made were what we have grown accustomed to hear over and over again.

The Chief Minister's reply, however, was to say the least brilliant.

It was hard-hitting, to the point, and only once or twice did a blow land a little low.

It was also a courageous address from the point of view that the Chief Minister quoted at length from a banned publication.



Dr Koornhof was forced to sit through it all, fidgeting a little and looking exceedingly grim.

He then left, making his way grimly down the centre aisle between the rows of silent members.

There was a crowd of Zulus who had been listening to the speeches over outside loudspeakers. These were the people Dr Koornhof professed to love, with a Christian love.

He ignored them, and reaching his car went into a huddle with police officers while the crowds moved around him and the

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By **GEORGE SHUTTLEWORTH**

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trouble and finance, a virtual justification of the various critics of the present Government.

We may ask ourselves, will the Government do what its own advisers say? And must sadly conclude that it will not.

In fact, many of us feel that it actually cannot. That the last opportunity the Government had to move to the left, was June 16, 1976, a day that will be etched in the memory of South Africa for many years to come

It was at that time that John Vorster allowed the initiative to slip out of his hands forever.

I must confess that I have been one who for some time now said that Parliament is irrelevant and that the Progressive Federal Party could achieve nothing





13/3/80

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ligtes second.

The Cillie Commission shows that we now have, over the period of nearly four years, and at great expense of time,

but, realise now, the Info. scandal, that while Parliament still exists, the PFP will have a very important role to play in the liberation struggle, even though they may not eventually sit at the conference table.

In fact no one is irrelevant in the struggle.

With the coming of a new prime minister, of course there was the possibility that he would grasp the initiative once more, and it did in fact look for a while as if he was doing this.

My own view is that when senior Inkatha members made the trip overseas to confer with the anti-apartheid leaders, they took the initiative back into the hands of those of us who are in the struggle, and that the

He then slipped quietly into the backseat and was whisked briskly and efficiently away as would befit a cabinet minister of the South African regime.

It will still take many years of slow and painful hard, grinding effort, to achieve the final victory, but that victory will be



**Black leader warns of unrest**

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Mr Fanyana Mazibuko, secretary of the Teachers' Action Committee, today warned of a possible recurrence of the student unrest of 1976.

Addressing the Black Sash conference in Hillbrow in what he described as "possibly my last public speech," Mr Mazibuko said for the past two days he had been subjected to "very irritating provocation by our dear Government."

The remark comes after police questioning of Mr Mazibuko and two colleagues from the TAC — its chairman, Mr Curtis Nkondo, and an executive member, Mr Lekgau Mathabathe.

Anger was building up again among black students, Mr Mazibuko said.

People had been fooled into believing that the black education system had been accepted, but he realised six weeks ago that this was not so.

"Black children are going to school because they have no option.

"But there comes a point when anger overtakes the wish to be educated.

"This is what happened in 1976," he said.

He called for a solution to the problems of land, franchise and freedom of movement to provide the basis for a solution to specific problems such as desegregation of schools.

Black children would begin to believe in change if they heard a clear statement of intent to remove the discrepancies between white and black education.

A revolution in attitudes was needed to prevent other kinds of revolution, Mr Mazibuko said.

It was up to whites to effect this counter-revolution.

This would stop even the most radical of blacks and make them say: "I have been overtaken by this revolution and must join it."

● Page 2: Leaders fear new crackdown.

● Page 23: Sense of doom.



# Black leader warns of unrest

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● Page 2: Leaders fear new crackdown.

● Page 23: Sense of doom.



# Mazibuko cautions on more unrest

# WARMING

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## 'Anger building up among students'

had been subjected to "every irritating provocation by our dear Government".

The remark follows police questioning of Mr Mazibuko and two colleagues from the TAC, the chairman, Mr Curtis Nkondo, and executive member, Mr Legau Matabathe.

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again among black students, Mr Mazibuko said. People had been fooled into believing that the black education system had been accepted, but he realised six weeks ago that this was not so.

"Black children are going to school because they have no option. But there comes a point when anger overtakes the wish to be educated. This is what happened in 1976," he said.

Once again it seemed as if the Government

wanted to "lock up" the people they should be talking to, preferring to speak to people who would tell them the things they wanted to hear.

Mr Mazibuko said he believed the Government was trying to "buy time", a very dangerous thing to do.

If those in power listen to people they saw as "rabble-rousers and agitators" they would realise that things like the removal of the Mixed Marriages Act were not top priorities.



### Mazibuko . . . call for a solution. Problems

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## BLACK SASH CONFERENCE

# '1976 echoes are getting even louder'

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By RIAAN DE VILLIERS  
Labour Correspondent.

A BLACK educationalist warned yesterday that black anger was building up again and that the events of 1976 could repeat themselves.

The warning came in an address to the national conference of the Black Sash by Mr Fanya Mazibuko, director of finance of Sached Trust and secretary of the Teachers' Action Committee.

In 1976, black teachers had tried to make the Government aware of the problems in black education but their memorandums were ignored, he said.

"Anger is beginning to build up again. I was even fooled into believing for some time that black people had accepted black education — but 6 weeks ago I realised that this was not so."

The anger was still there. Black children were going to school because they had no option but there came a point when anger overtook the wish to get educated.

This had happened in 1976, he said.

It seemed as if the Government's attitude once again favoured locking up the people it should be talking to, and talking to the people

from whom they would hear what they wanted to hear.

He believed people at the top were trying to buy time — which was very dangerous. "Let those who are in power listen to those black people always seen as rabble-rousers and agitators."

The Government should give them a hearing and determine what their priorities were.

The problems in South Africa would not be solved until the problems of land, franchise and freedom of movement were solved.

He added he would like to see a "revolution of attitudes" which would prevent "other kinds of revolution".

Referring to questioning by Security Police earlier this week, Mr Mazibuko said he had been subjected to "very irritating" provocation.

"I have a strong suspicion the talk I am giving now might be my last public speech."

© The conference called on the Government to introduce as rapidly as possible one system of free and compulsory education for all South Africans.

In a resolution, the organisation also gave notice that working towards this objective would be one of its main aims this year.



# Afrikaans and the Cillie report

DD  
17/3/80

(274)



My article, Unfair for Black Pupils, in a Johannesburg newspaper in 1975, anticipated the disturbances in Soweto and elsewhere of June, 1976. Three and a half years later the Cillie report on this tragedy confirms my implied warning.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the report, a model of impartial statement of facts on a highly emotional subject is available only in Afrikaans at this stage. But the translations available in the English press are, as always, completely reliable and those who cannot afford the full report, or whose command of Afrikaans prevents them reading it easily, can still be aware of the serious implications of this 1 200 page document — which might prove more important even than the Tomlinson or Theron reports.

The Cillie report may

give the impression, which I think would be inaccurate, that black pupils in black high schools, before 1976 and now, disliked, even hated Afrikaans — as a language per se. But they and the black community realised then, and do so today, that a knowledge of Afrikaans, and the ability to use it efficiently was, and still is, imperative for everybody living in South Africa — just as a knowledge and ability to know and use English is imperative, largely because it is a world language.

Unfortunately, black high school pupils in white urban areas were, until the tragedy of June, 1976, the only ones compelled to use Afrikaans and English as the medium of instruction and learning. White, Asians, Coloureds and Black pupils in rural areas, all enjoyed the privilege (?) of having only one language as their

medium of instruction and learning.

It was this discrimination which aroused such resentment among black high school urban pupils

## J. L. Omond: Port Elizabeth

and so laid the way for agitators to use this fuse to start the riots of 1976.

Incidentally, such disturbances were nothing new to the Eastern Province. In 1955 a boycott of black schools in protest against the then new Bantu Education Act of 1954, and the arson of 1960, resulting in the destruction of 60 classrooms in the Port Elizabeth/Cape Town circuit, caused much suffering and unnecessary loss of life and property.

The experiment, the dual medium system, of using English and

Afrikaans as the medium of instruction had been used in the Cape Province for a short time, but it was quickly and quietly dropped when it was found to be very inefficient


The problems facing the black teachers and pupils in the black urban high schools, were lack of fluency in Afrikaans and having to change the medium of instruction so often during the day. A teacher and his class, for example, might start the day at 8 a.m. with a period of mathematics in English. At 8.40 the teacher and his class might then have to teach and learn geography in Afrikaans. At 10.20 they would be faced with another change of language when the timetable required science to be learnt in English.

As neither teacher nor pupils had sufficient command of the two official

languages to bring efficiency, a change in the medium of instruction for teacher which can easily be imagined.

This inefficient and teaching, in waste of tax money, resulted in a cleverly obtained symbol and/or in the matric and examinations with only one language medium of instruction the three or four language subjects might have obtained an "A" symbol.

Similarly a class pass would be an ordinary average pupil who have just scraped (the great majority of pupils in many schools failed. This pass course, was re-



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each class from Std, 6, Form 1, upwards and during the monthly, quarterly and end of the year promotion examinations, finally leading to the "promised land" of matric.

It was this perhaps unconscious, and for parents and teachers and brighter pupils, conscious realisation that this detested system, applicable only to urban high school black pupils, led to more pupils obtaining lower marks than they should have obtained under a fairer system and to more pupils failing than they would otherwise have done, that was one of the causes of the resentment which eventually led to the riots of 1976.

It was not a dislike of Afrikaans per se, but of the refusal of the Department of Bantu Education to allow urban black high schools to use only one official language as the

medium of instruction, which caused such resentment.

Most black people — and children are also people — realised the economic and social necessity of being as fluent as possible in both English and Afrikaans for all black people, as they would have been handicapped if only one official language had been taught in schools.

Many teachers and pupils obtained a liking and appreciation of the beauty of Afrikaans as a language, as of course they had for English and their own language.

Allowing the community to decide which official language should be the medium of instruction and learning in black urban high schools, and so removing that discrimination against the black urban pupils, older and more politically conscious than their white counter-

parts, should have helped to restore a measure of sanity to the people who felt so strongly against this educational error — some might regard it as educational stupidity. But as Voltaire wrote "Against stupidity the very Gods struggle in vain."

The problem now facing the authorities, both black and white, is to provide a system of education for the black people which they would like for their children and which will be based on sound educational principles, and which will be financed on a much more equitable basis than is the case at present. Failure to do this will only lead to more resentment and more disturbances.

The admirable Cillie report in its presentation of perhaps unpalatable facts implies, if it was unable to recommend, what should be done now — not in the distant future.



cures: 4/21

early four years after the Soweto riots, the South African students who fled to neighbouring Botswana are embroiled in confrontation again.

Yesterday they defied a government order to move to Dukwe resettlement camp in northern Botswana.

Hours later, the Botswana government responded with a warning broadcast in the evening news bulletins that they would today have a "second chance" to report for transportation to Dukwe.

### Vulnerable

A rumoured demonstration did not materialise yesterday but neither did any of the nearly 500 South Africans who have sought sanctuary here.

The former students of Soweto and Alexandra comprise many and varied factions but they are united in their reluctance to go to Dukwe.

They say that once collected in a static camp they will be vulnerable to attack by South African security forces.

The Botswana government has assured them: "We will look after your defence."

But it didn't explain how.

At the heart of their unwillingness to move is the fact that Dukwe is a rural settlement designed to become a long-term home of black Rhodesians who have, however, gone

# Riot refugees

# in confrontation with Botswana

STAB 18/3/80

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377

caftan-clad young men who appealed to an official of the conservative Botswana government to call off the refugee shift in the name of black brotherhood and the "fight against the white racists"

### Sellout

Some see themselves to the left of the ANC, which they condemn as a "sellout organisation and tool of white racism."

There are those who have been offered scholarships in countries such as Nigeria, India or Spain and who turned them down in the hope of better options from Britain, America or West Germany.

In general, the feeling is now one of passive resistance.

They say that if an attempt is made to hound them up, they will melt into the townships of Gaborone.

### Warning

Some warn darkly that "they have never seen South Africans riot" but most are aware that far from having a sympathetic local population to back them up, South African students here are likely to be roughly used if they come into confrontation with the police.

The Government has warned that the South Africans' refugee status has run out, along with their R30 a month allowance.

The gloomiest fear among the young men now is whether they will find themselves faced with a choice between Dukwe or Zeerust.

Congress are accepted by the other Frontline states and by the OAU, the BCM has perhaps its strongest external membership in Botswana.

The BCM is largely out on its own.

### Mistrust

Some of its members here see themselves in a broad front with other organisations such as the PAC and the ANC but others, mistrust the ANC for its alliance with the Communist Party.

The movement also lacks political organisation and its members here fear they will not get any support once they are out of the capital.

In this political hotchpotch of exiles are Trotskyites and Maoists.

And there are oldtime Pan Africanists like the

The students who fled Soweto four years ago now defy the Botswana Government.

BRENDAN NICHOLSON of The Star's Africa News Service reports from Gaborone.



home with the end of the war.

Most of the South Africans are thoroughly urbanised young men who see little future in growing their own meales.

### Laugh

The Botswana government says it is its policy to give the refugees an opportunity to become self-sufficient.

The refugees say Dukwe was designed for rural people — which they are not.

Some actually laugh at the prospect of growing their own food.

Basically, those South African refugees still here are the ones who have not yet gone abroad for higher education or guerrilla training.

Of several thousand students who crossed the bor-

der after the June 1976 riots, barely 20 percent claimed allegiance to the African National Congress.

Most of those left belong to the relatively young Black Consciousness Movement, the organisation that faces possible disintegration if a wholesale move to Dukwe goes ahead.

While other organisations such as the ANC and the Pan Africanist

### Training

At this point, however, an estimated 70 percent of those to come over so far have joined the ANC.

They have left the country for guerrilla training in Angola or Tanzania.

STAB 18/3/80







# Violence by black youths

N M 16/1/80

## Bank, shops, cars burnt

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POLICE chiefs and city councils throughout Britain have had an 'It must never happen again' call from Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw. He was appalled at the explosion of violence by black youths in the normally tranquil city of Bristol.

He was even more aghast at the withdrawal of police protection from the riot area for four hours during which the rampaging youngsters burned a bank, shops and half a dozen police cars.

The Chief Constable of the counties of Avon and Somerset, in which Bristol lies, has been heavily criticised for his decision to pull out his men to regroup while reinforcements were called in from neighbouring towns.

He was in a cannot-win situation.

Had he left his officers in the riot zone and some had been killed, as he feared they would be, Mr Brian Weigh (who only got the job last September) would have faced rockets all round.

Leaving the young thugs to wreck and pillage equally earned him a howl of disbelief from the British Press that innocent citizens — one of Fleet Street's favourite phrases — should have been left unprotected. True it has never happened before in such a concentrated area.

But the events in Bristol have brought the country face to face with the realisation that times have changed from the good old days of the Bobby

on the beat who could be relied upon to break up a crowd with a quiet 'Move along there' before the agro exploded into action.

How swiftly and deeply the lessons of Bristol have been learned by both the opposing sides — the aggressive, often unemployed youngsters even more quickly than some policemen — was shown within days.

### Loot

In London's Finsbury Park a mob of 200 youngsters attacked police with stones and bottles.

Many of them chanted 'Bristol...Bristol' at the officers baiting them as well as belting them.

Again there was the new development, for Britain, of looting.

An Asian shop owner, Ashok Patel, claimed he had lost goods worth some R15 000.

Frankly, Whitelaw's 'It must never happen again' is a bit of pious hoping.

The thugs, as many whites as blacks when one looks at the whole country, have got the message.

The police are unarmed, apart from truncheons

### Splash

If they use these with any real strength you can guarantee that the newspapers and TV will splash big pictures of police beating unarmed youngsters. Liberal and Socialist MPs will be on their feet at Westminster making the most of what they would call 'the Government's failure to maintain law and order'.

Mrs Thatcher's ministers face some tough decisions. Can they hope to restore respect for the law in the shape of the police on the streets?

After Bristol a big question mark hangs over this one. Bear in mind that the West Country city was regarded as having almost exemplary race relations.

London has a record of far worse ghetto areas as do such cities as Birmingham, Coventry, Liverpool, Glasgow, Manchester and the rest.

The long-term invasion

of West Indians into Britain left scarcely a city or town of any size without serious race relations problems.

The trick is for the photographer to place himself close up to, and behind, a policeman with his albatross straining at the leash to get at rioters some yards away.

Those of us who have felt anger every time South African police have been pictured in British newspapers as menacing a rioting mob with dogs, noted that the British police got exactly the same treatment at Bristol.

### Loom

When the picture appears in the papers, or on the TV screens the constable and dog loom large in the foreground and the attackers relatively small and helpless in the background.

At the same time, it has to be faced that relations between police and public in Britain have seldom been at a lower ebb.

This is not just a matter of areas largely inhabited by blacks. The problem is almost as acute in the whole country which is overwhelmingly white.

Why should this be so?

One outstanding reason has been the steady run-down of the numbers of policemen on foot patrol almost to the point of total disappearance.

For a time they were replaced by men on lightweight motorcycles who could cover a wider area. As police pay fell, in relation to other occupations, and recruiting dropped, even these disappeared.

In an effort to provide protection for the public, a network of police cars controlled by radio and able to dash to scenes of trouble was introduced and still operates.

But what all this means is that the old, friendly Bobby has vanished.

More significantly, in his place the police are seen almost only when a squad car roars up in re-

sponse to an emergency call.

The men are total strangers, more often than not, in the area. They have no relationship with the local public. And they have changed in character and methods of action from the old, friendly Bobby.

Many of them appear, at any rate, to the victims of robbery and violence as having little concern for them as human beings.

This may well be due to the pressure under which the modern policeman works. His hours are long and his pay still not adequate compared with those he is called upon to protect.

And he is an unprotected target for violence.

### Booking

In addition, the same coppers in the same uniforms are the men who almost every hour of the day are booking motorists for traffic offences.

This means that there are thousands and thousands of otherwise law-abiding members of the public who feel aggrieved at the men in blue.

A lawyer warned a friend of mine recently that the courts convict more than 90 percent of drivers on the evidence of a single constable. 'Don't waste time and money fighting your case' said the legal eagle.

Now add to all this that you are one of the young non-whites most of them born in this country of West Indian parents who immigrated here, out of work or able to get only a low-paid job.

The police, as in the St Paul's district of Bristol, close up — quite rightly — the illegal drink and drug dens where such a youngster drifts into for escape from reality of life 1980-style.

He is left only the street. And trouble.

Father Keith Kimber, a long-haired and bearded young Welsh priest, who holds great sway among the racially mixed youngsters of St Paul's and leads a team ministry there — he is Anglo-Catholic — said

### Rejects

'The problem is not a racial one. Rather it is a case of young people rising up against authority. They want a place where they can smoke dope and drink when they want to and not just when the law says they can. It is a cultural problem. We have to find a way of fitting people, with a long tradition of noisy all-night parties and loud music, into a society that basically rejects that sort of thing.'

Does that sound familiar to you out there?

So-called Darkest Africa has little on the modern jungle of city life in Britain today. Perhaps guns are closer to hand south of the Equator than in this northern isle.

But how long before all British police are armed? Many already regularly carry guns. Almost all are getting training in marksmanship.



80 19/4/80

# Rand pupils join boycott

(257) (52) (274) (50)

CAPE TOWN — The Coloured school boycott yesterday spread to the Transvaal where 2 000 pupils marched with placards protesting against discrimination in education and conditions in their schools.

And in the Western Cape, where the boycott started, protesting pupils swelled to 25 000 as new schools joined the boycott.

Pupils from three Johannesburg high schools marched with placards chanting: "We want freedom." Some placards read: "Education is the key to liberation," "We want a fair deal for our teachers" and "away with ministerial consent."

Students said the strike was not over. They would not end the strike until they "achieved their rights."

The pupils said they were protesting against unequal pay for teachers; poor and inadequate facilities, and the inequality between white and Coloured education.

However, the chief inspector for Coloured schools in the Johannesburg region, Mr A. M. Muller, said yesterday: "They haven't got any specific complaints.

Not one of them can isolate what they say are problems at the schools."

Mr Muller asked the police to withdraw to avoid incidents. The police earlier blocked off students from Westbury who tried to join the march.

Mr Muller invited students to put their grievances in writing and to submit it through representative councils to their school principals.

In Cape Town, the protesters marched in the drizzling rain, two or three abreast, chanting in unison "Students unite" and "Down with racial education."

There was no police activity apart from the occasional car of Security Branch policemen parked outside school gates.

A crucial meeting of representatives from all Cape Town schools and educational institution will be held this morning to decide whether a mass boycott of classes should be called for next week.

The only Indian school in Cape Town, Rylands High School, joined the boycott yesterday "in solidarity with other black students" and the University of Cape Town SRC pledged solidarity and called for an "identical education for all South Africans" in an "egalitarian society"

Meanwhile, there was varied reaction to the growing boycott.

Speaking during the second reading of the budget debate in Parliament, the Minister of Coloured Relations, Mr Marais Steyn said the children were being en-

couraged by untrue propaganda.

He accused opposition politicians of doing nothing to tell Coloureds what was being done for their education and opposition newspapers of aggravating the situation with exaggerated reports.

He accused Mr Curtis Nkondo, chairman of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee and former president of the Azanian People's Organisation, of "coming from the Transvaal to incite people here in the Cape."

The poet and playwright, Adam Small, yesterday identified with the students.

Blacks and their children hated apartheid, he said.

"We hate it because it breeds inferiority. Our children don't want to be 'Coloureds.' They want to be South Africans."

He said Mr Steyn was "talking through his nose" when he blamed "agitators."

"I also find his attitude Mr Nkondo distasteful. We welcome Mr Nkondo's expression of solidarity with our children, who are obviously black, in so far as they also are excluded from the privileges of whiteness and white education." — DDC-SAPA.



# The Argus

APRIL 21 1980

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## Boycott goes deep

IF there are indeed outside forces surreptitiously promoting the coloured schools boycott, as Government spokesmen have alleged, then the country has cause for concern. But the concern should be tempered by a realistic appraisal of the situation.

Boycotts on the scale we now have in the Western Cape do not happen in a vacuum. Outside agitators need fertile soil in which to sow discontent and it is doubtful whether they could succeed were there not already a deep inclination towards protest in the coloured community.

As the Cillie Commission's report on the 1976 disturbances has shown, Government race policy was the fundamental cause of the violence which shocked the country at that time and it would be

an act of colossal self-delusion to believe that enough has been done in the four years since then to remove the root causes of the trouble.

And just as the 1976 complaints about the use of Afrikaans in black schools obscured what the Cillie Commission later identified as a more complex problem, so the reasons being given by pupils for the present boycott plainly conceal a more profound sense of grievance in the coloured community.

It is too easy to blame outside agitators. The boycott campaign illustrates with compelling urgency the need for bold and effective action to back up the mood of change created by the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha.



DD 22/4/80

# Coloured school boycott spreads

(257) (274) (52) (50)

JOHANNESBURG — The school boycott continued to gain impetus yesterday with reports estimating that more than 100 000 pupils in the Western Cape and the Transvaal have joined the strike which is expected to continue all week.

The stay-away also spread to Natal and the Free State.

About 5 000 of the demonstrators were from schools here and the demonstrations spread to schools on the Reef and Pretoria, as well as higher education centres.

Police said the demonstrators were apparently intent on getting into the city to stage a demonstration at the Department of Coloured Affairs.

Thousands of pupils in the Cape Peninsula were boycotting their classes yesterday in response to Friday's meeting at Athlone at which representatives from more than 60 schools decided on a boycott until Friday unless their grievances are met.

The demonstrations in the Cape and Transvaal were reported to be

peaceful. The only reported action by the police in Johannesburg was the confiscation of a few posters in a march at Eldorado Park.

The demonstrations spread to higher education centres — yesterday's demonstrations included one at the Rand College of Education where student teachers demonstrated along the Soweto highway.

Students at the University of the Western Cape and the Peninsula Technikon in Belville South yesterday held meetings to decide on what action they should take later this week.

The boycott spread to outlying areas in the Cape. In Stellenbosch, students marched with placards denouncing the education system.

Students at the Hewat Training College in Crawford in the Cape decided at a mass meeting to support the demands of the pupils by boycotting classes.

All practice teaching at the college was cancelled.

The Bechet Training College in Durban was

closed yesterday when students did not turn up for classes in sympathy with demonstrators elsewhere in the country.

There was no demonstration and they simply stayed away from classes.

In Bloemfontein, pupils protested with placards calling for better sports facilities and other amenities.

The principal, Mr P. R. Murison dismissed classes yesterday and said the school would reopen today.

In the Assembly, Mr Colin Eglin, opposition spokesman on Coloured Affairs, called on the Prime Minister yesterday to intervene to end the boycott.

He made the call shortly after the Minister of Coloured Relations, Mr Marais Steyn, restated his view yesterday that the school stayaway was a result of "outside agitation."

Mr Steyn conceded that there were problems facing Coloured education but added: "It is a situation we inherited, and it will take us a generation to catch up." — SAPA-DDC.



# Burnett education call

CAPE TOWN — South Africa had more money than it "dared to think possible" which could be used to improve black education, the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, the Rev Bill Burnett, said in a statement here yesterday

"The government has a unique opportunity to dramatically demonstrate its determination to achieve a peaceful and acceptable future for all our people by taking

radical steps to narrow and then eliminate the expenditure gap between white and black education.

"Let them take it and give us all a much needed sign of hope"

"This nation has now more money at its disposal than we ever dared to think possible. Good sense and justice must encourage us to take full advantage of that to begin to transform the facilities and salaries in black schools.

"The schools' boycott of the Cape Flats and elsewhere should not be seen as the irritating work of tiresome agitators. When the gap between expenditure on white and black education is so scandalously wide, there is a need for consciences to be stured

"We are witnessing the understandable refusal of young black people to accept the maldistribution of opportunity among white and black through education.

"They are saying that with the future that stretches out before them,



ARCHBISHOP BURNETT

they are not prepared to submit to this and other inequalities of apartheid society

"Can white South Africans really expect them to enjoy being discriminated against?"

"At the same time, the students will surely best forward their cause by continuing to exercise discipline and restraint

"Let neither state nor students provoke one another to violence", the archbishop said. — SAPA.







# The Argus

APRIL 23 1980

## The real demand

IT is common cause that the schools' boycott goes far beyond the issue of inadequate education.

The unhappy situation in schools round the country is another manifestation of the anger felt by the coloured community at their general status in the land of their birth. It can be seen as a demand by young South Africans for political equality. For without this there can be no guarantee of full rights in education, in jobs or anything else.

No matter how good a 'separate' education may be, it will always be suspect if the system is imposed. Nationalist Afrikaners should understand this well enough.

On the immediate question of

education, the Government's response should not be a display of muscle and a threat to close down schools, but a clear and visible undertaking to put matters right in a system that is inferior to what the children are entitled to.

Up to yesterday the protest was confined to school grounds. We hope it returns to the campuses and that serious confrontation with the police and involvement with other sections of the community can be avoided.

The boycotters have succeeded in bringing their cause to the Government's attention. It is the tragedy of this land that the Government seems only to respond to grievances when under pressure of one kind or another.



# RESTORE ORDER, THEN WE TALK — STEYN

Argus 24/4/80

(52)

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(274)

Political Correspondent

THE Minister of Coloured Relations, Mr S J M Steyn, said today the Government was willing to give attention to the grievances of striking coloured schoolchildren, provided order was restored at the schools first.

About 2000 parents from the Bellville South area last night expressed their total solidarity with the action of students in calling for non-racial education and the students' demands.

The meeting, in the Bellville South Civic Centre, was called by students of the University of the Western Cape Technikon and the training college. Students and high school pupils explained their grievances to a packed audience.

Dr Alan Boesak, theologian of the Ned Geref

(Continued on Page 3, col 5)

Extensive preparations have been made by the police to ensure that order is maintained.

Action is also likely to be taken against people who are regarded as agitators.

● Meanwhile, there is growing support in the coloured and Indian community among parents, teachers and principals, for the boycott action of pupils against 'racial' and inferior education.

Several areas, including Ocean View, Bellville, Lotus River and Belhar, have held public meetings at which pupils and students have had the opportunity to explain their grievances to their parents.

Mr Steyn emphasised that he was serious in his call to coloured parents and teachers earlier this week to see to it that the children returned to school.

He said on Tuesday that the closing of schools would be considered within a week if order was not restored.

The attitude in Government circles is that an 'order situation' has arisen and that the children must return to their classes before there can be any consultation with them.

**Action likely**



(Continued from Page 1)

Sendinkerk and UWC university chaplain, appeared to the audience to make it clear to the Government that the allegation that children and parents were going 'different ways' on the issue was unfounded.

Dr Boesak said today he was 'surprised and deeply moved by the incredible response of parents who were unanimous in their support for the action of students.'

Emphasising that the Government should treat education as matter of urgency, the meeting declared its full solidarity with the actions of students and their confidence in the students.

They rejected 'the political system which resulted in this intolerable situation.'

The meeting expressed its full support with the student demands for non-racial education and an improvement of conditions at schools.

#### MASS MEETING

Earlier this week, at a mass meeting in the Lotus River and Grassy Park area attended by 700 people, parents and teachers came out in support of the action by the pupils and called for a free-democratic, non-racial system of compulsory education.

Further meetings are being held tonight in Mitchell's Plain and in Silvertown, Athlone.

'I and most parents feel that the children are working in the right direction,' one parent who did not want to be named told The Argus.

He said that although some parents were not fully informed about their children's grievances, most were behind the boycott.

The issue went far deeper than broken win-

dow panes and a shortage of textbooks. It had to do with tribal, inferior education and a demand for a free, equal and compulsory education system 'which we used to get in my days at school,' he said.

The parent said some sections of the media — and especially the television and radio — had discussed the boycott, as though it was happening only in coloured schools.

He emphasised that Indian pupils and parents were in full support of what was happening. 'It is a united black struggle and we as parents owe our support in the fight against, not only education, but against the whole system as such,' he said.

#### IN SUPPORT

Both the Cape Teachers' Professional Association and the Athlone District Principals' Association, representing 70 heads of schools, have come out in support of the 'grievances of pupils and students.'

A statement issued by the principals said they identified with the 'basic grievances of the students and strongly urged' the authorities to defuse the situation by 'making a statement indicating when positive action would be taken to eliminate the underlying cause of the present situation.'


● It is reported from Kimberley that the boycott of classes by 3500 coloured senior secondary pupils and student teachers continued today.

School committees, which represent the parents at these schools, have been asked by the Administrator for their views on the matter.



24/4/80  
742

**PUPILS** at the Laudium High School near Pretoria joined the boycott of classes today and gathered on the school's sports fields singing freedom songs. A spokesman said they had joined the boycott as a mark of solidarity with other coloured and Indian high school pupils.



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# Police crack

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## POLITICAL STAFF

AS PROTESTS against unequal education continued to mount yesterday, trouble flared when police baton-charged three groups of demonstrators in Johannesburg coloured townships and used tear-gas to disperse students in Wentworth, Durban.

Police said stones were thrown at them at a school in Eldorado Park, Johannesburg, after one of the baton charges, in which tear-gas was also used.

The education boycotts spread to Indian schools and colleges in Johannesburg and Durban, while about 1 000 students at the University of the Witwatersrand voted to stay away from lectures in solidarity today.

### NOTE CAREFULLY

1. Enter at the top of the block on the question you are answering.
2. Blue or black ink answers. The use of red or green ink is not acceptable. Red or green underlining, emphasis or italics which pencil may also be used.
3. Names must be printed in blue or black ink (e.g. graph paper) in the examination book(s).
4. Do not write in the left margin.

Any dishonesty will result in

police used tear-gas and baton-charged pupils protesting in Eldorado Park and Klenburg.

The Divisional Commissioner of Police for Soweto, Brigadier Kobus Hamman, said about 500 pupils gathered on a soccer field in Eldorado Park, but that they refused to disperse after being ordered to do so.

"Three tear-gas canisters were fired and five black constables armed with batons moved in. The students scattered and returned to school," he added. "It is denied claims that a shot was first fired into the

But Hamman said that after the pupils returned to the Eldorado Park Senior Secondary School, they threw stones at policemen keeping watch outside.

An adult at the scene claimed "skollies", not pupils, were responsible for the stone-throwing.

Coloured community leaders condemned the police action, but appealed for calm.

Police said claims that some pupils were struck with batons while they were on the ground would be looked into.

In other incidents police intercepted and baton-charged about 500 Indian pupils marching along East Road. The pupils scattered and returned to school.

Five black constables armed with batons were sent in to break up a match along the Fickett stream-Jongensburg road by 200 Rev. Entero pupils on their way to Eldorado Park. The pupils dispersed after a tear-gas salvo.

Police used tear-gas in Durban to disperse coloured pupils marching to the City Hall.

### WARNING

1. No books, notes, material may be brought unless candidates are allowed to bring their own.
2. Candidates are not allowed to bring candidates or with a calculator.
3. No part of an answer may be written on the examination paper.
4. All answer books must be handed in to the invigilator or to an invigilator.

disqualification and to possible exclusion from the university



# Pupil demos mount and trouble flares

327 274 257 50 W.M. 24/4/80.

From Page 1

Placard-carrying pupils from Umbilo Road High gathered at the City Hall gardens, giving clenched-fist salutes. A group of 100 Wentworth High pupils marched to join about 1 000 Fairvale High pupils before proceeding to the City Hall, but police stepped in and dispersed them with teargas.

At an Indian girls' high school in Durban, the principal, Mrs S Poovalingam, asked five senior pupils to leave after they were found placing Press cuttings and placards about the boycott on the school notice-board.

Thousands of coloured pupils continued boycotts at other schools throughout the country, but no other incidents were reported.

In the Johannesburg Indian township of Lenasia, an estimated 2 000 of the 5 000 pupils at the four local high schools boycotted classes.

Uniformed police, riot police and Security Police kept watch outside the M H Joosub Technical High, where about 650 pupils chanted "Amandla" (power) and slogans calling for equal education and equal rights.

Lenasia pupils also issued a pamphlet outlining grievances and demands.

Students at the Indian Transvaal College of Education in Fordsburg, Johannesburg, decided at a campus meeting to boycott lectures today.

Indian stayaways were also reported from the Orient High and the Springfield Training College in Durban, while most students at the University of

Durban-Westville and the black section of the University of Natal medical school continued boycotting lectures.

A student mass meeting at the University of the Witwatersrand also resolved to stage a solidarity "sit-in" and called on the university administration and "sympathetic" lecturers to cancel lectures today.

The students were addressed by Mr Curtis Nkondo, chairman of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee and suspended president of the Azanian Peoples' Organisation, and Miss Brenda Liebowitz, a white teacher recently dismissed from her post at a coloured school.

Wits is the second "white" university to decide on a boycott. The University of Natal Students' Representative Council has called on students to stay away from lectures until tomorrow.

Meanwhile, organisations representing teachers and principals in the Cape endorsed the boycott. They are the 13 000-strong Cape Professional Teachers' Association and the Athlone District Principals' Association.

Both groups called on the Government not to carry out its threat to close schools. Statements from a wide cross-section of the black community underlined the fact that shutting schools would not eradicate the basic cause of discon-

tent — "inferior education".

Dr Alan Boesak, chaplain at the coloured University of the Western Cape, described the closure threat as a "very weak response to a very serious situation".

Professor Jakes Gerwel, professor of Afrikaans-Nederlands at the university, said the "foolhardy decision would only add extra sparks to a very explosive situation".

The leader of the coloured Labour Party, the Rev Allan Hendrickse, described Mr Steyn's threat as "irresponsible" and "arrogant".

A former Cape Town city councillor, Mr Dawood Khan, called on Mr Steyn to resign. Mr Khan took exception to Mr Steyn's claim that Indian pupils in Rylands had joined the boycott because agitators forced them to do so.

The general secretary of the SA Council of Churches, Bishop Desmond Tutu, this week sent telegrams to Mr Steyn and the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, requesting urgent attention to the "threatening situation regarding so-called coloured schooling".

In Johannesburg, the director of the SA Institute of Race Relations, Mr John Rees, expressed concern over Mr Steyn's attitude. The Institute said agitation as alleged by Mr Steyn was only effective when there was gross dissatisfaction.

Mr Rees quoted statistics as proof of "the inherently discriminatory education system".

Editorial Comment  
— Page 8



# Teargas fired as police halt pupil demos

327 274 257  
ADM 24/4/80

Staff Reporter

POLICE fired teargas and baton-charged three groups of coloured schoolchildren in Eldorado Park and Kiptown yesterday morning.

And pupils were reported to have attacked police for the first time in the four-day schools boycott yesterday, when they threw stones at police outside the Eldorado Park Senior Secondary School.

The principal, Mr M Jacobs, said about 500 pupils had gathered on a soccer field near the school at about 8.30am yesterday when police arrived.

This was confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner of Police for Soweto, Brigadier Kobus Hamman, who said the pupils refused to disperse when ordered to do so.

"Three teargas canisters were fired and five black constables armed with batons moved in. The pupils scattered and returned to school," he said.

Witnesses claim a shot was first fired in the air, but Brig

Hamman denied this.

A pupil's mother — who does not want to be named — said she was on the field with the pupils when the police charged.

"I begged them to stop hitting the children, but they carried on hitting them even where they fell on the ground," she said.

A doctor had to be called to attend to four of the pupils at the school Yolanda Begbie, 17, was treated for severe bruising and a sprained ankle. Another unnamed girl allegedly suffered convulsions and shock.

Brig Hamman said the pupils later threw stones at police keeping watch outside.

One of a group of adults who spoke to pupils in front of the school told the Rand Daily Mail later that "skollies" had thrown the stones.

"We told them 'This is not your fight'," she said.

Police baton-charged about 300 pupils from Kiptown High School as they marched along East Road. The marchers scattered and returned to school.

Brig Hamman said a schools circuit inspector, Mr Willie Magardie, used a loudhailer to try and persuade both groups to return to school, but in vain.

Mr Mohamed Dangor, Coloured Management Committee member for Kiptown, said he watched as police baton-charged pupils.

In the third incident, about 200 Randfontein pupils were intercepted by police just outside Eldorado Park as they marched along the Johannesburg-Potchefstroom Road to join Eldorado Park pupils.

Six black constables, armed with batons, were sent in to break up the march. Three teargas canisters were then fired, and the pupils dispersed.

Pupils at most other schools staged quiet meetings within the grounds and went home at 11am, according to a pre-arranged plan.

Brig Hamman said the claims by witnesses "may be possible" and he would investigate them today.



Some riot  
STAR 24/4/80  
compensation  
(274)  
awarded

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY  
— Payment of R108'396 in  
ex-gratia compensation to  
31 persons who suffered  
damages as a result of the  
riots in Soweto during the  
1976/77 unrest has been  
recommended by the  
Compensation Committee.

A list of names and  
particulars of the claim-  
ants were tabled in the  
Assembly today by the  
Minister of Justice, Mr  
Alwyn Schlebusch.

The biggest payments  
recommended by the com-  
mittee were those to a  
certain N Molefe  
(R15 000), S Dube  
(R15 000), R Molapo  
(R20 000), S J Mosia  
(R20 000), R Nkosi  
(R12 000) and M Ngubane  
(R10 000).

The list also gave the  
names of 52 claimants in  
respect of whom the com-  
pensation committee did  
not recommend the  
payment of ex gratia  
payments

One person, a certain L  
Kgang, had claimed  
R83 000, E M. Mthethwa  
(R80 500), S B Baron  
(R70 500), C Mphaki  
(R50 000), Z J Mfenyana  
(R45 000) and R Edelstein  
(R42 350).

There were also other  
lesser claims ranging from  
R22 000 down.

re called for, adhering  
at used for the data above,  
er, with short notes  
calculations. Both jobs  
being done or are likely

A revised budget (if you  
showing which job you (a)  
explaining your guiding  
would last 12 months; n  
to be offered.

Required:

- (b) Manual labour is hired locally from week to week.
- (d) All the plant needed for Southampton has been owned for some years. £1,600 is the year's depreciation (straight-line) in the financial accounts. If the Hull job is taken, less plant will be required, and the surplus items will be hired out for the year on similar work at a rental of £750. Interest is based on a memorandum entry, at 5% of original cost, in the cost records.
- (f) Office and general expenses amount to about £1,800 every year.



# List <sup>(274)</sup>

## details

## riot

## damage

## claims

THE ASSEMBLY. — Payment of R108 396 in ex-gratia compensation to 31 people who suffered damages as a result of the riots in Soweto during the 1976/77 unrest has been recommended by the compensation committee.

A list of the claimants was tabled in the Assembly yesterday by the Minister of Justice, Mr Alwyn Schibusch

The committee, under the chairmanship of the Judge President of South Africa, Mr Justice W. G. Boshoff, only considered claims for damages suffered in "riotous situations" during the period June 16, 1976 to March 16, 1977.

The biggest payments recommended by the committee were those to a certain N Molefe (R15 000), S Dube (R15 000), R Molapo (R20 000), S J Mosia (R20 000), R Nkosi (R12 000) and M Ngubane (R10 000).

The list also gave the names of 52 claims in which the committee did not recommend ex-gratia payments.

One person, L Kgang, had claimed R83 000, E M Mthethwa (R80 500) S B Baron (R70 500), C Mphaki (R50 000), Z J Mfenyana (R45 000) and R Edelstein (R42 350).

There were also other lesser claims ranging from R22 000 down.

The committee said that where persons were injured or killed as a result of their own participation in, or contribution to the riots, or by intentionally or wilfully exposing themselves to danger by moving into riot areas, the applications were not recommended.

Also listed are the names and particulars of claimants whose claims were based on damage to property and in respect of which the compensation committee has made no recommendations.

There were 67 claims in this category, the highest being R156 319 submitted by the Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Highveld Area.

A certain M. T. Rambau had claimed R115 000.

Mmesini (R104 000) and Sitshongaye (R80 000). The other claims ranged from R44 000 down.

In assessing the amounts payable the committee bore in mind that:

- Because of the subjective nature of pain and suffering, injured persons are apt to exaggerate;
- The courts had accepted in principle that compensation for general damages should be assessed conservatively and
- The amounts to be assessed were for ex-gratia payment. — Sapa.



*Argus*

# Coloured solidarity

A FEATURE of the coloured schools boycott is the unprecedented solidarity shown by the coloured community behind the cause of the pupils, though there are differences about the methods of protest.

City and country schools alike have joined the boycott. The complaints of pupils have been supported openly by teachers and principals as much as by parents and politicians, churchmen and community leaders.

People of all income levels have spoken out and the protest has reached into universities and teachers' training colleges as it has into high schools in all parts of the country.

Solidarity on this scale does not show itself merely at the behest of outside agitators and to suggest that it does is to pro-

vocatively devalue the sentiment now prevailing in the coloured community. Clearly what is happening is symptomatic of a deep and pervasive unhappiness.

The Government should candidly face up to this manifestation of fellow feeling and recognise the urgent need for leadership and for a clear declaration of where it is heading in seeking to accommodate the broad aspirations of the coloured people.

Nobody suggests that educational inequities can be righted easily or immediately. But a statement from the Government proving that it grasps the full nature of coloured grievance and outlining a plan of action to alleviate it, would help defuse a tense situation. The children should be back in their classrooms and this is the way the Government could get them there.



## Argus 25/4/80 Schools

(Continued from Page 1)

ing college and several primary schools have come out in boycott. The Roggebaai Teachers' Training College in Cape Town decided today to stay away from classes from Monday, next week.

Primary schools in Bontheuvel, Surrey Estate and Bellville South have also decided to join the high schools' boycott.

### MEETINGS

At public meetings last night, from Ocean View to Stellenbosch and Paarl, parents and teachers expressed their solidarity and full support for the action of pupils throughout the country protesting against 'inferior education'.

Meetings were held in Stellenbosch, Athlone, Rylands Estate, Grassy Park, Parkwood, Ocean View, Mitchell's Plain, Kensington, Tiervlei and Hanover Park.

The black staff at the University of the Western Cape which has 137 members, have also expressed their support for the pupils' and students.

## Question 257 Argus 25/4/80 52 on closing 274 schools

COLOURED school committees throughout the country have been instructed by the Administration of Coloured Affairs to state by today whether they support the threatened close-down of schools in the face of continuing boycotts.

The Director of Coloured Education, Mr A J Arendse, was meeting the Minister of Coloured Relations, Mr Marais Steyn and was not available for comment earlier today.

Yesterday, however, he confirmed that school committees were asked about the advisability of closing schools if the boycotts continued.

Mr Arendse denied this had been done on instruction of Mr Steyn who earlier this week threatened to close coloured schools.

'We are merely asking parents to decide for themselves. Whatever they decide, we will carry out,' he said.

The Argus has been reliably informed that most school committees in the Peninsula have advised against the closure of schools.

In Maritzburg, the Haythorne High School committee unanimously decided that the closing down of schools 'could benefit nobody.'

The chairman of the school's hostel committee, Mr J A Lundall, said parents were against influencing their children to stop their boycotts 'because they are expressing exactly what coloured parents have been asking for years.'

### MORE BOYCOTTS

Support for the student action in the black community continues to grow as the boycott of classes becomes more widespread.

Another teachers' train-

{Continued on Page 3, col 2}



5052 25/4/80 274

# Roots of the school boycott

CAPE TOWN — Students and pupils all over South Africa have categorically rejected their education. The slogan "Down with inferior, racist education" is echoing through school and college halls throughout the country. The call for a free and equal education has been taken up by thousands of students over the last few days.

An investigation into some of the most common grievances — unqualified teachers, shortage of school books, inadequate, run-down school buildings — has shown there are grounds for concern.

The Minister of Coloured Relations disclosed in Parliament last year that only five per cent of all Coloured teachers have university degrees. Just over 62 per cent have themselves only been educated until Std 8, besides their teacher training.

In March, 1957, the Separate University Education Bill was introduced in the House of Assembly which eventually led to the establishment of separate facilities for all post-school education.

Many of today's teachers received their training at colleges and the University of the Western Cape, which were set up at the beginning of the sixties specifically to train Coloureds.

Despite recent assurances by the Minister that the number of teachers in

Coloured schools has increased from 14 871 to 25 146 in the past 10 years, there is still a marked disparity in the ratio of pupils to teachers.

In black schools, there is one teacher for 47.6 pupils, while in white schools the ratio is one teacher to 19 pupils. In Coloured schools, there is one teacher for every 29.6 pupils.

Underlying all is the gap between the amount the government spends on white and black children. For 1978, R551 on every white child and R185 on every Coloured child.

More recent figures were not made available by the Department of Coloured Relations. With white children receiving more than double the amount of Coloured children, there is some basis for complaint.

Tied to this is the shortage of classrooms at most Coloured schools. In response to a question in the House of Assembly in March this year, Mr Steyn said there was a backlog of 1 828 classrooms for Coloured pupils up to March 1979.

A teacher at a reasonably affluent Coloured school in Cape Town says three of four children have to share desks designed to hold two.

"This not only makes it difficult to give individual attention to pupils who

need it, but it also makes it virtually impossible to maintain discipline," she said.

In the 1979 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, it was reported that overcrowding was prevalent in Coloured schools throughout the country.

The survey gives the example of two schools in Kimberley which were forced

The qualifications of teachers as disclosed by the minister.

## PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED

WITH:	Number	Per Cent
A university degree	1 234	5.00
Matriculation or equivalent	6 418	26.01
JC or equivalent	15 339	62.16
Other qualifications	71	0.29
No professional qualifications but with university degree	147	0.60
Matriculation or equivalent	742	3.01
Technical or vocational qualifications	160	0.65
Less than matriculation	565	2.29

Estimated per capita expenditure during 1977-1978 on school pupils of the various racial groups was given in the Assembly:

Group	Average
White	R551
Coloured	R185.16
Asian	R236.13
Black	R 54.08

Pupil-teacher ratios for 1979 were calculated by the Institute of Race Relations using educational statistics supplied by the Department of Statistics. Ratios are for primary secondary and special classes:

White	1:19.6
Coloured	1:29.6
Asian	1:26.2
Africans	1:47.6
	— DDC.



# Teacher, students held

25/4/80 DD.

327 274

**JOHANNESBURG** — Security police have detained nine people, including students and a teacher. Yesterday a banned former executive member of the Black Peoples' Convention, Mr Vuyisile Mdeleleni, was detained. Seven of those being held are from the Western Cape. The other Transvaal detention was of Mr Curtis Nkondo, former president of the Azanian People's Organisation.

The others are: Mr Trevor Wentzel, a community worker in Lavistown and a member of Azapo; Mr Achmat Cassten, a banned former president of the SA Students' Association, Mr Michael Sedgwick, a youth organiser of the churches urban planning commission, Mr Allan Liebenberg, former president of the UWC Students'

Representative Council; Mr Neville Fry, a Schoonspruit teacher, Mr Lloyd Fortuin, and Mr Michael Crail, both students at the Joubert High School in Paarl. The acting chief of the Security Police, Brigadier Jan du Preez, confirmed the detentions.

A spokesman from police headquarters in Pretoria said last night they had launched an intensive, nationwide investigation into the schools boycott which has spread to almost every major centre in the country.

In East London, members of the John Bisseker Senior Secondary School Committee

were summoned to an urgent meeting last night on the instruction of the Port Elizabeth-based chief inspector of schools in the Eastern Cape, Mr D. Crawford, to discuss whether schools should be closed or not.

But a motion by Mr Peter Mopp that it was not in the committee's jurisdiction to discuss closure of the school was unanimously accepted.

The boycott by hundreds of Bisseker students continued yesterday and the only incident occurred when teachers had to dissuade hundreds of pupils from marching to town to hand in their grievances to the regional representative of

Coloured Affairs, Mr D. J. Dippenaar. The pupils were later addressed in the school grounds by the circuit inspector, Mr H. D. Sweeney, who urged them to return to their classes and warned them it was against the law to march without permission.

In Queenstown, large numbers of students at Maria Louw High School boycotted classes on Tuesday and Wednesday.

No incidents were reported but security police kept a close watch on the school. According to the headmaster, Mr E. P. Scheepers, most of the students were back at school yesterday. They

handed him a list of their grievances and said they would boycott classes again if these did not receive immediate attention.

In Grahamstown, all was quiet at Mary Waters School but a boycott of lectures was initiated at Rhodes University.

After working through the night preparing pamphlets, posters and a wall newspaper, more than 120 students gathered in the university quadrangle to demonstrate their solidarity with the boycott.

In Port Elizabeth, the boycott spread to Dower College and all senior secondary schools as well

as in Uitenhage, Humansdorp and Graaff-Reinet. The boycott focused on Durban yesterday where more than 30 schools, colleges and universities — at least 10 of them Indian — have joined in.

Police denied reports that they baton-charged about 500 Chatsworth pupils earlier yesterday.

Some pupils claimed they had been hit with batons. A police spokesman said teachers had complained pupils were obstructing them. "Police drew batons and walked towards a group of pupils who fled. We do not regard this as a charge."

On the Rand, fresh boycotts were reported. —DDR- DDC-SAPA.

Slabbert call for action, page 7  
Nash attacks Steyn, page 15







# More Indians and Whites join protest

50

387

274

ADM

25/4/80

## POLITICAL STAFF

**MOUNTING protests against unequal education spread to more coloured and Indian institutions and English-language white universities yesterday.**

And there were more allegations of baton charges, stonings, teargas salvos and questioning of students — most of them denied by police.

As the protest entered its scheduled final day today, fresh boycotts of classes were reported from coloured and Indian areas as far apart as Klerksdorp, Rodepoort, Laudium, Kimberley, Oudstroom, Potchefstroom, Maritzburg and Middelburg.

High-wings and protesters were involved in heated exchanges on university campuses, and a prominent anti-apartheid campaigner, Mrs Helen Joseph, 75, was pelted with eggs by a Rightwing contingent when she attended a meeting at the University of the Witwatersrand.

Only three police divisions — Northern Natal, Northern Free State and Northern Cape — have

not reported protests.

A spokesman for the Police Directorate of Public Relations said yesterday that generally the protests were peaceful and no arrests had been made.

But witnesses said police baton-charged and dispersed about 500 pupils from two high schools in Chatsworth, Durban, yesterday. This has been denied by police, but according to Sapa, parents and children reported that pupils at the two high schools were assaulted with batons after a number of girls were given five minutes to return to classes or go home.

According to one parent, most of the children left for home after the police charge.

Two pupils were said to have been taken for questioning and then released. A girl was reportedly taken to hospital and others were bruised and shocked after the incident.

A police spokesman denied there had been an incident in Klerksdorp in which police vehicles were stoned after a pupil was questioned. Pupils from both the coloured and Indian high schools in the town boycotted classes.

Protesters in different parts of the country said a number of pupils were taken in for questioning by police. However, the police spokesman could not confirm this, as no records of such questionings were kept.

Mrs Gonom Nacker of Chatsworth said police used batons, broken branches and stones to disperse a crowd of children who had gathered on one of the school grounds.

In other developments

Yesterday  
The Leader of the Opposition, Dr Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert, called on the Government to come forward with a new declaration of intent on issues affecting the black communities, then to determine who the effective leaders were and negotiate a new deal with them.

The general secretary of the SA Council of Churches, Bishop Desmond Tutu, warned the Government it could expect a repeat of the 1976 riots if it continued to treat the coloured schools issue with threats and detentions.

to Page 4








# 1976 riots: R108 396 compensation urged

**THE ASSEMBLY** — Payment of R108 396 in ex-gratia compensation to 31 persons who suffered damages as a result of the riots in Soweto during the 1976/77 unrest has been recommended by the Compensation Committee.


The Compensation Committee, under the chairmanship of the Judge President of South Africa, Mr Justice W. G. Boshoff, only considered claims for

damages suffered in riotous situations during the period June 16, 1976, to March 16, 1977.

The Compensation Committee says that where persons were injured or killed as a result of their own participation in, or contribution to the riots, or by intentionally or wilfully exposing themselves to danger by moving into riot areas, the applications were not recommended. — SAPA.



Volume of sales by chemists s Adj



Volume of furniture sales s Adj

Latest month Jan 86,9  
Seasonally adjusted 108,8  
% Changes Latest 3 months 11,8  
Year to date 17,4  
Compared to same period one year ago

Compared to same period one year ago  
-5,3  
-6,5



# R108 000 to be paid out in riot compensation

STAR  
25/4/80  
274

**THE ASSEMBLY** — A Compensation Committee has recommended ex-gratia payments totalling R108 000 to 31 people who suffered injuries and personal grief through actions of State employees in riots in Soweto and other townships.

In a report tabled in Parliament, the committee says in cases where the persons responsible were not State employees, payment was not recommended because these cases fell outside the scope of the Indemnity Act.

Amounts which the committee recommends should be paid out range from R80 to R20 000. In many cases the amounts

recommended are a small fraction of the amount claimed.

The committee, headed by Mr Justice W G Boshoff, Judge President of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, only considered claims for damages suffered in riots between June 16 1976 and March 16 1977.

Where people were injured or killed as a result of their own participation in the riots or intentionally or wilfully exposed themselves to danger, the applications were not recommended.

No recommendations were made concerning damage to property. A total

of 67 such claims were made to the committee.

It received 83 applications for compensation for injuries and personal grief.

In 31 cases the committee recommended the payment of ex-gratia compensation.

In assessing the amounts payable, the committee bore in mind that:

- "Because of the subjective nature of pain and suffering, injured persons are apt to exaggerate."

- "The courts have accepted in principle that compensation for general damages should be assessed conservatively."

- "The amounts to be assessed were for ex-gratia payment."



August 25/4/20

They are  
tired of  
inferior  
education

(274)

(257)

(25)

CONSIDERING this latest dissatisfaction among our non-white pupils and students, I feel that every parent should take the same stand as their children

These young people are tired of inferior education, and it is because of the will to learn and to better themselves that they are actually rebelling against the low standard of education which is being given to them.

Why must their education fall under the Department of Coloured Affairs?

Why not directly under the Department of Education, the same as the white schools?

And why separate syllabuses? Surely these children have the right to the same standard of education as their white counterparts

Is this the reason why our non-white school leavers cannot get jobs — inferior educational qualifications?

In other words is it, 'keep their standard of education down, and they'll never qualify for certain positions, which by right must be kept for our white children'

H R NETHLING  
Atlantis



# Payouts likely for victims

274

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY  
Payment of R108 396 in ex gratia compensation to 31 people who suffered damages as a result of the riots in Soweto during the 1976/77 unrest has been recommended by the compensation committee.

A list of names and particulars of the claimants were tabled in the Assembly yesterday by the Minister of Justice, Mr Alwyn Schabusch.

The compensation committee, under the chairmanship of the Judge President of South Africa, Mr Justice W. G. Boshoff, considered claims only for damages suffered in riotous situations during the period June 16, 1976 to March 10, 1977.

The biggest payments recommended by the compensation committee were those to N. Molefe (R15 000), S. Dube (R15 000), R. Molapo (R10 000), S. J. Mofia (R20 000), R. Nkosi (R12 000) and M. Ngubane (R10 000).

## No payment

The list tabled also gave the names of 52 claimants in respect of whom the compensation committee did not recommend ex gratia payments.

I. Kgang had claimed R83 000, E. M. Mthathwa, R80 500, S. B. Baron, R70 500, C. Mphahlele, R50 000, Z. J. Mfanyana, R45 000 and R. Edelstein, R42 330.

There were also other lesser claims ranging from R22 000 down.

The compensation committee says that where people were injured or killed as a result of their own participation in or contribution to the riots, or by intentionally or wilfully exposing themselves to danger by moving into riot areas, the applications were not recommended.

## Property

The list also contains the names and particulars of claimants whose claims were based on damage to property and in respect of which the compensation committee has made no recommendations.

There were 167 claims in this category, the highest being R156 310 submitted by the Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Highveld Area.

A certain M. P. Rambau had claimed R115 000, D. A. S. Mmesel had claimed R104 000 and I. T. Sitshongaye, R80 000. The other claims ranged from R44 000 down.

In assessing the amounts payable the committee bore in mind that:

• Because of the subjective nature of pain and suffering injured people are apt to exaggerate.

• The courts had accepted in principle that compensation for general damages should be assessed conservatively, and

• The amounts to be assessed were for ex gratia payment.

Sapa